

Somewhat later, I established a connection with RUKHIMOVICH. I contacted him through PYATAKOV.

PYATAKOV told me that RUKHIMOVICH was in a particularly conspiratorial position, as if a reserve, hidden deputy of PYATAKOV to direct the subversive work of the participants in the organization in industry.

RUKHIMOVICH, like GAMARNIK, were not formally part of our center, but in essence they were in the position of participants in this center, since they were closely connected with me, were aware of all our activities and informed me about their anti-Soviet activities.

Thus, the main core of our organization crystallized out, consisting of a small group of people (I - YAKOVLEV, VAREIKIS, BAUMAN, N. N. POPOV), who, in turn, through proven, limited contacts, maintained contact with other anti-Soviet organizations.

tions. Through VAREIKIS, I was connected with an anti-Soviet organization on the periphery; each of the participants I have named also had their own connections on the periphery. VAREIKIS led the organization, first in the Central Chernobyl region, and then in the Stalingrad region, the participants of which were right-wing Trotskyist elements who were in leading party and Soviet work, carried out extensive subversive work in the national economy of these regions and knocked together insurgent-terrorist cadres. I knew from VAREIKIS that the members of this anti-Soviet organization, headed by VAREIKIS in the Central Chernobyl region and in the Stalingrad region, were: FEDIN, secretary of the Kursk City Committee; IVANOV - Head of the Department of Party Personnel of the Regional Committee; RYABININ - Secretary of the Regional Committee; SHVER - newspaper editor; KAUCHUKOVSKY - director of the Komvuz; DRAPKIN - head of the prom. Department of the Regional Committee and others.

When VAREIKIS went to work in Stalingrad, he managed to drag the main core of the organization's participants from the above-mentioned persons from the Central Chernobyl Region there and, in addition, draw in some new people - GOLDIN, KUZNETSOV, KVITNITSKY (head of the agricultural department of the Regional Committee), NERSESYAN (head ONO) and a number of other persons who were in personal contact with VAREIKIS.

In addition, through VAREIKIS-BAUMAN, we were connected with a group of right-wingers in Moscow - KAMINSKY, BUBNOV; with the Antipovsko-Sulimovskaya group, which was the new center of the right underground (which led approximately the same line in the Central Committee as I did); on the periphery with the leading workers of the regional and regional party organizations - rightists and Trotskyists who headed anti-Soviet organizations, Sheboldaev, Khataevich, Kabakov, Ivanov, Lavrentiev, Shub Rikov, Ptukha, Krinitsky.

Through N. N. Popov, who was in the Ukraine, we were connected with a large branched right-wing Trotskyist organization in Ukraine and with Ukrainian nationalists.

Along with this, as I have already shown, I had an independent group, recruited by me, in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and in the apparatus of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. These included - MIKHAILOV, GEGECHKORI, TOKAREV, TSYLKO, ODINTSOV, POLOVINKIN, SIDELNIKOV, IOSI

FOV. Members of underground organizations were also associated with me; my deputy is MARKEVICH, on the right is SKOLYGA; Trotskyist terrorist REINGOLD; a little later - Yakimovich. Through these persons, I carried out wrecking work and maintained contacts with members of right-wing and Trotskyist organizations on the periphery in the land authorities - with DEMCHENKO in the Ukraine, with KOVALEV - on the Middle Volga, with RACHINSKY - in Belarus, with POLONSKY - in Ivanovo , with KONDRATEV - in Smolensk, with TYURNIKOV and ODINTSOV - in the North Caucasus.

In order to cover up anti-Soviet cadres in the Narkomzem system in the center and on the periphery, I appointed MIKHAILOV as head of the personnel department of the Narkomzem. After my departure from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, I succeeded in making him the head of Selkhozgiz in order to continue contacts with the anti-Soviet underground through him.

In addition, through Victoria UDASEVICH, I kept in touch with the leftists - Stan and Shatsky.

I retained all these lines of communication even after my transfer in 1934 from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and through them I carried out the management of sabotage in the country's agriculture.

Despite the fact that I led all this anti-Soviet work and maintained extensive contacts with a number of anti-Soviet organizations, thanks to the fact that I carried out my work very carefully, through second and third parties, I managed not only to save myself, but also to stay on responsible work in the party. In order to preserve myself and the main backbone of my group, I sometimes "sacrificed", participated in the exposure of certain groups of Trotskyists and rightists. And since the rank-and-file and even many leading members of the anti-Soviet peripheral organizations did not know about me, I managed to keep myself and the main backbone of my group from being exposed by double-dealing.

Having contacted all the anti-Soviet organizations mentioned, I found myself, as it were, with the leading core of our group (YAKOVLEV, VAREIKIS, POPOV, BAUMAN) at the center of the crossing of these anti-Soviet forces.

I must say that we did not strive to create a coherent organization, we did not chase after a sign and believed that time and conditions work for us, that we are relentlessly moving towards our goal. We decided that in the presence of a number of underground anti-Soviet formations, with which we had connections, there was no need to set up a special center that would unite all these organizations organizationally.

As a rule, I took measures to establish contacts with those anti-Soviet formations, on whose shoulders, if the action was successful, one could come to power.

At the same time, as I have already shown, I double-dealed and took every measure to strengthen my position in the Party and in the Central Committee and to get out of the way those who hindered me in this, using all means for this purpose - slander, intrigues, and so on. This was in line with TROTSKY's guidelines and ours—mine, VAREIKIS's, BAUMAN's—aspirations and my personal

plans.

Simultaneously with the anti-Soviet activity that I described above, I, VAREIKIS, BAUMAN, POPOV, GAMARNIK and others tried to create against the leading members of the Central Committee, with the aim of discrediting them in order to advance me to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) in order to eliminate the supporters of STALIN, pulling VAREIKIS, BAUMAN and our other accomplices to leading work in the Central Committee. It flowed, as I already say

394

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

ill, from the instructions of TROTSKY, transmitted to me by GAMARNIK and PYATAKOV, about our work aimed at undermining and disintegrating the unity of the Central Committee and the leading group of the Central Committee, at weakening and creating discord in the leading group of the Central Committee, at facilitating by this way coming to the leadership in Central Committee leaders of the Trotskyists and the right.

TROTSKY believed that unity in the Central Committee could also be broken by such methods as the method of slander, provocative rumors, artificial creation of strained relations between the leading members of the Central Committee. Lately we have focused the fire of slander primarily on MOLOTOV, EZHOV and ZHDANOV. We spread slanderous rumors directed against MOLOTOV; they spread slander about Zhdanov, as about a person allegedly not corresponding to his appointment; about Ezhov as an accidental upstart and a man who allegedly goes too far in the fight against the rightists and Trotskyists and eliminates people valuable and necessary for the party.

Question: You are talking about the connection of GAMARNIK and VAREIKIS with foreign intelligence services. Have you personally had such connections?

Answer: Yes, he had connections with German intelligence.

Question: Tell me specifically, when did you get in touch with German intelligence?

Answer: I was recruited by German intelligence when I was in Germany, in Berlin, in the autumn of 1935, and from that time until my arrest I cooperated with this intelligence, maintaining contact with it through a special representative in Moscow.

In Berlin, I was recovering at the hospital of the Catholic Community. Approximately a week after my arrival in Berlin, a man unknown to me in civilian clothes came to my hospital, introduced himself under the name of SCHMUKE, and stated that he "had instructions to reach an agreement with me on a number of urgent issues of interest to him and me." He declared that he knew "from my political friends" that I belonged to underground organizations fighting the existing government in the USSR and that, on behalf of the German government, he wanted to establish a business relationship with me. SCHMUKE further pointed out to me that in the leading spheres of government in Germany there are many friends of those currents in the USSR which are hostile to the present leadership, that these German spheres support such trends in the USSR—that is why the German government considered it possible to send SCHMUKE to me for negotiations.

Fearing a provocation, I naturally did not want to open up to this unknown person and expressed my complete bewilderment by this kind of appeal to me; however, Schmucke insistently continued that I was in vain denying the facts well known both to him and to me; that the German government is not the only one (of the leaders of the underground organizations in the USSR) who is addressing me with such a proposal. In the end, he emphatically said to me: "Your chief boss, L. TROTSKY, is acting in full contact and on the basis of mutual services with the new Germany." I still tried to stop this conversation and pretended to want to get up to say goodbye and force SMUKE to leave. But SHMUKE did not move, telling me that I was too cautious and, apparently, did not trust him; that this caution characterizes me on the good side, however, he has every opportunity to prove to me the "official nature" of his visit and the full knowledge of the German government about me. Following this, he told me that "in Germany they were very interested in my person even when I was

DOCUMENTATION

395

People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and not by chance, said Schmucke, one of our magazines in Berlin featured your photograph with an autobiography. Indeed, this happened: my photograph was placed in one of the fascist magazines. Then he stated that "immigrants from Russia live in Germany, including former officials of the Russian police, who informed the German authorities about some episodes of my cooperation with the Russian police at the end of 1916 in Petrograd. Having the full opportunity at any moment to compromise me before the Soviet authorities, they, Schmucke pointed out, do not want to do this, because they hope to establish the same kind of contact with me as with TROTSKY.

I realized that I had fallen into a trap, from which I had no other way out. Faced with this fact, seeing that the Germans were fully aware of me, I decided to agree with SCHMUKE's proposal, especially since SMUKE's information about TROTSKY's connection with Germany completely coincided with what Pyatakov told me and what TROTSKY himself wrote.

I then asked what exactly he—SCHMUKE—required of me, and what services I could render to the German government, pointing out that my work was connected mainly with agricultural affairs and had nothing to do with defense or military affairs. SCHMUCK objected that the German government was interested not only in defense work, but also in the situation in the country, in the Bolshevik Party, and especially in the situation within the government and the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party; about these matters he asks that the German authorities be kept informed and, as he put it, he hopes that with this information I will at the same time help my political friends who work in full contact with Germany.

In addition, Schmucke emphasized to me that he and his leaders did not mind if I informed the German government, to the extent that I considered possible, about the affairs of the underground organizations to which I belonged. SCHMUCK said that, as he believed, this would be to our mutual advantage.

Then I told SCHMUCK that I accepted his proposal and agreed to continue, to the best of my ability and ability, to inform the German government on questions of interest to the Germans.

On reflection, I decided, perhaps, to sell my cooperation to the Germans at a higher price, first of all by obtaining from the German intelligence the appropriate opportunities for foreign relations of our organization and, first of all, with TROTSKY, and also by strengthening my weight in the eyes of the German government.

[•..]

The protocol was written down from my words, right, I read it, - YAKOVLEV

Interrogated:

Head of the 5th department of the GUGB of the
NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security - YAMNITSKY

Assistant to the head of the 1st department of the 5th department of the
GUGB, junior lieutenant of state security - KOZAKEVICH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 324. L. 100-136. Script. Typescript.

*

The protocol is published in part.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Return after reading."

396

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 227

QUESTIONS I.V. STALIN TO THE PROTOCOL
INTERROGATION Y.A. YAKOVLEVA

Not later than October 20, 1937

- 1) He knew about the service of Vareikis in the tsarist secret police.
- 2) His opinion about Mikhailov from Voronezh and his participation in the c.r. or-tion.
- 3) No connection with Trotsky (I saw him personally in 1935 or 1934).
- 4) How would you like to use MOPR? Who from the MOPR did you use?
- 5) Take Yakovlev's wife into circulation: he is a conspirator and must tell everything. Ask her about Stasova, Kirsanova and her other friends and relatives.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 324. L. 98-99. Script. Manuscript.

No. 228

SSHCHCHESSCOMNATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE STATEMENT OF THE ARRESTED I.D. OVSYANNIKOVA

October 16, 1937

No. 61130

I am sending a statement from the arrested Ovsyannikov, the former driver Sokolnikov and Krestinsky about the USSR plenipotentiary in Budapest Bekzadyan.

Ovsyannikov was arrested as an active participant in the Trotskyist-terrorist organization liquidated in the NKID motor depot.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

General Commissar of State Security Ezhov to the Investigator of the NKVD

from the arrested Ovsyannikov Ivan Dmitrievich

STATEMENT

At the end of February 1935, I was sent by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to work as a driver in Budapest at the USSR embassy.

Plenipotentiary Bekzadyan repeatedly talked to me, asked me in detail about my background, past work and my personal life.

When he learned that I worked as a driver for Sokolnikov, he asked me to tell him in detail about Sokolnikov's moods and his work.

I frankly told Bekzadyan everything I knew about Sokolnikov. Bekzadyan told me more than once that Sokolnikov was being wiped out. Plenipotentiary Bekzadyan in 1935, at a general meeting of the staff of the embassy, making a report on the Plenum of the Central Committee, said: "Yenukidze was offended in vain, he is the largest revolutionary in Transcaucasia and he was eaten on the basis of personal accounts."

Bekzadyan told me that now the CEC would feel bad without Yenukidze, since he is a good worker. Bekzadyan was opposed to Beria and spoke about Beria's report that "you read it, but I know more than Beria."

I was once present at a conversation between Bekzadyan and his wife. Bekzadyan said that the workers are not capable of mental labor and the workers are not able to govern the country. They should only do physical labor.

DOCUMENTATION

397

Bekzadyan argued that the leadership of the country would belong to the same group of people, no one would ever re-elect them. This group will live well, while the workers will live worse. To his wife's question: "Why are the workers

shed blood?" Bekzadyan replied: "You don't understand anything." At this point, the conversation was interrupted. Bekzadyan also said that the most democratic country in the world is Norway, where workers live much better and more cultured than in the USSR. He also said that Germany is well equipped technically, the Germans are good organizers, cultured, economical.

Bekzadyan often visited restaurants in Budapest, where he invited me to take him with him, and had acquaintances among the merchants who came to Budapest. Met with Dr. Ern Fish, with whom he went to restaurants. I went to the landowner with officials of the Hungarian ministries, where he drank for three days on his estate, located 200 km away. from Budapest.

Bekzadyan went to an unknown woman editor of some magazine, spent a long time at her apartment, went to parties with her and on dates with unknown persons. Bekzadyan was friends with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about whom the Hungarian drivers told me that he was a fascist, a protege of Germany, during the Hungarian revolution he hanged workers, I don't know his last name.

Bekzadyan had suspicious meetings with unknown persons outside of Budapest. In April 1935, late in the evening, I drove Bekzadyan to the mountain "Turkish Fortress", where he had a meeting with unknown people. The same dates Bekzadyan took place repeatedly in a restaurant on the mountain "St. Mary" and in restaurants in Budapest.

With me, the supply manager of the embassy Magalif came twice from Berlin to Bekzadyan. When Magalif arrived, Bekzadyan locked himself in his office with him and talked to him about something for a long time. In March 1935, in honor of the arrival of Magalif, tea was arranged, to which all the employees of the embassy were invited. During tea time, I had to sit near Bekzadyan and Magalif at such a distance that I heard that they were talking about Volovich from the NKVD, about whom they said that he was his own person and you could rely on him. The conversation was interrupted, as the wife of Consul Shaprov approached.

I heard a similar conversation about Volovich a second time, which took place between Bekzadyan and his adviser Mirny, when I was taking them from Seget to Budapest. Both spoke of Volovich as the only person, calling Volovich a professor in his field.

Bekzadyan in this conversation spoke about the chairman of the CEC of Georgia, that it is impossible to agree with him, that he is a very firm person.

Before traveling to Moscow, Bekzadyan went to Berlin, in November 1934 he went specially to Berlin, where he bought an old Chevrolet car for 2,000 marks. The same car could be bought in Hungary for 1,000 marks.

Bekzadyan often traveled to Czechoslovakia, where he bought large quantities of manufactory, but where he sold it is unknown. Bekzadyan liked to play cards and, according to his wife, lost large sums of money with foreign ambassadors.

Bekzadyan called Karakhan his best friend and comrade. In 1935, Karakhan was twice passing by Bekzadyan in Budapest, and the latter had a ballerina named Semyonova.

Bekzadyan was on good terms with Krestinsky and spoke of him as an intelligent, intelligent, capable person. They had constant correspondence with each other. Bekzadyan spoke about his good relations with Kan-

398

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Delaki and Eliava, while in Moscow, drank in their apartments. In the summer of 1935, Bekzadyan was visited by his relative, a doctor, an Arab by nationality, a Turkish citizen, who has his own clinic in Istanbul. Lived with Bekzad for about a month. I know that Bekzadyan in Budapest hosted a merchant with goods, for whom he arranged for duty-free importation of carpets to Budapest.

Written from my words correctly.

OVSYANNIKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 324. L. 84-88. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "Cautiously summon to the USSR and arrest. St."

No. 229

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE STATEMENT OF THE WIFE YA.A. YAKOVLEVA

October 17, 1937

No. 61165

Secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the statement of the arrested former. director of Mosfilm Sokolovskaya - dated
October 15, 1937

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Secretary of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks N.I. Ezhov

In connection with the arrest of my husband Yakovlev Ya.A., with whom I have lived since 1921, I decided to tell everything that I know about Yakovlev's struggle against the party, which he carried out for many years.

Yakovlev has been a Trotskyist since 1923. Even then, in 1923, he took an active part in the struggle against the party on the side of Trotsky. During this period, he was associated with a group of active Trotskyists - Voronsky, Eltsin, N. N. Popov, *Mikhailov*, took an active part in factional meetings of the group ...

Over the past five years, Yakovlev has been taking an active part in an underground anti-Soviet organization that adheres to Trotskyist positions.

tions. He was in a special conspiratorial position, double-dealing in order to gain a foothold in party work and striving to advance to the leadership of the party.

Together with Yakovlev, Vareikis and Bauman took an active part in this underground organization. Of the members of this organization, grouped around Yakovlev, I know Mikhailov, Reingold, Tsylo and others.
gie.

Yakovlev was in anti-Party relations with the leader of the conspiracy among the military, Gamarnik. Through Gamarnik, he maintained contact with Pyatakov, who headed the Trotskyist underground...

DOCUMENTATION

399

My guilt is further aggravated by the fact that after exposing Gamarnik, Yakir, N.N. this gang of enemies of the party and the people.

E SOKOLOVSKAYA

The application was accepted by early 5th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR Yamnitsky AP of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 324. L. 93-96. Script. Typescript.

The statement is published in part.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Which Mikhailov? They didn't even ask for a patronymic name... The investigators are good. What matters to us is not the past activities of Yakovlev and

Sokolovskaya, but their sabotage and espionage work over the past year, recent

months of 1937. We also need to know why both of these scoundrels went abroad almost every year. I. Stalin.

*

There is a note on the margins: "What Mikhailov?"

No. 230

NOTE V.M. MOLOTOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A RADIO STATION IN DVK

October 17, 1937

No. co - 3760

Secret

TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR reviewed and approved the standard projects submitted by the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry and the cost estimate for the construction of radio stations in the Far East.

The estimated cost of a radio station with a capacity of 150 kW. set at 27.8 million rubles. and a power of 10 kW. - 9.4 million rubles. In connection with the successful progress of the preparatory work on the construction of radio stations in the Far East, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry applied to the Council of People's Commissars with a request for a vacation in the GV quarter. 80 million rubles in excess of the allocated 55 million rubles. The Council of People's Commissars considers it possible to satisfy the request of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry.

Please make the following decision:

To release to the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the 4th quarter of 1937 80 million rubles. (in excess of the allocated 55 million rubles) for the construction of radio stations in the Far East and Eastern Siberia. Allow Prombank to provide financing until February 1, 1938 according to the model approved by the Council estimates, of People's Commissars of the USSR *.

V. MOLOTOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 324. L. 97. Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Your opinion. It seems to me that 80 million rubles is an exaggerated amount. I. Stalin.

— inscribed in pencil by V.M. Molotov.

400 _ LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 231

CODE TELEGRAM KUDRYAVTSEV I.V. STALIN,

N.I. Ezhov, ON TRANSPORTATION OF KOREANS (60)

October 18, 1937

The task of the Central Committee for the transportation of Koreans in all three phases was basically fulfilled, the last five echelons remain. This work of great importance was a combat check of the mobilization readiness of a number of the most important road junctions, especially the Vladivostok branch. At first we were defeated, then after your warning we placed people, primarily political workers, both in organizing train equipment, loading, and in escorting trains along all sections of the road, and now we are happy to report that we have coped with the work. We achieved that, for example, the station Pervaya Rechka, being a decisive point for the preparation of echelons, even exceeded the planned readiness, in fact, it produces one echelon equipped for the winter in 4 hours thanks to the correct organization and competition of brigades. For example, the carpenter Pavlenko, after the liquidation of the depersonalization, fulfills the norm up to 700%, the tinsmith Tobolov up to 500%, many dozens of others worked well.

The expulsion of saboteurs from among the obvious enemies associated with Korean transportations, arrested by the NKVD, and also exposed by party organizations, helped a lot to radically improve the situation. The railroad commanders tried to remove themselves from directing the work, willingly yielding to the eviction troikas to interfere in operational affairs. The wrong behavior of certain workers of the NKVD in Primorye did not help to strengthen discipline; early Safonov roads. All this led to the fact that the meeting of the workers of Pershaya Rechka looked like a meeting of the collective farm brigade during the period of kulak sabotage, they kept silent, even some direct discontent was felt. Now the mood has risen, wages have risen, competition has begun. I was forced to apply to replace these workers of the NKVD, one of whom, even at a meeting where we were talking about competition, called all sorts of epithets of a good worker-commander ... *

BEGINNING BY DOR
KUDRYAVTSEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 49-50. Script. Typescript.

*
The telegram is published partially.

On the first sheet there is a typewritten resolution: "The Secret Five. Allow the railroad workers of the Far East Railway to occupy part of the fanz houses vacated by the Koreans. Arrest NKVD workers Savtsov and Gridnev. I. Stalin. V. Molotov. Yezhov. K. Voroshilov. Kaganovich.

No. 232

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) ON THE ARREST OF
BAYEV AND MULLA WITH THE APPENDIX OF CHUBIN'S TELEGRAM

October 21, 1937

384 - Question of the NKVD.

To allow the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to arrest all the beys and mullahs who returned from Afghanistan and Iran and were expelled by the general meetings of collective farmers of their collective farms in Turkmenistan.

Cases of the arrested beys and mullahs to be considered at the troika.

DOCUMENTATION

401

APPLICATION

Top secret

Making copies is prohibited

From ASHGABAT entrance ý 2308/Sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

Recently, general meetings expelled from collective farms more than two thousand bais, mullahs who returned from exile, Iran-Afghanistan, accepted into collective farms by order of Aitakov, I consider it necessary to expel them from the borders of Turkmenistan to camps.

I ask for instructions.

and about. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Turkmenistan

CHUBIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 132-133. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov.

No. 233

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHIC CARDS ON
PASSPORTS" (61)

October 21, 1937

390 - On the introduction of photographic cards on passports.

Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
(see Appendix).

APPLICATION

to item 390 pr. PB No. 54

ON THE INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHIC CARDS
ON PASSPORTS

Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of
the USSR

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 21, 1937)

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

1. Supplement Article 6 of the Regulations on Passports approved by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on December 27, 1932 (SZ 1932 No. 84 Article 517) with the following paragraph:

"In order to obtain a passport, a citizen is obliged to present two photographic cards, one of which is pasted on the passport, and the other remains

at the police station that issued the passport.

2. To instruct the NKVD of the USSR to carry out this resolution in relation to newly issued passports - immediately, and in relation to the issued

402

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

prior to the issuance of this decision in the areas listed in Art. 10 of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 28, 1933 "On the Issuance of Passports to Citizens of the USSR on the Territory of the USSR" (SZ USSR 1933 No. 28, Article 168), - by January 1, 1939 and in all other passportized areas - by January 1, 1940.

Chairman of the Central Executive
Committee of the USSR

Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR

Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 992. L. 83, 160. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

No. 234

CODE TELEGRAM Yu.M. Kaganovich I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE FIRE AT
THE BALAKHNA PAPER MILL

October 22, 1937

input No. 2335/sh

Top secret

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

At night there was a fire at the Balakhna paper mill. Great efforts were made - two machines are in perfect working order, two machines require three or four days of repair. The reasons are being clarified, but we assume sabotage; Up to a hundred people of counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet elements were seized at the Bumkombinat before the fire.

Secretary of the Gorky Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) KAGANOVICH

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 93. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "Arch. Art.*.

No. 235

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO K.N. VALUKHINA ON THE
PROGRESS OF THE POLISH OPERATION IN THE OMSK REGION (62)

October 23, 1937

N° 61299

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 976 beginning. UNKVD for the Omsk region comrade.
VALUKHIN.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

403

People's Commissar VNUDEL comrade. Ezhov

As of October 20, 577 people were arrested along the Polish line, of which 379 were Polish defectors, 35 prisoners of war, 12 political emigrants and political exchanges, 9 members of the PPS, and 9 Polish nat. k.-r. - 142. Of this number, they worked in the army - 3, in the defense industry - 31, in transport - 171, not in the defense industry - 97, in collective farms, state farms, institutions - 275. espionage activities 57. Investigations completed 93 cases against 165 people, of which 21 cases against 29 people were carried out under the ATT. The Polish defector STRISHKEVICH Mikhail Iosifovich confessed to espionage, saying that he had been recruited by the Polish officer SAVLEVICH and in 1931 transferred to our territory. The Polish intelligence officer BECHLER confessed to espionage activities, indicating that he was recruited in 1932 and received a report from GRINGOLTS, who lives in Kyiv.

VALUKHIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 6-7. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a handwritten resolution: "Gringolts must be arrested. I. St. *.

No. 236

NOTE I.V. STALIN M.P. FRINOVSKII ABOUT TAIROV
AND WEINER (63)

October 23, 1937

Tov. FRINOVSKY

I think that it is no longer possible, and indeed not worth it, to restrain the study of the issue at the top of the corps (partly in the middle levels) about Tairov and Vainer, but without the Mongols knowing about it.

I. STALIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 325. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

No. 237

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE ORGANIZATION OF AN OPEN TRIAL
OVER "PESTS" IN GOMEL (64)

October 28, 1937

36 - Question of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus (Telegram of Comrade Volkov).

Approve the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belorussia to hold in the city of Gomel on November 1-2, 1937, an open trial of pests-saboteurs who carried out mass infection of children with infectious diseases.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 205. L. 89. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

404

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 238

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE OF THE USSR"

October 29, 1937

46 - 0 People's Commissar of Agriculture of the USSR.

1) Release Comrade Chernov from the duties of People's Commissar of Agriculture of the USSR.

2) Approve the People's Commissar of Agriculture of the USSR comrade. Eikhe.

3) To oblige comrade Chernov to hand over, and comrade Eikhe to accept cases with the participation of comrades. Chu bar, Andreev and representatives of the KSK, the CPC and the NKVD.

RGASPI. F. 3. Op. 17. D. 993. L. 8. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

No. 239

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF D.M. DMITRIEV ON THE
LIQUIDATION OF THE "FASCIST" ORGANIZATION

October 30, 1937

No. 61512

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of note No. 9416 of the head of the UNKVD of the Sverdlovsk region *
comrade. DMITRIEV*.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Top secret

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR TO THE GENERAL COMMISSAR OF THE STATE
SAFETY comrade. Ezhov

We liquidated a large fascist officer organization operating in the Urals, created by agents of the
so-called "Russian All-Military Union" (ROVS).

The testimonies of those arrested established that the fascist officer organization was created by
that part of the members of the ROVS, which stands for the establishment of a military fascist dictatorship in
Russia on the model of Hitler's dictatorship in Germany, as opposed to another part of it, which stands for
the restoration of the tsarist monarchy.

The role of the agents of the ROVS in the
creation of an officer-fascist organization in the Urals

An important role in the creation of the fascist officer organization in the Urals was played by the
emissary of the ROVS known in the K.-R. underground of the Urals under the name EPIFANOV
(the real name has not been established). According to a number of

DOCUMENTATION

of the arrested EPIFANOV, a Cossack captain and staff captain in the SHKURO detachments, was transferred to the USSR shortly after the end of the civil war, travels to various regions of the Union and does a lot of organizational work, recruiting officers of the tsarist and white armies into the ROVS and planting his agents. Recruited by EPIFANOV as a member of the ROVS, Major General OKULOV testified about EPIFANOV visiting him in Bryansk in 1924, 1926 and 1929. and in 1932 in Moscow. Colonel of the General Staff EITNER was involved in the organization by EPIFANOV in 1929 in Vologda, where EPIFANOV at one time lived under false documents, working as an accountant in one of the collective farms. In the next two years, EITNER, who moved to Sverdlovsk, corresponded with YEPYFANOV at a conditional Vologda address. At the end of 1932, EPIFANOV, while in Berezniki, established contacts with the officers DYAGELEV and TRUSHNYKOV, known to him. In 1935, EPIFANOV visited Tagil to meet Okulov, who had been sent by him to work in the Urals. In 1936, EPIFANOV meets in Moscow with a former recruited by him. officer BATALOV. The whereabouts of YEPIFANOV has not been established at the present time, we are looking for him.

The Ural fascist officer organization is created on the direct instructions of EPIFANOV by the officers of the tsarist army VASILENKO recruited by him, who held the post of deputy commander of the troops of the Ural Military District and the aforementioned EITNER, who are the leaders of the organization.

In addition to the persons mentioned above, EPIFANOV maintained contact with the following members of the fascist officer organization in the Urals: ex. colonel MIONCHINSKY, ex. officer of the tsarist army Krivoshchekov. In addition to EPIFANOV, the connection of the fascist officer organization with the ROVS was carried out through the Cossack Yesaul KISLOV, who ended up in the Urals in kulak exile, who, being in his homeland in the Kuban, was recruited by agents of the ROVS ex. white officers DOLZHENKO and ZARUBA, transferred to the territory of the USSR from Bulgaria. KISLOV kept in touch with DOLZHENKO, who had moved to Tashkent.

A special line of communication with the EMRO was represented by the former. white officer KOTELNIKOV, who emigrated to Manchuria at the end of the civil war and was transferred from there in 1928 by the head of the ROVS branch in Manchuria, General DITERIKHS, on whose behalf he created the ROVS organization in the Nadezhdinsky district.

Active officer-fascist organization

The active of the Ural fascist officer organization was made up of career officers of the tsarist army - terry counter-revolutionaries, in the ranks of the White armies, or as the commanding staff of the Red Army, who actively fought against the Soviet power.

One of the leaders of the fascist officer organization EITNER was recruited by German intelligence even before he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff and during the entire imperialist war, while in Harbin and then on the German front, he transmitted espionage information to the Germans. For these services in one of the Berlin banks, 40 thousand marks were put in his name.

One of the active participants in the organization was the captain of the royal army

missions, Petlyura Colonel BULGAKOV. Commanding the Bogunsky Regiment, notorious for its cruelty, in the Petliura army, BULGAKOV organized

406

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

called Jewish pogroms and mass executions of captured Red Army soldiers. After the defeat of Petliura, BULGAKOV commanded the regiment of the former. Petliurists in the RYDZ-SMIGLY division of the Polish army during its attack on Kyiv. Having been captured by the Reds, and being sent to a concentration camp until the end of the Civil War, BULGAKOV facilitated the escape of one of the Petliurists from the camp, for which he was sentenced to 5 years in prison.

Major General OKULOV, having remained on the territory of Soviet Russia and voluntarily joined the Red Army, was an agent of White émigré organizations. In 1918, being an inspector of the infantry of the Red Army in Moscow, OKULOV had a meeting with Boris Savinkov, Colonel PERKHUROVYM and General GOPPER, on whose behalf he created a large underground officer organization of up to 500 people, which was supposed to act in the event of a victory of the rebels in Yaroslavl. In the future, being in command positions in various parts of the Red Army, OKULOV with the help of other ex. officers decomposed the Red Army units. As a result, his Ph.D. activity, in 1919, on the Petrograd front, the Pavlovsky regiment went over to the side of the whites.

Ex. At the end of 1917, an officer of the tsarist and white armies, Dyagilev, took part in the massacre of a company of soldiers who had refused to go to the front. DIAGILEV personally shot soldiers with a machine gun. EPIFANOV also took part in this massacre.

Second lieutenant of the tsarist army DARICHEV was awarded the officer's St. George Cross for organizing the execution of soldiers of the 56th Odoevsky regiment on the Southwestern Front for refusing to go to the front.

From the first days of the revolution, the Cossack Yesaul KISLOV embarked on the path of open struggle against the Bolsheviks, participated in the battles against the Red Army in the army of Denikin, became a member of the K.-R. government in the Kuban as a member of the regional Kuban Rada. At the end of the Civil War, while in the North Caucasus, he took part in the creation of the c.-r. organizations in Maykop and in the Azov-Black Sea region.

A lieutenant of the tsarist army and a captain in the army of Kolchak STIKHNO in 1918 joined the Union for the Liberation of Russia. On behalf of the latter, STIKHNO voluntarily joins the ranks of the Red Army, where he contacts other former. officers and is working on the decomposition of the Red Army units. As a result of his activities, most of the Red Army men of the Perm Rifle Regiment went over to the Whites, taking with them 4 machine guns. During the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprising, the regiment decomposed by the agents of STIKHNO in full strength went over to the side of the rebels. STIKHNO ran to Kolchak and, as commander of the Tagil armored train, took part in operations to capture the city of Perm and then retreated with the Whites to Irkutsk, where he was captured by the Red Army.

Ex. captain of the tsarist and white armies DIKUSHIN in 1917 in the days of

Nilovshchina participated in the bloody massacre of the Kornilov units with the workers, for which he received the rank of captain from the government of Kerensky.

Dislocation of the officer-fascist organization

The fascist officer organization covered a number of large industrial centers of the region: Sverdlovsk, Perm, Tagil, Voroshilovsk, Nadezhdinsk, as well as the center of the Komi-Permyatsky district Kudymkar. Individual members of the organization were also located in other districts of the region where there are no large industrial facilities.

DOCUMENTATION

407

Contact with foreign intelligence

The Ural fascist officer organization was connected with the Finnish, Polish, Japanese and German intelligence services.

Communication with Finnish intelligence was carried out by the above-mentioned BATALOV and KRIVOSHCHENKOV. Both of them were Komi-Permyak nationalists and, in addition to participating in the fascist officer organization, were members of the K.-R. a nationalist organization closely associated with Finnish intelligence.

Head of the fascist officer organization in Perm and Molotovo, ex. AZBUKA N officer was connected with the resident of the Polish intelligence priest Budrys, who instructed his agent NOVITSKY to recruit into the fascist officer organization.

EITNER was personally connected with Japanese intelligence, whom the Japanese recruited in 1936, using the known fact of EITNER's cooperation with German agents during the imperialist war. In addition, on behalf of EITNER, the Japanese were contacted by a member of the officer-fascist organization in Tagil, ex. officer HRISANOV.

The fascist officer organization had the closest ties with German intelligence. The directive on contact with the Germans came from above from EPIFANOV. German agents were VASILENKO, EITNER, MIONCHINSKY, OKULOV, members of the organization in Tagil - former. Petlyura Colonel BULGAKOV, ex. officer STIKHNO and others. German intelligence gave specific tasks to the members of the fascist officer organization to carry out terrorist acts and major sabotage.

Directions k.-r. activities of the fascist officer organization

Setting as its goal the overthrow of the Soviet government with an armed hand and the establishment of a military fascist dictatorship, the Ural fascist officer organization, focusing on the upcoming war between Germany and Japan against the Soviet Union, launched espionage, sabotage, terrorist and insurgent activities.

Block with other k.-r. organizations

The fascist officer organization established organizational ties with the right-wing Trotsky bloc operating in the Urals. VASILENKO and a member of the fascist officer organization, the head of artillery of the Ural Military District, brigade commander BLUM, became part of the participants in the Trotskyist conspiracy in the Red Army, which was headed on the territory of the Ural Military District. Commander of the troops of the Ural Military District Trotskyist GARKAV.

EITNER joined the c.-r. organization of the right, operating in the communications department of the Sverdlovsk region. Through BATALOV and KRIVOSHCHIEKOV, the fascist officer organization was connected with the K.-R. nationalist underground organization of Komi-Permyaks.

Block with the Ural rebel headquarters

In the summer of 1936, the fascist officer organization became part of the c.-r. the insurrectionary underground, formed by the so-called "Ural insurgent headquarters", organized on the initiative of the right in 1935 and uniting the insurrectionary activities of the right, Trotskyists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and churchmen on the principles of a bloc. The composition of the Ural insurgent headquarters included VASILENKO and ETNER. The fascist officer organization retained its organizational independence. Heads officer

408

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

sko-fascist organization, blocking with other k.-r. organizations, looked at them as temporary companions in the fight against the Soviet regime, with whom it would not be on the road the day after the overthrow of the Soviet power.

In this respect, Eitner's conversation with Okulov in 1936 is very characteristic. EITNER stressed that after the victory of the uprising, a new struggle for power would inevitably begin, and the fascist officer organization would have to ensure the transfer of power to the fascists. For this, the officer cadres must remain under arms even after a complete victory over the Bolsheviks, while the rest of the insurgents must be sent home without weapons in order to remain masters of the situation.

Spy activities of the fascist officer organization

Members of the fascist officer organization carried out extensive espionage work for the benefit of foreign intelligence services.

KRIVOSHCHIEKOV and BATALOV, through Finnish agents - the head of the nationalist organization TARAKANOV and the nationalist professor LYTKIN (convicted of espionage) transmitted to the Finnish embassy in Moscow, in the person of an employee of the embassy UNIONEN, information about the insurrectionary activities of the nationalists and the political mood of the kulak exile in Komi- Permyak district. Through Tarakanov, Krivoshchekov received 20,000 rubles from Finnish intelligence for the development of the insurgent movement.

Espionage in favor of Japan was carried out by EITNER, HRISANOV and the former recruited by the latter. Kolchak officer KULIKOV. EITNER, through Khrisanov, was connected with an employee of the Japanese consulate in Moscow, on the instructions of which, with the help of the same Khrisanov, who worked in the Centrospart system in Perm and had his own agents at defense plants, transmitted information about the products manufactured at these plants. KHRISANOV and KULIKOV were also used to carry out the terrorist missions planned by the Japanese.

Significant espionage work was carried out in favor of Germany. VASILENKO, using his official position as deputy commander of the troops of the Ural Military District, passed on to the Germans top secret information of a mobilization nature and data on the composition, deployment and armament of the troops of the Ural Military District. MYONCHINSKY, who worked as a teacher at the Metallurgical Technical School in Nadezhdinsk, systematically supplied German intelligence in the person of the residents of the German specialist BURGARDT and the representative of the bourgeois German newspaper in Moscow, Arthur YUST, with information on the Nadezhda metallurgical plant and on defense plant No. 76. Over the past three years The MIONCHINSKY were given information to the Germans: about the annual production program of the metallurgical plant, about the quality of steel produced for aviation, about orders for high-quality steel and which defense plants it goes to. At plant No. 76, MIONCHINSKY gave the Germans information about the production program, about the calibers of remote tubes produced at the plant, about the state of production of cylinders for aircraft engines, about factories consuming the products of plant No. 76. The role of MIONCHINSKY, as an agent of German intelligence, was not limited to collecting espionage information on Nadezhdinsk. He was involved in espionage work, a member of the officer-fascist organization of the former. captain of the white army STIKHNO, whom, as a person who spoke German well, MIONCHINSKY sent at the disposal of the German intelligence agent in Tagil, the German specialist SHODA. Arriving in Tagil, STIKHNO was hired by the Tagilstroy administration as an interpreter for the German specialists of the SOD,

DOCUMENTATION

409

CHRISTAF and HEIMERL. In fact, STIKHNO carried out communication between SHODA and other German specialists, who were also German agents, with their Russian agents. In addition, STIKHNO was a signalman, periodically plying between Nadezhdinsk, Tagil and Solikamsk. At the last point were the German residencies GRIMM and ROGGE, to whom STIKHNO delivered espionage materials, in particular, photographs of drawings and construction schemes of Uralvagonzavod and Tagilstroy taken by the Leika camera. In addition, MIONCHINSKY and STIKHNO carried out the tasks of German intelligence on sabotage and terror.

In addition to the German agents mentioned above, STIKHNO since 1933 was directly connected with the employees of the German embassy HERZ and RSOM, whom he met in Grimm's apartment in Solikamsk.

BULGAKOV, who worked in the equipment department of N. Tagil Metallurgy

a logical plant, was recruited by a resident of the German intelligence KRAUSE and after his departure from Tagil in 1936, he led the residency of the German intelligence, covering Uralvagonzavod, Tagilstroy and other industrial enterprises of Tagil. On the instructions of the Germans, BULGAKOV launched espionage and sabotage activities at these enterprises.

Terrorist activities of the officer-fascist organization

The fascist officer organization in the Urals considered one of its main tasks the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government. The same task was assigned to the leadership of the organization by the German and Japanese intelligence services.

At the end of 1932, the emissary of the ROVS EPIFANOV found BATALOV, who worked in the Administration of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, in Moscow and suggested that he organize a terrorist act against one of the leaders of the party and government, setting the condition that the perpetrator of the terrorist act should be a communist or a person socially close to the party and the Soviet government. → ty. BATALOV first involved in the terrorist attack the director of the Komi-Permyatsk industrial complex VILESOV, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of a nationalist insurgent organization, who lived in Kudymkar. However, at the last minute, VILESOV's candidacy as the perpetrator of the terrorist act was dropped, since BATALOV had doubts whether VILESOV had enough determination to commit a terrorist act. In 1936, BATALOV resumed preparations for a central terrorist attack. For this purpose, he attracts a member of the fascist officer organization POPOVA - the supply manager of the Gainsky timber industry enterprise in the Komi-Permyak district. Having obtained the consent of the latter to commit a terrorist attack, BATALOV promises him to get fictitious documents, including a party card, on the basis of which he intends to get POPOV a job in one of the government agencies in Moscow. Further measures were thwarted by the arrest of POPOV.

ROVS agent KISLOV, who created a large k.-r. organization, together with an active participant in this organization, IVANOV, prepared the commission of a terrorist act against STALIN, VOROSHILOV, KAGANOVICH and MOLOTOV. According to the plan worked out by KISLOV and IVANOV, during a demonstration on Red Square on the day of the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution, one of the members of the organization was to make his way to the podium and throw a bomb. IVANOV and another member of the organization, kulak BURKOV, were designated as the perpetrators of the attack. IVANOV was supposed to get explosives and prepare a bomb, but was arrested in connection with the liquidation of the organization.

410

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

STIKHNO, on the instructions of German intelligence, was supposed to kill the Japanese ambassador in Moscow in order to provoke a war between Japan and the USSR. According to the plan developed by the Germans, STIKHNO, with the help of the head of the protocol department of the NKID FLORINSKY, recruited by the Germans, was supposed to sneak into the service as a waiter in one of the mansions of the NKID, where, during a diplomatic banquet, he was to be shot from

revolver of the Japanese ambassador. For reasons unknown to STICHNO, this plan was subsequently cancelled.

KhRISANOV had an assignment from Japanese intelligence to prepare a terrorist act against one of the leaders of the party and government, for this purpose he instructed KULIKOV, a member of the fascist officer organization, to find the perpetrator of the terrorist act, in particular, he instructed to involve in the terrorist act who lived in Moscow student of the Institute of Transport Engineers former. White Guard SMIRNOV, who evaded this. In fulfillment of this order, Khrisanov was connected with the former. Deputy People's Commissar of Railways, a Trotskyite and German spy LIVSHITS.

Subversive activities

The sabotage activities of the fascist officer organization were carried out on the direct instructions of German intelligence and were aimed at disrupting the implementation of the program and putting out of action the largest enterprises of defense importance.

In Nadezhdinsk, on the instructions of the Germans, MIONCHINSKY created sabotage groups at 2 main enterprises of the region - a metallurgical plant and military plant No. 76. The main task of these groups was to prepare acts of sabotage in case of war. At the metallurgical plant, MIONCHINSKY recruited the head of the chemical laboratory of the plant, ex. white officer, son of the former. the shareholder of this plant, PONOSOV, the chief power engineer CHUPRAKOV (both were convicted in 1936 for sabotage), the head of the special department, SCHNEIDER, and the power plant engineer, SYUTKIN. CHUPRAKOV had the task, on first demand, to disable the power plant of the Nadezhda plant, which was supposed to paralyze the work of both Nadezhda plants, Bogoslovsky coal mines, copper and bauxite mines located in the area. A sabotage group at plant No. 76 was created by MIONCHINSKY at the beginning of 1936, headed by the chief engineer of this plant, GURASTOV, who, in turn, attracted employees of the plant ALEKSANDROV, DANILOV and OSHEV, who were known to him for their hostile attitude towards the Soviet authorities, to the group. GU RASTOV developed a plan of sabotage at three points of the plant at once: an explosion of a hydraulic installation, an explosion of a battery that supplies energy to the plant, and workshop No. 3, where all the main mechanisms of the plant are concentrated. In order to implement his plan, GURASTOV began buying up explosives from the miners. The sabotage was planned on the first day of the war.

Particularly active subversive activities were launched by BULGAKOV and STIKHNO at the enterprises of the city of Tagil.

In the spring of 1935, STIKHNO received an order from BULGAKOV to destroy the Uralvagonstroy Thermal Power Plant. The head of Uralvagonstroy, the Trotskyite MARYASIN, took part in the development of the plan for this diversion. It was planned to set fire to oil tanks located in close proximity to the heat and power plant. STICHNO recruited the foreman of the construction of the thermal power plant, kulak MAKRAKOV, who, for 1,000 rubles and a piece for a suit, received from MARYASIN, agreed to set fire to the oil tanks. For this purpose, he instructed electric welders

DOCUMENTATION

weld the lid of one of the oil tanks in need of repair if there is oil in it. As a result, the oil ignited from a spark in the tank opening and both tanks exploded. The thermal power plant was under direct threat of destruction from the resulting fire, but thanks to the efforts of fire brigades and workers, it was possible to defend it. MAKLAKOV fled from responsibility.

At the beginning of 1936, STIKHNO, on behalf of German intelligence, an attempt was made to set fire to the car assembly shop of Uralvagonzavod. STIKHNO recruited the head of the electrical department of the workshop, a returnee from the Chinese Eastern Railway. TULSKOY. The latter, under the pretext of drying the walls of the transformer corridor, which were still in wooden sheathing, gave a high-voltage current in order to arrange a short circuit, which would inevitably cause a fire in the wooden sheathing of the walls of the transformer corridor and a fire in the entire workshop, which had a wooden floor. TULSKY started the current, but this was noticed by the technical staff of the workshop and reported to the fire brigade, who forced TULSKY to turn off the current and the fire was prevented.

In May of the same year, STIKHNO tried to disable the CHPP transformer with the help of an electrician ALEKSANDROV recruited by him, who, while repairing the transformer cable, deliberately destroyed the cable insulation, which should have caused a short circuit when the current was started and put the transformer out of action. The accident was prevented during the control check of the cables before the start of the current.

At the beginning of 1937, a German intelligence agent, an employee of the German embassy HERZ, who came to Tagil, demanded that BULGAKOV intensify sabotage work. In carrying out this task, BULGAKOV and STIKHNO organized an arson attack on the furnishing shop of Uralvagonzavod. The special settler BACHURIN, who was recruited STIKHNO and worked in this workshop, set fire to the office of master BELOGOYEV located inside the workshop. The fire that started was noticed by the workers, who immediately extinguished it. In the summer of 1937, Bulgakov and STIKHNO planned a diversion of the Uralvagonstroy gas-generator station. For this purpose, in July, the recruited kulak Levenevsky set fire to a warehouse with flammable cleaning materials located next to the gas generating station. The fire brigade and workers managed to put out the fire and defend the gas generating station. For active sabotage work STIKHNO received 10 thousand rubles from the German resident KRAUSE upon his departure from Tagil in 1936.

A number of arsons on the instructions of BULGAKOV were organized by the former. officer of the tsarist and white armies DIKUSHIN, head of the electrical equipment group in the supply department of Tagilstroy. In the autumn of 1936, DIKUSHIN organized the arson of a transformer box located on the territory of Tagilstroy's material warehouses, meaning to cause a fire in the warehouses. The fire was quickly contained by the fire brigade. In the winter of 1936, DIKUSHIN, with the help of the recruited fist of TANYGIN, set fire to the vegetable storage of the ORS Tagilstroy, located next to the central warehouse of the ORS. The vegetable storage burned down, but the central warehouse of the ORS was defended. In addition, DIKUSHIN organized a fire in the technical and planning departments of Tagilstroy, located in barrack No. 3 on Fedorina Gora. The fire destroyed all the drawings and projects, which delayed the construction for a year and a half and brought hundreds of thousands of rubles to a loss.

Members of the officer-fascist organization who worked in the forestry of the Komi-Permyatsk district, formerly. officers DARICHEV and

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Dyagilev systematically organized forest fires. DIAGILEV in the summer of 1933 organized four forest fires one after another in the Lipovsky forest area of the Kosinsky timber industry enterprise, as a result of which 11 thousand hectares of forest were destroyed. Darichev, on the instructions of EITNER, in 1935 organized a number of large forest fires with the help of the technical director of the Velvin forest and tractor base, ANAN'INA. In the same year, the accountant of the base PRISTYAZHNYUK, recruited by DARICHEV, set fire to the Votinovsky hut, which burned to the ground and caused a major forest fire.

Insurrectionary activities of the officer-fascist organization

Even before the conclusion of the bloc with other Ph.D. organizations united by the Ural insurgent headquarters, the fascist officer organization conducted insurrectionary activities, which consisted in creating insurgent formations exclusively from former officers of the tsarist and white armies in a number of the largest industrial centers of the region. Rebel organizations were created in Sverdlovsk, Perm, Tagil, Voroshilovsk and Nadezhdinsk. In Sverdlovsk, the insurgent officer organization was headed directly by VASILENKO, in addition, in the village. Coin near Sverdlovsk, as noted above, there was an organization headed by KISLOV and IVANOV, the ROVS organization, consisting of special settlers. In Perm, the officer organization was headed by AZBUKIN and consisted of several dozen officers who lived in the cities of Perm and Molotovo. In Tagil, the officer organization was headed by Bulgakov and Okulov. It also numbered several dozen people. In Voroshilovsk, the captain of the old army IZMESTEV was recruited into the fascist officer organization, who, on behalf of EITNER, managed to put together an organization of officers of a dozen and a half people. In Nadezhdinsk, an agent of ROVS KOTELNIKOV created an organization from the former. white Cossacks of special settlers, among whom there were many officers, numbering about 100 participants.

From the moment the fascist officer organization entered the insurrectionary formations of the Ural insurgent headquarters, its insurrectionary activity unfolded even more widely. Members of the fascist officer organization were to play the role of commanders of the insurgent units and ensure the restructuring of the entire insurrectionary underground in the Urals on a military basis. VASILENKO and EITNER took part in the development of the basic principles for building an insurgent organization. The territory of the Ural region was divided into 7 insurgent districts, in which battalions, companies and platoons of insurgents were created. Members of the fascist officer organization were introduced into the district insurgent headquarters. The head of the Kudymkar rebel headquarters was officer KRIVOSHCHIEKOV. In addition, the direct leadership of the insurrectionary activities in this district was entrusted to a member of the Ural insurgent headquarters EITNER. Colonel MIONCHINSKY was nominated as the head of the Nadezhda insurgent district, and the ex. lieutenant MYZNIKOV. • In Tagil, the head of the rebel district

was BULGAKOV, his assistant OKULOV. In Voroshilovsk, the assistant to the chief of the armed insurgent forces was IZMEST'EV. The head of the Krasnoufimsky insurgent district was put former. white officer HORIZONS.

DOCUMENTATION

413

DARICHEV, STIKHNO, DIAGHILEV, KHRISANOV and other active participants in the fascist officer organization were placed at the head of the combat rebel units. The above-mentioned members of the officer-fascist organization, who were in charge of the insurgent districts, on the instructions of the Ural insurgent headquarters, developed plans for the uprising, which were consolidated into a single uprising plan for the VASILENKOV and EITNER region. When adjusting the plan, VASILENKO took into account the requirements of the German intelligence, transmitted to him by the German intelligence agent tg ITOKMAROM, which boiled down to the task of isolating the Sverdlovsk region from other regions of the Union in order to interrupt communication between Moscow and the Far East. These considerations proceeded from the general orientation of German intelligence to organize an uprising at the moment the war against the Soviet Union began on the part of Germany and Japan. The beginning of the uprising was scheduled for the spring of 1939.

Another important task in the field of organizing an uprising was to ensure that the insurgents were armed. According to VASILENKO's plan, the rebels had three sources of weapons: the use of weapons that the rebels had kept from the time of the civil war, the seizure of weapons located in Osoaviakhim, the seizure of weapons stored in military depots. Since, according to VASILENKO and EITNER, the weapons remaining among the population are insufficient in quantity and are in poor condition, the last two were the main sources of weapons for the insurgents. The task of mastering the weapons of Osoaviakhim was facilitated by the fact that members of the officer-insurgent organization, on its instructions, infiltrated the leadership of the organizations of Osoaviakhim. The regional council of Osoaviakhim was headed by a former officer VASILYEV; white officers headed by ZAMYATIN, in Voroshilovsk the chairman of Osoaviakhim was a member of the GUNNIR organization, and before him - SHERSTOBITOV. These persons deliberately disorganized the accounting of weapons and created stockpiles of weapons in the warehouses of Osoaviakhim, which were stored by people recruited by them and could be transferred to the rebels on demand. So, at the disposal of Kanonirov and Sherstobitov in Voroshilovsk there were 7 machine guns and about a hundred rifles. In Tagil, ZAMYATIN, KULIKOV and a member of the organization YABLONSKY illegally acquired and hid 8 machine guns of the Maxim and Degtyarev systems, several hundred combat rifles and revolvers, and 10 thousand rifle cartridges.

It was planned to carry out the capture of weapons located in military depots in the following way. A member of the fascist officer organization brigade commander BLUM, using his official position as chief of artillery Ural-

VO, before the uprising, had to issue orders for receiving weapons, according to which the rebels, dressed in military uniform, were to receive them in military warehouses. Even more important in terms of supplying the insurgents with weapons was the capture by the insurgents of military depot No. 59 in Perm, as outlined by the uprising plan, in the vaults of which there are stocks of weapons that could provide the insurgent forces of several insurgent districts.

The uprising plan developed by VASILENKO and EITNER had the main strategic task - to capture Perm with its defense plants and destroy the main railway line connecting the European and Asian parts of the Union. The plan was to destroy

414

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

the production of sabotage, all the most important industrial enterprises of the Urals and the deployment of bacteriological warfare, for which the Ural insurgent headquarters, with the help of German and Japanese intelligence, created hidden stocks of explosives and ammunition and bacteriological cultures.

Head of the UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk Region,
Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank DMITRIEV

October 25, 1937 No. 9416

Sverdlovsk

AL RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 205. L. 90-113. Script. Typescript.

*On the first sheet there is Stalin's resolution: "To T. Yezhov. Strange letter. And who from

named persons arrested? Have, say, Epifanov, Stikhno, Bulgakov and others been arrested? Dmitriev's note gives the impression of a newspaper article. I. Stalin.

No. 240

TELEGRAM K.N. VALUKHI ON I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE RIGHT TROTSKIST ORGANIZATION

October 30, 1937

No. 61514

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

In the case of the rightists, a branch of counter-revolutionary organizations in the Nenets district was additionally uncovered, headed by the former secretary of the district committee of the CPSU (b) LOBANOV, who was a close friend of UGLANOV. LOBANOV is closely connected with the former People's Commissariat of Health KAMINSKY.

Trotskyist CHIZHOV, an employee of the district newspaper arrested in this case, betrayed one of the groups of the organization, which settled in the north around the editorial office of the district newspaper Naryan-Ngern, and also betrayed a number of members of the organization in the branches of the GUSMP. A large manuscript with a fascist-terrorist content, which was the result of a joint discussion of the members of the organization, was confiscated from CHIZHOV. CHIZHOV in Magnitogorsk was closely associated with LOMINADZE. In Tyumen, testimonies were also received from a number of members of the organization about the emergence of the underground, in particular, the former chairman of the Tyumen City Council PICHUGIN and the director of the MTS SAKUN confessed and gave detailed testimony.

Arrested in Omsk, a teacher of a pedagogical institute, a cadre Trotskyist double-dealer SLIVKO, testified about participation in a Trotskyist organization, and named a number of participants. SLIVKO, inclusive, until 1933 studied in Moscow at the Second Moscow State University, where he was a member of the Trotskyist organization, of which SYROEZHINA is said to be a member, *V. ENUKIDZE*, "VINOGRADSKAYA" (wife of K. PREOBRAZHENSKY) and others.

I'm forcing the investigation.

VALUKHIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 325. L. 127-129. Script. Typescript.

On the last page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Are these gentlemen arrested or not yet?"

»_ * Surnames are circled.

DOCUMENTATION

415

No. 241

NOTE L.P. BERIA I.V. STALIN

ON MEASURES TO ACCELERATE THE CONSIDERATION
OF CASES ON ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS

October 30, 1937

№298

Secret

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

Over the past year, over 12,000 people have been arrested by the NKVD of Georgia. So far, of those arrested, the following have been convicted:

Troika 5 236

Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 910

Special Meeting at the NKVD of the USSR 591

Special Collegium of the Court of the Georgian SSR 468

Military tribunals 99

People's Courts 70

And in total, 7,374 people were convicted out of the total number of those arrested.

As a result, in the prisons of the NKVD of the Georgian SSR at present there are more than 5 thousand people under investigation, of which more than 2 thousand are kept in Tbilisi.
prisoners.

A number of abnormalities are being created in the conditions of detention of prisoners, namely: 1. The workload of the cells, which contributes to the violation of the rules of isolation, passing on the same cases of those arrested. 2. The impossibility of proper control over the behavior of prisoners, which contributes to various kinds of provocative tendencies on their part (attempts have been recorded to agree on the rejection of previously given truthful testimony about C.R. activities, a number of facts have been established when the lack of proper isolation contributed to collusion on the non-extradition of the activists of the KR organizations that remained at large). 3. Creation of conditions under which, when newly arrived arrested persons have the opportunity to get into the cells where the previously arrested are kept, to inform them about the newly arrested arrests and to give the prisoners any other information. 4. In turn, as a result of the foregoing, the prisoners inform the new arrivals about the course and methods of the investigation, allowing them to largely orient themselves and choose the most advantageous for their C.R. organizations line of conduct during the investigation.

Overloading of the prison premises of the Georgian SSR and its peripheral organs by excessive delay in the consideration of investigative cases prepared for trial.

The reasons for this delay are also rooted in the congestion of the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, which serves a number of territories and regions.

As a result, the arrival of an visiting session of the Military Collegium for a normal daily analysis of cases in the Georgian SSR was difficult, and in 1937 the Military Collegium considered only 910 cases in Georgia.

In this regard, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia asks for permission to submit for consideration

the decision of the Special Troika, created in accordance with the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, of the case against the participants of the NKVD opened by the GSSR:

1. Trotskyist terrorist sabotage and espionage organization,
2. Terrorist sabotage and espionage organization of the right.

If a positive decision on the transfer of cases of these categories to the consideration of the Special Troika is considered unacceptable, we ask you to allow the creation of a Special Collegium from the Supreme Court of the Georgian SSR to consider these cases.

In the event of a positive resolution of the issue of establishing a Special Collegium under the Supreme Court of the Georgian SSR to consider these cases, the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia will submit for your approval the intended composition of this Special Collegium.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (b) of Georgia BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 137-139. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From Comrade Beria*.

No. 242

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ARUTYUNOV S."

October 31, 1937

49 - About Arutyunov S. (telegram from Beria).

Approve the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia on the removal of Arutyunov S. from the work of the head of the political department of the Transcaucasian Railway. roads and investigate it.

RGASPI. F. 3. Op. 17. D. 993. L. 9. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 55.

No. 243

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF THE LEADERS OF SPECIAL TRIOS

November 2, 1937

76 - Question of the NKVD.

Approve as chairmen of special troikas for the repression of kulak-criminal elements to replace those who left:

1. Smolensk region early. management of the NKVD Comrade Nasedkin.
2. Rostov region early. management of the NKVD Comrade Deutsch.

3. Kuibyshev region early. management of the NKVD comrade Zhuravlev.
4. Krasnoyarsk region early. management of the NKVD Comrade Grechukhin.
5. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Khvorostyan of the Armenian SSR.
6. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Apresyan of the Uzbek SSR.
7. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Zagvozdin of the Tajik SSR.
8. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Mikhelson of the Crimean ASSR.
9. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Mikhailov of the Tatar ASSR.
10. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Medvedev of the Bashkir ASSR.

DOCUMENTATION

417

11. Buryat-Mongolian ASSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Tkachev.
 12. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Kornaukh of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
 13. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Comrade Mir kina.
 14. Chechen-Ingush ASSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Iva new.
 15. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Lotsmanov of the Kirghiz SSR.
 16. Alma-Ata region of the Kazakh SSR Comrade Volodzko.
- AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 141-141v. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 55.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov, regional committees, regional committees - respectively".

No. 244

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. EZHOVA I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM G.G. TELESHOVA
ON ARRESTS OF LEADING EMPLOYEES

November 3, 1937

N° 61642

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 85 beginning. UNKVD for the Tambov region comrade. TELESHOV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

MEMORANDUM No. 41906

The arrested former secretary of the Michurinsky city committee of the CPSU (b) POZNER Leonid Matveyevich and the chairman of the Michurinsky district executive committee KOZLEN KOV Kuzma Ilyich testified:

1) POZNER was recruited into the Trotskyist-Bukharin organization in 1936 by BULATOV, the former head of the agricultural department of the Voronezh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (arrested in Voronezh).

2) KOZLENKOV was recruited into the organization in 1936 by POZNER.

3) POZNER and KOZLENKOV knew about the presence of a right-wing Trotskyist center in Voronezh, headed by Ryabinin.

4) On the instructions of BULATOV, POZNER created an organization in Michurinsk, which included: KOZLENKOV - chairman of the district executive committee (arrested), BELYAKOV - chairman of the Michurinsky City Council, KUDRYAVTSEV - deputy chairman of the city council (arrested), KOKIN - early. political department of the railway in Michurinsk, ZHITENEV - director of the Michurinsk MTS (arrested), BARTEV - assistant. director of the MTS for political affairs (arrested), MALKOV - director of the MTM (arrested), DROBININ - chairman of the district consumer union, ODINTSOV - director of the Research Institute. Michurin (to be established).

418

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

5) Wreckers and sabotage were carried out by the organization in the direction of reducing crop yields, destroying collective farm livestock, destroying the MTS transport fleet, and disrupting trading activities.

We send interrogation protocols

1.XI.

TELESHOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 325. L. 144-146. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Yezhov. We must arrest all exposed. I. Stalin.

No. 245

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION P.T. ZUBAREVA

November 3, 1937

No. 61658

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the fifth protocol of the interrogation of P.T. Zubarev, an arrested member of the anti-Soviet organization of the right. dated October 29 of this year.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov

Zubarev Prokopi Timofeevich, born in 1886, employee, member of the CPSU (b) from 1904, until the arrest of the deputy. People's Commissar of Agriculture of the RSFSR and a member of the Central Executive Committee.

Question: During previous interrogations you repeatedly promised to tell the investigators truthfully about all your counter-revolutionary activities.

But in spite of these promises, each time you stubbornly concealed from the investigation very important facts of your c.r. work.

We suggest that you stop your double-dealing tactics and say everything that you have hidden from the investigation?

Answer: I am forced to admit that I concealed from the investigation a number of important points from my criminal counter-revolutionary activities.

I concealed from the investigation my secret work in the tsarist secret police, my provocative activities in the party, and my espionage secret service. activities under Soviet rule.

Question: When, where and under what circumstances did you establish contact with the tsarist secret police?

Answer: I established contact with the tsarist secret police in 1908 in the mountains. Kotelnichi b. Vyatka province, where I worked in the organization of the RSDLP from 1904 to 1908. and carried out party work on the analysis of the archive of illegal literature, receiving it from abroad through the Ural organization. In addition, I conducted agitation and propaganda work. The circumstances under which I was recruited by the police as their agents were as follows:

At the end of 1908, a bailiff Vasiliev with a large police squad conducted a search in my presence at my father's house in the village of Zubari. At the time of the search, the bailiff Vasiliev told me that I would be arrested the other day, that I could save myself from arrest and repression, provided that I agreed to be a police agent and would give them the necessary information, and suggested that if I agreed to meet him in the mountains Kotelnichi.

DOCUMENTATION

419

A few days later I was in the mountains. Kotelnichi, went to the bailiff's apartment, gave him consent to work in the police as an agent and to carry out all the tasks of the secret police. The bailiff Vasiliev gave me the nickname "Vasily".

Question: What tasks did you receive as an agent of the tsarist secret police?

Answer: The bailiff Vasiliev instructed me to periodically inform him about the work of the Boiler Organization of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks), about its personnel, and to give characteristics to individual most active participants. I completed this task. For the first time, I gave information in December 1908 about the work of the Boiler Organization of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks) and about the composition of this organization. In addition, I gave references to some employees of this organization, in particular, to the Bolsheviks Chibizov, Petukhov and Popov ...

Question: Tell us about your espionage work. By whom, where and under what circumstances were you involved in espionage work?

Answer: I was involved in espionage work in December 1935 by Sulimov, secretary of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, Ivanov, a member of the anti-Soviet organization of the right. Ivanov in his office during one of my meetings with him and conversations about k.r. activities of our organization suggested that I conduct espionage work, making it clear that this proposal comes from the leadership of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR: Sulimov, Lebed and Ryskulov. I gave him my consent.

Question: What specific assignments did you receive on espionage activities and from whom?

Answer: I received an assignment from Ivanov to collect secret information about the total sown area, the gross harvest of grain and other crops, about providing the collective farm population with food, seeds, providing livestock with fodder, and about the mood in the countryside.

Question: Did you complete the task?

Answer: Yes, I did. In January 1935 and December 1936, I gave Ivanov two pieces of information in accordance with the assignment received from him, and in the last piece of information I drew attention to the difficult food situation of the collective farmers, an extremely aggravated situation with fodder and the possibility of a large loss of livestock in arid regions ... *

Question: You have committed the gravest crime against the Party and the working class, the motherland. What do you plead guilty to?

Answer: I plead guilty to:

1. Being a member of the anti-Soviet organization of the right from 1929 until the day of my arrest, I actively fought against the Communist Party and the Soviet state with all the methods available to me, seeking the overthrow of the Soviet

th system and the restoration of capitalism in our country.

2. For these purposes, I carried out recruiting work in Moscow, in the Urals to attract new participants in the counter-revolutionary organization, capable of actively fighting the Soviet regime.

3. He was one of the leaders and a member of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in Moscow, one of the active organizers and leaders of the counter-revolutionary organization in the Urals.

4. Was one of the leaders of the c.r. sabotage subversive work in agriculture, carried out by the anti-Soviet organization of the right in the "Semenovodobedinenie", in the NKZem of the RSFSR and in the Urals.

5. Conducted espionage work in favor of Nazi Germany, becoming a traitor to the motherland.

420

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

6. He was one of the active leaders of the terrorist group of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in the NKZ of the RSFSR, which set itself the task of committing terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet state.

7. He was an agent in the tsarist secret police and a provocateur in the Bolshevik Party from 1908 to 1916 and betrayed the interests of the working class and workers.

The testimony from my words was recorded correctly and read to me. ZUBAREV.

Interrogated:

pom. early 4th department of the GUGB
NKVD captain of state security DOTSENKO

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 325. L. 147-157. Script. Typescript.

*

The protocol of interrogation is published partially.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Zubarev is a security guard. To include in the list".

No. 246

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. EZHOV I.V., TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF STATEMENT S. BERGAVINOV

November 5, 1937

No. 61723

I am sending a copy of the statement of the arrested Bergavinov dated 2.XI.37.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

NKVD USSR

From today, I consider further denials pointless, stop fighting the investigation and express a desire to give exhaustive evidence, both about my criminal activity and about other persons whom I know as participants in the anti-Soviet conspiracy.

For the first time, I embarked on the path of anti-Soviet struggle in 1933 upon my return to Moscow from the Far East. The main reason that prompted me to take this path was, in my opinion, the wrong removal of me from the Far East Committee, which at first aroused dissatisfaction in me, which later grew into anger against individual leaders of the Central Committee.

I was first drawn into an anti-Soviet organization by Mogilny, with whom I had personal relations and close friendship for a number of years. Subsequently, I became aware that a number of persons were participating in the anti-Soviet organization: Yakovlev, Veger, Grinko, Ioffe S., Kontorin, Khlopyankin, Sud'in, and others.

This anti-Soviet organization, in which I took part, recognized individual terror as a method of combating the Soviet regime.

The first conversation about the use of terror against individual leaders of the CPSU (b) and the government I had with Mogilny in the summer of 1935, after which I set about creating a terrorist group. I personally, as a member of the organization, created a terrorist group in Moscow in 1935 to organize assassination attempts on government leaders.

Since the end of 1935, I have involved hostile, determined people in this terrorist group - Ermon, Krylov, Chikovani, Zhigalev, Pochernev,

DOCUMENTATION

421

Levin, Zhdanov. In the early spring of 1936, I informed Mogilny about the terrorist group I had created, and then in the summer of 1936 Grinko.

The terrorists, each individually, on my instructions, studied the ways and means, routes, the passage time of government vehicles to commit terrorist acts against individual leaders of the party and government.

I undertake to give detailed testimony about my anti-Soviet terrorist activities at the next interrogation.

2.XI. 37 S. BERGAVINOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 325. L. 159-161. Original Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Has Ioffe S. been arrested? It is necessary to arrest both Ioffe and Ermon, Chikovani and other "terrorists". I. Stalin.

No. 247

NOTE L.Z. MEHLIS TO THE SECRETARIES OF THE CC AUCP(b)
ON THE SITUATION IN OGIZ

November 5, 1937

No. 1421

To the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Vol. STALIN,

KAGANOVICH, ANDREEV, ZHDANOV, EZHOV

About the situation in the OGIZ, how the press department sent enemies there

It is only now that the picture of the egregious crimes of Tal and his associates, who sent enemies of the people, Trotskyists and other spies, into the OGIZ is beginning to be clarified in all details.

Tov. Yudin, who is now the head of the OGIZ and is largely responsible for its contamination, sent me a list of 29 workers at various times seconded by the press department to the OGIZ. The overwhelming majority of them were expelled from the party or arrested. And even now there are dozens of people in the OGIZ who are politically dubious and hostile to Soviet power.

Yudin, who worked in the press department with publishing houses, is forced to admit: "... What has already been revealed quite eloquently says that the OGIZ is a collection of all kinds of rabble - spies, Trotskyists, politically dark people, rogues and decomposed people."

The situation in KOGIZ is apparently even more serious. The Central Committee has already removed, at the suggestion of the Press Department, Head. KOGIZ Strauch, but a thorough cleaning of the KOGIZ apparatus has not yet begun.

I am enclosing a list of persons sent to work by the press department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and a note by Yudin on 13 pages.*

Head Department of Press and Publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks MEHLIS

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 325. L. 162-163. Script. Typescript.

*

The note is published in part and without an appendix.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Comrade. Yezhov. Need to re-arrest the whole oggy evil scum. I. Stalin.

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 248

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE STATEMENT D.A. CONTORINA

November 7, 1937

No. 61746

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the statement of the arrested Dmitry Alekseevich Kontorin.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov
from the arrested Kontorin Dmitry Alekseevich

STATEMENT

Today I am arrested. Being summoned for interrogation, without waiting for evidence from the investigation, I frankly confess to the crimes I committed against the party and Soviet power. I asked the investigator only one question: was Ivanov Vladimir Ivanovich arrested?

Having received an affirmative answer, I immediately declared that I wanted to document my desire to repent before the Party.

In recent months I have become increasingly convinced that the organization of the right, of which I was a member, is failing more and more. One arrest of members of the organization followed another, I languished, did not know what to do. For reinsurance, I even wrote a statement to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks exposing the criminal practice of Ivanov V.I. It seemed to me that by doing this I would be able to avert suspicion from myself.

...Before 1931 Bergavinov was the secretary of the regional committee, under the influence of Bergavinov my careerist aspirations became more acute.

From Bergavinov I took over leadership and a passionate desire to advance at all costs.

Ivanov V.I., who arrived in Arkhangelsk in 1934 as the first secretary. soon caught my careerist aspirations, he managed to play on this, bring me closer to him and include me in an anti-Soviet organization.

It all started with seemingly innocent conversations, with critical remarks. By the time Ivanov arrived in the Northern Territory, it was bad with collectivization. At first around this question between Ivanov and

I had anti-Party conversations.

... My counter-revolutionary activities took place under the leadership of VI Ivanov, who was directly connected with the center of the right. He told me about his connection with Bukharin, Rykov and Lobov.

... I undertake to give detailed evidence to the investigation about my wrecking and terrorist activities.

I won't hide anything.

The investigation constantly asks me the question: which of the members of the organization of the right has not yet been arrested?

DOCUMENTATION

423

I must admit that, taking advantage of my official position as the secretary of the regional committee, I managed to save a number of members of the organization of the right from failures and arrests.

... During the interrogation, I will tell you in detail about the activities of the members of the organization and my own.*

Z.XI.37

D. KONTORIN

AL RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 326. L. 1-6. Script. Typescript.

*

The statement is published in part.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. This gentleman must be tied

with English intelligence. The penitent tone of the statement is a mask. Shake everything out of him that is out of him.

known (and he knows a lot). I. St.

No. 249

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH
ON THE "DIVERSION" ORGANIZATION

November 7, 1937

No. 61747

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 8015 of the head of the UNKVD for the ZSK comrade. GORBACH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Top secret

MEMORANDUM No. 42619

From Novosibirsk
November 5, 1937

People's Commissar VNUDEL comrade. Ezhov

We uncovered a spy and sabotage organization at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, which was preparing to disable the thermal power plant, blast furnace, open-hearth, railway, rolling shops, disorganized the work of departments - created and led by a Japanese intelligence officer - head of the chemical department of the central laboratory of the plant STADLER Ludwig Georgi

evich.

The arrested STADLER testified that, being in the army of Kolchak with the rank of captain, together with the remnants of the BAKICH gang, he fled to Western China in Shara-Sume, where he established contact with Colonel TRAVIN, who in 1921 was recruited and illegally transferred for sabotage reconnaissance work. STADLER had appearances * in Semipalatinsk to TROYE MILOV * and in Ust-Kamenogorsk to * ZVONKOV Fedor *. Until 1930, while working at the Beloretsk Metallurgical Plant, STADLER regularly transmitted espionage information to ZVONKOV about the work of the plant. In 1930, for

424

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Danish ZVONKOV, he went to the construction site of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant to organize a spy-sabotage group, to carry out a red flag. work aimed at disrupting the construction of the plant. By the time they arrived at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, STADLER recruited at different times *FEDER - an accountant *, the son of a kulak; *OKHOPKIN - design engineer*, son of a merchant; * PERIMOND - power engineer, son of a nobleman *; * DOLGANOV - designer, son of an archpriest *; * BESSONOV * - engineer, former white engineer; * PILIPENKO * - laboratory assistant, fist; * ELOVSKII * - technician of the technical control department, son of a fist; *IVANITSKY* - economist of the planning department, son of a priest; * LUTSENKO Fedor - an employee of the railway shop *; * CHUGAEV Stepan - switchman of the railway shop *; *BUSHMA KIN* is the rationing officer of the central laboratory and a connection has been established with *WOLF Felix*, *KULIKOV* Alexander and SHALAGIN Nikolai, who arrived from Harbin - all were arrested.

In sabotage and reconnaissance work at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, STADLER since 1931 was associated with ZVONKOV, to whom

transmitted espionage information, drawings of the plant's workshops under construction, and since 1931, on the instructions of ZVONKOV, he switched to communication with * PASHENTSEV Ivan, arrested *, to whom he transmitted spy information about the work of the plant, about the quality and purpose of the products.

Members of the organization created by STADLER disabled turbine generators, boilers, open-hearth furnaces, electric motors, prepared for the explosion of gas pipelines, thermal power plants and blast furnaces.

Protocols of interrogation are being sent.

3.1X.-1937

ÿ8015 GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 8-11. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "To T. Yezhov. Have members of Stadler's organization been arrested? Why doesn't Comrade Gorbach write about this? I. St.

* _ " circled.

No. 250

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO YA.A.
DEYCH ON THE SITUATION IN THE ROSTOV REGION

November 7, 1937

No. 61748

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 162397 of the head of the UNKVD for the Rostov region, comrade. DEYCH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

425

Top secret

TELEGRAM No. 2282

From Rostov
November 5, 1937

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR comrade. Ezhov

To No. C-1271

1. This morning in the mountains Rostov was still marked by long queues, mainly for manufactory and ready-made clothes. In the morning there were up to 12,000 people in the queues. The reason for the queues: the goods were released for sale in the last 2-3 days, despite the fact that there was a full opportunity to release them for sale much earlier. We raised this issue with the leading organizations. Another reason is the poor organization of trade and, finally, a large influx of collective farmers from the regions adjacent to Rostov. There are up to 50 percent of collective farmers in the queues.

Thanks to the measures taken, now the queues have decreased. 23 speculators were arrested.

2. In the order of measures for the alignment of the railway junction, the Road Administration named after Voroshilova ordered the cancellation of a number of suburban trains running from Bataysk to Rostov, and the trains with which workers and employees living in Bataysk go to the city were cancelled. As a result, on November 4, more than 3,000 passengers accumulated at the station. To maintain order, 60 shooters had to be thrown out. By evening, this order was cancelled. Now the trains are functioning normally.

3. At the Tikhoretsky, Armavir, Taganrog and Caucasian railway junctions, there is a delay in the payment of wages. The debt is calculated up to 2,000,000 rubles. Appropriate measures have been taken.

*4. In addition, 81 people were arrested. Eliminated two sabotage groups - a) At the mine. Artyom, Shakhtinsky district, a worker of this mine, POPKOV, was arrested, who was preparing an explosion at the mine for November 7th. POPKOV's testimony establishes that he was a member of a sabotage organization and was himself recruited by the former. the instructor of the party committee of the mine PUTILIN.

Also identified as members of this organization are the former. pom. chief engineer GOLETS and legal adviser ANDRIENKO. The arrested PUTILIN confirmed POPKOV's testimony about the presence of a sabotage organization and named a number of its participants, mainly from the engineering and technical staff. The investigation continues*.

b) The second sabotage group was opened at mine No. 5 of the Boguraevo-Gornyatsky Mining Administration, where the chief mechanic TARASOV recruited one locksmith, offering him to disable the main pump for the holiday for a monetary reward. Tarasov is arrested. The investigation continues.

5. In the Sulinsky district, near the Sokolov farm, on the night of November 4, a tractor driver of the Comintern MTS was killed. A special group was sent to the area to investigate.

426

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

6. In Rostov, half of the students did not show up for the meetings held on November 3 and 4 at the Medical Institute, the Pedagogical Institute and other universities dedicated to the 20th anniversary.

November 5, 1937 No. 162397

DEYCH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 205. L. 114-117. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's resolution: "Pogov. with Yezhov and Malenkov. The situation in the Rostov Region is alarming. Art. R.8. And what evidence does the recently arrested editor of the Rostov newspaper (Boitsov) give?

— On the left side of the margin there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Suspicious."

**
on the left in the margin there is Stalin's handwritten note: "What's the matter?"

No. 251

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO YA.A.
DEYCH ON THE SITUATION IN THE ROSTOV REGION

November 8, 1937

No. 61751

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 162400 from the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Rostov Region, comrade. DAYCH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

Top secret

MEMORANDUM No.
2285 Moscow. NKVD comrade. Ezhov

From Rostov N/A
dated 6.XI-37

To No. C-1271. Summary #3.

1. As a result of the 'delay in the issuance of salaries to individual enterprises*', in the mountains. Rostov took place the discontent of workers and employees. November 4 this year at the DGTF during the rally, a group of workers shouted: "Don't give us money, we won't go to the demonstration." By the measures taken, the salary was issued today afternoon. Four * shops of Rostselmash, due to the fault of the administration, were not given salaries *. In this regard, the ceremonial meeting on November 5 in the wheel shop was disrupted. At the Gosemalposuda plant on November 4, half of the workers were not present at the meeting due to non-payment of wages. On November 4, in the repair and mechanical shop of the Lenzavod in Rostov, a meeting was disrupted, which was attended by 700 people *, due to non-payment of wages. On November 5, a group of workers at the same plant, led by a female worker, RODINA, tried to beat up the commercial director of the plant.

2. An additional check in the cities of Novocherkassk and Shakhty, in trading organizations and canteens, found a significant amount of poor-quality products, mainly fish cones.

DOCUMENTATION

427

servos. November 1 this year in Novocherkassk, 6 cases of mild poisoning were noted from the use of biscuits made by a bakery. An investigation is underway. Substandard products are confiscated. The Rostov bakery received more frequent cases of poor-quality flour with worms, nails, acid smell, etc. in it. The culprits are revealed.

3. Additional 41 people were arrested.

The Kashar regional branch of the NKVD is being liquidated. a group of young people who set themselves the task of committing on November 7 "robbing stores, beating up Komsomol activists *. We are arresting 4 people. A provocative and slanderous statement. We arrest Khibalov. A counter-revolutionary slogan was written by house painter Kuznetsov at the Krasny Gidropress plant in Taganrog.

5.XI-37, No. 162400

DEYCH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 205. L. 118-120. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's note: "It is not safe in the Rostov region. St.". underlined in pencil.

No. 252

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN

TO SVERDLOVSK REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE AUCP(b)

ON EXPANDING THE RIGHTS OF THE TROIKA

November 14, 1937

No. 2028/sh

SVERDLOVSK REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE AUCP(b) TO THE STOLYAR

Answer No. 149. Go through the top three cases of acts of sabotage on the Kaganovich road with execution to the guilty.

STALIN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. II. D. 57. L. 132. Original. Typescript.

No. 253

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH
ABOUT THE "SPY AND WRECK" ORGANIZATION
IN THE STATE BANK SYSTEM

November 15, 1937

No. 61936

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 839 beginning. UNKVD for the Novosibirsk region Comrade GORBACH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

428

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

People's Commissar VNUDEL USSR comrade Ezhov

We have arrested Georgy Pavlovich GINGERSON, head of the department of monetary circulation of the Regional Department of the State Bank in Novosibirsk. In the past, a nobleman, convicted twice for attempting to illegally cross the border into Latvia. GINGERSON testified that he was a member of the Trotskyist espionage and wrecking organization that exists in the system of the State Bank, into which he was recruited in 1935 by the former manager of the Gosbank Administration Area in Novosibirsk, LEIKAND, who was arrested in Moscow.

According to the testimony of GINGERSON, it was established that in the system of the State Bank No.

Vosibirsk Region, Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, on the instructions of the Trotskyite MARYASIN, the former chairman of the board of the State Bank in Moscow (arrested) by LEIKAND and FAINER (also a former manager of the Regional Administration of the Gorbank in Novosibirsk committed suicide), a spy-sabotage organization was created, in which included AGUZIN Moisei Abramovich - the chief accountant of the Regional Directorate of the State Bank, the son of a big merchant - we are arresting; GONOROVSKII Boris Semenovich - head of the department of crediting the industry of the Regional Directorate of the State Bank, lived in Harbin until 1929 - arrested; BURYKIN Georgy Dmitrievich - former inspector of the Leninsky branch of Gorbank, expelled from the party, Trotskyist - established; BERGAUZ Saul Irtsevich - director of the Novosibirsk City Administration of the State Bank, Trotskyist, was associated with the Trotskyist NUSINOV (arrested), formerly lived in Riga - we are arresting; SHARLAMOV Yakov Arkhipovich - former chief accountant of the Novosibirsk City Administration, kulak merchant, former white punisher officer, lived in Harbin until 1923 - is being established; KONEV Boris Petrovich - former head of the statistics department of the Regional Directorate of Gorbank, former white lieutenant colonel officer - arrested; MULIKOVSKY Aleksey Konstantinovich - consultant of the Regional Agricultural Bank, former nobleman - arrested; KUCHIN Fedor Georgievich - former manager of the Regional Agricultural Bank, expelled from the party, Trotskyist - we establish; NATANZYAN Alexander Alexandrovich - head of the foreign group of the Regional Directorate of the State Bank, in the past, a former trusted private bank - arrested; ADLER Denis Rudolfovich - former deputy manager of the Novosibirsk City Administration of the State Bank, Hungarian, arrived in the USSR in 1924 - arrested; FALLEVICH Anatoly Alexandrovich - Deputy Governor of the Obltorg Bank, former merchant, Socialist-Revolutionary until 1923 was repeatedly in Harbin, Shanghai - arrested; LOKHMACHEV Yakov Yakovlevich - former manager of the Kemerovo branch of the State Bank, expelled from the party, Trotskyist, was associated with the Trotskyist DROBNIS, NORKIN (we establish).

MAGNITSKY Leonid Nikolaevich — head of the revision group UNKVD of the State Bank, former white officer - arrested; EPIFANTSEV Alexander Fedorovich consultant of the planning sector of the Regional NKVD of the State Bank, expelled from the party, a former white officer - arrested; FOFANOV Sergey Mitrofanovich - inspector of the monetary circulation sector of the regional department of the State Bank, a former Menshevik - we are arresting. GOLOSKOV Pyotr Andreevich, former manager of the Stalinist branch of the State Bank, was expelled from the CPSU (b) for his connection with the Trotskyists (we establish others among 40 people). The members of the organization are involved in espionage and sabotage activities, mainly in the branch of the State Bank of Industrial Regions: in Stalinsk, Kemerovo, Leninsk, Angers, Barnaul, Krasnoyarsk and others. The organization through LEIKAND, FAINER and the chief accountant of the Novosibirsk State Bank AGUZIN (we are arresting) was connected

DOCUMENTATION

429

with the center of the Trotskyist organization in the Board of the State Bank of the USSR, represented by MARYASIN, ABEZGAUZ, ARKUS, LANDE, ARSON and RUMYANTSEV (arrested in Moscow). On the instructions of this center, the organization in the regions of Siberia disrupted lending to the leading branches of industry and agriculture, disorganized money circulation, disrupted timely

payment of wages to workers in the districts.

Her subversive espionage work was in contact with the right-wing Trotskyist center in Novosibirsk, in the person of GRYADINSKY, VORONIN, KO LOTILOV, EDELMAN and VAZHNOV - they were arrested.

GINGERSON also testified that in 1925 in Novosibirsk he was recruited for espionage work by a German intelligence agent, the former secretary of the German consulate in Novosibirsk, HUBNER (left for Germany), to whom until 1935 he transmitted espionage information in the State Bank system. In 1935-1936. GINGERSON was connected personally with the German consul in Novosibirsk, GROSSKOPF. 1

A member of the organization, the deputy manager of the Novosibirsk city office of the State Bank, ADLER, was arrested - he was also a German and Japanese agent. Through them, the organization maintained constant contact with the German and Japanese consulates in Novosibirsk, passing on spy materials collected by members of the organization. I'm making arrests. Sending the protocol.

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 326. L. 123-127. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Grichmanov (personally) for information (for use, return to the Central Committee to Comrade Poskrebyshev).

No. 254

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO I.P. MALKIN
ABOUT "WRECKING" IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

November 15, 1937

No. 61938

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 190200 of the head of the NKVD department for the Krasnodar Territory, comrade. Malkin.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR EZHOV
MEMORANDUM No. 43946

In connection with the systematic lag of Mainneft in the implementation of the oil production program and frequent accidents, I sent an operational team headed by my deputy to Neftegorsk to clarify the situation.

The team established that the poor performance of Mainneft was the result of the activities of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, which had been operating for a number of years.

The arrested chief of staff of the Air Defense M. Yekimov testified that in 1934 Gorbunov, head of the inspection of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, was recruited into the Trotskyist organization in Rostov (convicted) and, on his instructions, contacted the existing counter-revolutionary organization in Moscow, headed

430

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

managed by the manager of the trust Borshchevsky, a Pole, a nobleman, and his deputy Parakhin, an engineer.

The counter-revolutionary organization, literally in all areas of the production of the trust, has widely launched wrecking and sabotage work.

For a long time, drilling was widely carried out in areas where there was no oil. Oil-rich areas were hidden and not developed for a number of years. Oil from flowing wells, under the pretext of poor throughput, was dumped into ravines.

The most important structures: a power plant, water pumps, compressor stations are built in such a way that they constantly threaten to fail and completely stop all industries. The railway line built by Borshchevsky is clearly unsuitable for operation. Drilling power plant accidents, pumping stations adopted the system. According to Ekimov's testimony, the organization's sabotage activities were managed by the former chief of Glavneft, Barinov. Ekimov named more than 20 members of the organization. Some of them arrived with Borshchevsky from Sakhalin.

Additionally, 6 members of the organization were arrested. We develop the investigation. After covering Ekimov's testimony, I will request a sanction for the arrests of Borshevsky and Parakhin. Malkin.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 338. L. 275-277. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "Borshchevsky and Parakhin must be arrested immediately. I. Stalin.
==

No. 255

SPBTSSOBSHCHEENIE N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO V.A. TKACHEVA
ABOUT THE PANMONGOLIAN SPY ORGANIZATION

November 15, 1937

No. 61969

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 315 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, comrade. TKACHEVA.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of DORZHIEV, DAMPILON and MARKIZOV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

People's Commissar Vnudel N.I. Ezhov

We are uncovering a counter-revolutionary underground Pan-Mongol espionage-rebel organization in Buryatia.

According to the testimony of the arrested participants in the organization of the center, the pan-Mongolian organization included: YERBANOV - former secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b), MARKIZOV - former second secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b), DOR ZHIEV - former chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, DAMPILON - former chairman of the BurTSIK, professors in Leningrad : BORODIN, ZHAMSARANO and ABTU ANIS DORZHIEV are unofficial representatives of Tibet. The organization covered all the main sectors of the national economy of Buryatia, creating rebel subversive branches in a number of areas. A number of members of the organization

DOCUMENTATION

431

were associated with Japanese intelligence. As established by the investigation, Yerbanov established contact with the pan-Turkic center headed by RYS KULOV. 142 people were arrested in the case, including: people's commissars - 5, secretaries of the district committee of the CPSU (b) - 7, chairmen of district executive committees - 5, employees of the NKVD - 3, employees of the republican organization - 54, kulaks and llamas - 68. Arrests continue.

DORZHIEV, former chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, DAMPILON, former chairman of the BurTSIK, and MARKIZOV, former second secretary of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who are active participants in the center and organization, have long been expelled from the party, removed from work, all of them are members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

I ask for the purpose of reversing the investigation by telegraph to sanction their arrest.

I'm sending you the interrogation protocol.

TKACHEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 326. L. 129-131. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Yezhov. For arrest. St."

No. 256

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO N.I. IVANOV
ABOUT THE "WARNING" ORGANIZATION (65)

November 15, 1937

No. 61979

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 3320 from Comrade Ivanov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Top secret

MEMORANDUM No. 44431

From Grozny 14. IX.37

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. Ezhov

1/XI, the Trotskyist wrecking organization of Grozneft was liquidated under the "Otvét" department. Arrested in the case of GASHIN Stepan, KORNIENKO Alexander confessed and confirmed the existence of a wrecking Trotskyist organization in Grozneft, about their involvement in the K.-R. wrecking organization to reduce oil production by manufacturing substandard equipment. Recruited into the organization in 1936 by DYRCHENKO, at that time the manager of the Staro-Grozny oil region. He named 25 participants, including: ROZINOER, the former manager of the Groznoneftekombinat, the chief mechanic of the combine, SHEVCHENKO.

According to the testimony of KORNIENKO, the organization, on the instructions of DYRCHENKO, is working to disable and reduce the production of newly discovered oil

432

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

district "Mountain-Gorskaya". For this purpose, the members of this organization, Alexander Fyodorovich MARKOV, and GASHIN, a mechanic, were sent to work at Gora-Gorskaya. According to Agdan, the organization was associated with *BICHKEVSKY*, who arrived from Germany and is now working in Tuapse as the director of the plant.

We send interrogation protocols by mail.

14.XI. No. 3320.

IVANOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 338. L. 278-280. Copy. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Bichkevsky should be arrested. I. Stalin.

— underlined in pencil.

No. 257

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP OF
EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY,
POLICE AND PRISONS"

November 20, 1937

278 - On trade union membership of employees of the Department of State Security, Police and Prisons
(OB dated 17.XI.37, pr. No. 75, p. 213gs).

Accept the proposals of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions:

- 1) Liquidate the union of employees of administrative institutions;
- 2) Employees of the departments of state security, police, corrective labor camps and prisons should be exempted from being in a trade union, while retaining the right to restore their professional experience when they transfer to work in other institutions or enterprises (as for military personnel);
- 3) The civilian employees of these institutions, remaining in the trade union, shall be transferred to the union of employees of state institutions;
- 4) Workers of labor communes, colonies and ancillary production enterprises of the NKVD should be transferred to the relevant industrial trade unions.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 993. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 55.

No. 258

I.V. SAVINOV'S CODER TELEGRAM STALIN AND N.I. Ezhov
ON INCREASING THE LIMIT ON KULAK OPERATIONS

November 20, 1937

No. 2677/sh

Top secret

Moscow. Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, vol. STALIN, EZHOV

The limit of kulak operations of the first category established for the Smolensk region has been exhausted. In connection with the end of the operation in the near future, it is necessary to condemn more than 2 thousand people of active counter-revolutionaries -

DOCUMENTATION

433

priests, sectarians, organizers of counter-revolutionary formations,

rorists, most of which should be assigned to the first category. I ask permission to increase the limit for the first category by 1,000 people.

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks SAVINOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 97. Original. Typescript.

On the sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "For. I. St.

No. 259

SPECIAL MESSAGE M.P. Frinovsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
REVIEW OF A SPECIALIST FROM XINJIANG

November 28, 1937

No. 62349

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

In 1935, a member of the CPSU (b) Yu SU SUN, aka NARIMANOV, was transferred to
Xinjiang (PB decision 29.1.35, No. 20).

NARIMANOV in Xinjiang is the deputy head of the political department of the headquarters of
the duban and the secretary of the anti-imperialist union.

In 1936, NARIMANOV married the sister of SHEN duban.

Currently, in Khabarovsk, a k.r. a Trotskyist organization led by the Chinese ZHOU DA MING, aka
CHUGUNOV (he was also approved for transfer to Xinjiang, but then the trip was canceled for
reasons he presented - he was widely known as a communist). ZHOU DA MIN created the organization on the
instructions of a Japanese agent, a participant in the military-fascist conspiracy, VALINA (former head
of the intelligence department of OKDVA).

The investigation established that NARIMANOV was also recruited by VALIN and was a
member of the liquidated k.r. Trotskyist organization CHUGUNOV.

It seems necessary to immediately recall NARIMANOV from Xinjiang to the USSR and
bring him to justice.

I ask for solutions.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

M. FRINOVSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 327. L. 193. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the sheet: "I agree. I. St.

No. 260

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM L.M. ZAKOVSKY

ABOUT "VARATIVENESS" IN THE GUNS INDUSTRY

November 29, 1937

No. 62373

Soy. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 102153 of the head of the NKVD department for the Leningrad region, comrade. Zakovsky.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

434

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

MEMORANDUM No. 4030

The 3rd department of the UNKVD for the Leningrad region arrested a participant in the POV, the chief engineer of artillery plant No. 7 Nedzvetsky P.V.

Nedzwiecki admitted during interrogation:

a) recruited as a member of a counter-revolutionary organization by the head of the tool shop Labuts (convicted) and the former head of shop No. 2 Chukhlita - now the director of the Kyiv Machine-Building Plant (the arrest was reported to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR);

b) on the instructions of the POV, carried out sabotage and wrecking work aimed at disrupting the production of guns and producing low-quality guns;

c) in the spring of 1937, on his instructions, a sabotage was carried out in cannons of the 02/30 system, sent to the country on a special order. Lead was put into the gun compressors, which led to their failure in a combat situation. Of the 32 guns of this special order, 25 were out of order;

d) for the implementation of sabotage, Nedzvetsky recruited the master of the OTK Savin. Savin was arrested, admitted:

1) that he was producing obviously unusable guns on the instructions of Nedzwiecki; 2) when checking guns after shooting at an artillery range, he put pieces of lead into gun compressors. This led to the failure of the recoil device after a small number of shots.

The investigation continues.

ZAKOVSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343. L. 96-97. Script. Typescript.

On the second sheet there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "T. Yezhov. What kind of guns?

No. 261

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON VACATION TO EZHOV"

December 1, 1937

380 - About Yezhov's vacation.

1. Oblige Comrade Yezhov to comply with the decision of the Central Committee on leave until December 7 with a stay outside the city and with a ban on him to appear in the institution for work.

2. Suggest to Comrade Stalin to see to it that the present resolution of the Central Committee is carried out by Comrade Yezhov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 993. L. 74. Original. Typescript.

Protocol N° 55.

No. 262

RESOLUTION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(B)

ABOUT BAUMAN, BUBNOV AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CC

December 4–8, 1937

1. About Bauman. Bubnov. Bulin, V. Mezhlauke, Rukhimovich, Chernov. Ivanov V., Yakovlev Ya., Mikhailov M., Ryndina.

On the basis of irrefutable data, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) considers it necessary to withdraw from the membership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and subject to arrest, as

DOCUMENTATION

435

enemies of the people, Bauman, Bubnov, Bulin, Mezhlauk V., Rukhimovich and Chernov, who turned out to be German spies; Ivanov V. and Yakovlev Ya., who turned out to be German spies and agents of the tsarist secret police; Yakovlev, and Ryndin, who was connected in counter-revolutionary work with Rykov and Sulimov.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 238. L. 230. Copy. Typescript.

No. 263

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. STALIN

WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL B.M. TALY

December 5, 1937

No. 62257

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. Stalin

I am sending you the first protocol of the interrogation of the arrested member of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist organization BM TAL. dated November 28 this year

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF TAL Boris
Markovich dated November 28, 1937

TAL B.M. - Born in 1898, born in Baku, citizen of the USSR. Doctor of Economic Sciences, from 1917-1918 a member of the left internationalist group LINDOVA.

From 1918 to the day of his arrest he was a member of the CPSU (b).

Former head of the department of printing and publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Question: You are accused of being a member of an anti-Soviet Trotskyist organization of waging a struggle against the Party. Tell us how and when you embarked on the path of struggle against the party?

Answer: This is either a slander against me, or a combination of some fatal circumstances. I have never been a member of a Trotskyist organization.

Question: You have been fighting against the Party for many years. Stop your denial and testify about it?

Answer: I did not fight against the Party. I have had errors in my work for which I am ready to bear responsibility.

Question: You are not arrested for mistakes, but for crimes.

Answer: I confess that my mistakes were harmful, but I did not commit crimes against the Party.

I admit that my mistakes and mistakes in my work could objectively lead to sabotage.

Question: TAL, call a spade a spade. You can't get away from a direct answer. How and when did you embark on the path of struggle against the Party?

Answer: I see that I will have to tell the truth about the crimes I have committed against the Party.

I decided to tell everything. In 1922-1923. I wrote a pamphlet "History of the Red Army", in which history was distorted in the Trotskyist spirit and the role

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

TROTSKY was exalted. This was my departure from the party. In subsequent years, I published this pamphlet, changing only the number of quotations from TROTSKY, but the essence remained the same.

At the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress, I wrote a pamphlet, Ways of Building Socialism in the USSR, in which I propagated the Bukharin thesis that the kulak was growing into socialism.

In the future, until 1932, although I did not have such a speech against the party, the Trotskyist wormhole undoubtedly remained with me. In 1932-1933, during the years when the resistance of the hostile elements to the developed socialist offensive was especially sharpened and the party was smashing the Trotskyists, rightists, "leftists", I did not agree with the line of the party on this important question. I considered it wrong that the party was fighting against the Trotskyists, I believed that these people could be used and could work well, although they did not agree with the leadership of the party.

Disagreeing with the attitude of the Party towards the undisarmed Trotskyists, in my practical work I tried in every possible way to preserve these people, not to offend them.

In 1932, when I came to work as an editor at the newspaper For Industrialization, I met here a solid bunch of Trotskyists, Mensheviks, expelled from the CPSU (b) and the like. I saved most of these people in the newspaper For Industrialization. This was the practical expression of my struggle against the Party. I moved further and further away from the party.

During my work in the newspaper "For industrialization" I often met with SEREBROVSKY. We met with him at the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, at my editorial office, at meetings, and so on. In one of the conversations - this was around 1934 - I shared with SEREBROVSKY my views on the need to use former Trotskyists at work.

SEREBROVSKY warmly supported my anti-Party views.

In one of the subsequent conversations, SEREBROVSKY himself developed these thoughts of mine. From the question of the use of Trotskyist cadres, we moved on to discussing party policy, criticizing it from anti-party positions. We have come to the general conclusion that the point is not only that Trotskyists must be used in the work, but the main thing is that Trotskyist cadres must be preserved, they must be united and fight against the line of the Party, against the leadership that has established in party intolerable regime pursuing a wrong policy.

SEREBROVSKY, pointing out that he was actively fighting against the leadership of the party, told me that he had created a Trotskyist-right organization in the NKTP. According to SEREBROVSKY, the main task of this organization was to carry out sabotage in all areas of the work of the NKTP, which was aimed at undermining the confidence of the working people in the party, weakening its influence. In the same conversation, he angrily declared that the role of business executives was not sufficiently appreciated. They create all the material values, and they are forced to walk "under the secretaries." I have a better position on gold, - boasted SEREBROVSKII, - there the secretaries of district committees are "in the pocket" of business executives, since in the hands of business executives

all material resources and all supplies.

Question: When did SEREBROVSKY recruit you into an anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization?

Answer: I cannot restore the exact date now, since in 1934 we met with him quite often. But I attribute SEREBROVSKY's involvement in the Trotskyist-right organization precisely to this period.

DOCUMENTATION

437

I agreed with SEREBROVSKY's proposal to work jointly with the organization existing in the NKTP, since I stood on anti-Party positions. This is how my recruitment into an anti-Soviet organization happened.

Question: What instructions did you receive from SEREBROVSKY as a member of an anti-Soviet organization?

Answer: SEREBROVSKY gave me a directive to keep the Trotskyist and right-wing cadres in the press and to cover up in every possible way through the newspaper For Industrialization the facts of the organization's sabotage activities, for which purpose to put out the signals of sabotage coming to the editorial office.

Question: Will you testify about your wrecking activities in the field of the press?

Answer: While working as the editor of For Industrialization, I defended the Trotskyists and the rightists in every possible way. When there was a special examination of the staff of the newspaper, and the check revealed a large number of alien, dubious and hostile people, I openly spoke out in their defense (*YBERMAN-YURIN*, *YERNER*, *ROSENBLIT*, *EPSHTEIN*). In my practical work, I carried out the instructions of SEREBROVSKY and did everything possible to cover up the existing Trotskyist-right organization in the NKTP and its sabotage activities from exposure.

Question: How was your anti-Soviet subversive activity expressed at work in the press department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks?

Answer: When in 1935 I transferred to work as head of the press and publishing department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I used every opportunity here to fight against the party: I littered the central and local newspapers, the publishing houses of the Central Committee with people alien and hostile to the party; authority.

By this time, I was already on the Trotskyist positions. Departing from the party path on the question of using Trotskyist cadres, I began to fight against the construction of socialism, against the leadership of the party with the logic of struggle, and, naturally, this grew into a struggle for the restoration of capitalism.

Wrecker work in the field of the press was carried out along the following lines: planting Trotskyists and Rights in the central, regional and regional newspapers, clogging the publishing houses with alien and hostile people, disintegrating

all the work of training press cadres, the disruption of work on the verification and promotion of new cadres, the covering and encouragement of the hostile line in newspapers and publishing houses.

This sabotage work, hostile to the Party, was carried out with the help of the Trotskyist wrecking organization, which I had created in the Department of Press and Publishing, and I assigned the task to the members of which to carry out wrecking work in the press and publishing houses.

Question: Who was recruited by you into the Trotskyist anti-Soviet organization you set up in the press and publishing department?

Answer: Arriving at the press department in the spring of 1936, I began to look closely at the employees of the department. In a number of workers I found Trotskyist waverings in the past, suspicious connections with hostile elements, personal dissatisfaction with the position they occupied. Using this data, I started recruiting for an anti-Soviet organization.

MIKHAILOV. He came to the press department from the agricultural department. At first he worked for the central agricultural newspapers, and then he began to be in charge of the sector of the regional and regional press. Probing MIKHAILOV, I tried to find out how he relates to the staff of editors of regional newspapers. While talking about newspapers

438

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

(1935-1936), I repeatedly demanded that he evaluate the work of editors and characterize a number of newspapers. He approached the evaluation of editors very superficially. If a newspaper was presented lively from the purely external side, the editor's ability to present material well was noticeable, then the editor of such a newspaper, despite the fact that this newspaper suffered from a lack of political sharpness, was defined by MIKHAILOV as good. MIKHAILOV considered one of the foremost editors **MUHOVITSKY** ("Ural Worker"), who really had an external effect.

Emphasizing the correctness of such an attitude towards editors, I instructed MIKHAILOV that when selecting people for leading newspaper work, one should take into account their ability to write, especially without carping about the fact that they do not raise political issues. MIKHAILOV easily accepted this installation. He easily accepted the conclusion that we should strive to preserve the existing staff of editors, although some of them do not work well. I stressed the briefing on questions of newspaper technology only and pushed aside the completely political examination of leading newspaper workers.

After that, I had an open conversation with MIKHAILOV, proposing in every possible way to litter the press workers with people hostile to the party, primarily Trotskyists, and cover them up. MIKHAILOV agreed to this, and I involved him in the Trotskyist organization I created. This I easily managed to do because MIKHAILOV was a hidden Trotskyite. He actively joined in the work of polluting the editorial staff with people hostile to the party and was the main supporter and conductor of the wrecking system of moving the same editors from one region to another, although they were politically bankrupt.

MIKHAILOV received instructions from me to do everything possible to cover up the sabotage activities of the people we sent, not to lose contact with them, and to protect them from the attacks of the Party organizations. He emphasized close ties with the editor of the Crimean newspaper *** MADONOV *** , the editor of the Chelyabinsk newspaper *** SYRKIN *** , the editor of the state farm newspaper ^ SEGALO - WHICH *** and many others, whose names I do not remember.

That this connection is not accidental, but pursued the goals of the Trotskyist organization to preserve the cadres fighting against the party, is evidenced by the following facts: when MADONOV was removed in Stalingrad (he had previously worked in the Crimea), MADONOV urgently came to Moscow to MIKHAILOV, as to protector and to get a job. This was prevented by the arrest of MADONOV.

The same must be said about SYRKIN. Materials were received on him that he was connected with the counter-revolutionaries, we gave SYRKIN responsible assignments and supplied him with money.

In addition, MIKHAILOV monitored the staffing of regional and regional newspapers and he did not interfere with the fact that the states were clogged with alien and hostile people.

ZHDANOV. He worked in the sector of the regional press with MIKHAILOV. It was not difficult to convince him that in the process of selecting people and evaluating those already working, it was enough to approach from the "business" side and not pay attention to political fluctuations in the past, or political "mistakes" in the present. Working under the direct supervision of a member of the organization MIKHAILOV and under the influence of my processing, ZhDANOV was drawn into the sabotage clogging of press personnel, was recruited by me, for which he gave

your consent.

DOCUMENTATION

439

Having been recruited by me into an anti-Soviet organization, ZhDANOV went so far in sabotage that he did not even carry out the elementary and necessary checks on people sent to work by the press department of the Central Committee. This led to the scandalous failure of Zhdanov**. In May-June 1937, he prepared 8 candidates for approval by the Central Administration, who turned out to be politically dubious and enemies of the people. By decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, ZHDANOV was removed from work.

Carrying out the instructions of the organization about communication with the editors of newspapers of interest to the Trotskyist organization, ZHDANOV was connected with VORONOV, KAPUSTIN (former editor of the Saratov newspaper), RUBINSTEIN (former editor of the Kuibyshev newspaper).

"Soviet trade". Its editor, NODEL, impudently suppressed signals of wrecking work in the system of the Tsentosoyuz, with whose leader, ZELENSKY, he was politically connected and waged a struggle against the leadership of the party. The newspaper "Soviet Trade" has completely lost its political sharpness. This does not mean that she did not post negative materials, did not signal. She did this, but deliberately presented the material in such a way, so

condensed negative facts that it was possible to conclude that throughout the USSR there were continuous outrages and hunger for all goods. NODEL, advertising the enemies of the people, did not fight pests.

A signal was received about NODEL - a statement to the press department from an employee of the newspaper RUPASOV about NODEL's suspicious mistakes, about his connection with the arrested Zelensky, and so on. This signal, of course, was serious enough to immediately raise the question of removing NODEL from the post of editor of the newspaper. However, this was not done. An employee of the press department YELIZAROV, whom I instructed to check RUPASOV's statement on the spot, dragged out the investigation and did not give any conclusions. I left NODEL as the editor.

Question: You not only drowned out this signal, but also praised NODEL as an editor in every possible way?

Answer: I do not remember such facts.

Question: And what about your speech at the anniversary evening of the editors of the Sovetskaya Torgovaya newspaper, where you declared that Sovetskaya Torgovy was one of the best newspapers and that its editor, NODEL, was one of the best editors?

Answer: It was an anniversary performance.

Question: You are lying. You praised the enemy of the people who fought against the party and the people.

Answer: TAL is silent*.

Interrogated:

Head of Department of the 4th Department of GUTE
Major of State Security KORBENKO

Assistant to the head of the department of the 4th department of the
GUTE, senior lieutenant of state security KOLOSKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 328. L. 77-96. Script. Typescript.

The protocol is published in part.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Malenkov. Read it together with Comrade Mekhlis and get Yezhov to arrest all
the scoundrels noted in the testimony of the scoundrel Tal. I. Stalin.

— Surnames are circled and there is a note in the margin: "Where are they?"

— The surname is circled and there is a note in the margin: "Where is he?"

— Surnames are circled and there is a note in the margin: "Arrest]".

No. 264

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE REPORT OF THE FORMER ASSISTANT
OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE

December 10, 1937

No. 62672

Napravlyak> Japanese documentary material received by us through undercover means - a report by the former assistant to the Japanese military attache in Moscow, Captain KOOTANI - "The Internal Situation of the USSR (Analysis of the Tukhachevsky Case)", made by him at a meeting of the Japanese Diplomatic Association in July 1937.

The report of KOOTANI is preceded by an introductory speech by Colonel KASAHARA, Chief of the Soviet Section of the 2nd Division of the Japanese General Staff.

The members of the Japanese Diplomatic Association are the most prominent diplomatic and military figures of Japan. Association meetings are secret.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Top secret July 1937

Japan Diplomatic Association

INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE
USSR (Analysis of the Tukhachevsky case)

Report by Captain KOOTANI with a preface by the Chief of the General Staff Department, Colonel KASAHARA, at the 199th meeting of the Japanese Diplomatic Association.

Documentary
translation from Japanese

WARNING

The Japanese Diplomatic Association at its 199th meeting heard reports from Colonel of the Cavalry KASAHARA and Captain of the Infantry KOOTANI on the current situation in the USSR. The content of the reports is of great importance and is of deep interest, which is why the presidium made a record of the reports for distribution only to the full members of the association. It should be borne in mind, however, that the text has not yet been reviewed and tested by the speakers and that, therefore, the full responsibility for it lies with the association. In addition, the reports touch on highly sensitive military and diplomatic issues. In this regard, please pay special attention to the fact that the transfer of material for familiarization to unauthorized persons is strictly prohibited.

Research Department of the Japanese Diplomatic Association

Colonel KASAHARA

DOCUMENTATION

441

HOW TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN THE RED ARMY (Foreword to the Report of Captain KOOTANI)

The peculiarity of the Soviet problem is that it is subject to extremely rapid changes, in connection with which the new situation in the USSR is of great interest than in any other country.

Captain KOOTANI returned from Moscow at the beginning of this month and among our army has the latest data on the internal situation in the USSR, in view of which a detailed report will be made by him.

I would like to take this opportunity to make a few summarizing remarks about the trial of the Red Army commanders.

The current process has demonstrated the fact that the weakness of the Red Army lies along the line of its moral solidarity, which further confirms our idea that in the event of a clash with the Red Army, which we cannot equal in numbers and quantitative terms, victory must be achieved along the moral line, and this is the weak point of the Red Army, in the event of a collision, we will need to use

call.

It seems to me, however, that this is the weak point of the Red Army, and that the upheavals that we observe inside the USSR are not a factor of great importance in its external relations, and that it is too early for us, when we make our observations from the outside, to express hope. to the fact that "something will happen" to the Soviet Union.

On the question of how such a situation will affect foreign policy (many specialists are present here, and I apologize for intruding into their area), I believe that at the present time the USSR does not want war, but on separate issues foreign policy will probably be held more firmly - to the extent that this cannot lead to war. It seems to me that they will be more firm on the fisheries and the oil question. Already after June 19, Soviet troops occupied two islands east of Blagoveshchensk and continue to occupy them to this day. It would be another matter if these islands were a disputed territory in the past. But they were not a disputed territory, navigation signals were installed on them, and a fairway passed between them and the Soviet territory. The Soviet side still recognized these islands as the territory of Manchukuo. Now, the Soviet troops unexpectedly attacked the islands, demanded the eviction of the Manchu gold diggers who were there, and continue to occupy this territory to the present. This, apparently, should be viewed as the desire of the Red Army to show its strength: "You supposedly think that the Red Army is not capable of anything, but we are not so weak." I consider it possible that it is in this situation that a great

firmness in relation to foreign countries.

Captain KOOTANI will tell you about the details.

Captain COOTANI

INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE USSR I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

I was in Moscow as an assistant to the military attache from March 1935 to early April 1937, and before that, I had been studying Russian affairs at the General Staff for only two years, that is, in general, I have been studying Russian affairs for about 4.5 years. Of course, I am just a beginner in this sense.

442

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

and I cannot be compared with Colonels KASAHARA and HATA present here, who have been studying the Russian problem for more than ten years. It confuses me to no small extent that I have to express my thoughts and observations here, in the presence of the most authoritative representatives of various circles. However, I want to speak frankly on the basis of my personal observations.

II. THE CASE OF MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKY

1. Stalin's measures for cleaning inside the country.

First of all, I want to express my thoughts on the most interesting question of the day—the trial of Marshal Tukhachevsky and other leaders of the Red Army. In general terms, I have no big differences with what was published in the interview of Colonel HATA or in the form of a military communiqué. In details, however, there are some differences, and I ask you to listen to them, considering that this is entirely my personal assessment.

It is wrong to consider the execution of Tukhachevsky and several other leaders of the Red Army as the result of an anti-Stalinist movement that broke out in the army. It would be correct to see this as a phenomenon stemming from the purge work carried out by Stalin for some time, penetrating the entire country. Such processes, presumably, will take place in the future. This purge started last year. It is based on the desire of Stalin, in connection with the growing tension in the international situation, to achieve political strengthening within the country and secure freedom of action for the implementation of his plans. The first step was to purge the Communist Party. Lenin said that the party would certainly grow, but if its growth were left to chance, it would begin to rot, and therefore it was necessary to organize purges at the right moments to expel all alien elements. Purges were repeatedly carried out in the past, but the purge that began the year before last was

the first step in the general purge conceived by Stalin within the state. This great purge was carried out under the name of the exchange of party documents. All party cards were taken away, and all those who had something in the past, who did not justify the title of party member and who represented a passive element, were not given new documents. It is said that in the period up to the middle of last year, several hundred thousand people were thus expelled.

This great purge was followed last August by the process of the so-called united centre, with Zinoviev and Kamenev at the head. At this trial, on Stalin's instructions, the testimonies of the defendants, who had already been involved in the case of the murder of Kirov and were under supervision, were published for general information. 16 defendants were shot. This, in my opinion, was the second stage of Stalin's work to purge the interior of the country. At the trial of the united center, the name of the now executed PUTNA was named, and already during the trial or immediately after it, PUTNA was arrested. He was an attaché in London and is said to have been recalled on some pretext and arrested at the frontier. Putna belonged to the Trotskyist group, and was an expert on the Far East - at one time he was a military attache in Japan, then commander of the Primorsky group and deputy commander of the OKDVA.

DOCUMENTATION

443

I do not remember exactly who testified at the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial that cells were created in the Red Army that plotted to kill Voroshilov and other leaders of the army (maybe even Stalin). Since that time, arrests began in the army. Of course, this was not published, but information about it reached us. One could think that after Zinoviev and Kamenev new victims would appear. Indeed, in January of this year, the case of the parallel center arose. At the trial there appeared the figures of the former Deputy Party Committee of Foreign Ministers SOKOLNIKOV, PYATAKOV, SEREBRYAKOV and RADEK (RADEK always got into squabbles with Colonel KHATA; an extremely interesting figure). Three of the accused were sentenced to 10 years in prison, the rest to death. The process of the parallel center, in my opinion, represents the third stage of Stalin's work to purge the interior of the country. During this process, PRIMAKOV, assistant commander of the troops of the LVO, was arrested, who was said to be connected with the case of the parallel center. There were rumors about PUTNA during my stay in Moscow that he had already been shot. It is possible that he really was shot before the current announcement of the trial and his testimony was published retroactively.

Both PUTNA and PRIMAKOV are old Trotskyists, but TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, EIDEMAN and KORK cannot be included in the same group. Simultaneously with the arrest of PRIMAKOV in January of this year, quite large figures were also arrested. Their names are not known now. It is possible that there will be another new process, or the matter will be dispensed with without any process. At the trial of the parallel center, it became clear, moreover, that TUKHACHEVSKY'S adjutant had been arrested, and around January-February, TUKHACHEVSKY ceased to appear at diplomatic banquets. We thought he might have been arrested. There were rumors that he was in danger.

In fact, TUKHACHEVSKY was on vacation in the Caucasus at that time, but from that time on they began to talk about what was not going well with him. It could therefore be assumed that TUKHACHEVSKY, PUTNA and PRIMAKOV would be arrested, and I personally was not very surprised to see their names in the current report on the trial. However, the fact that, after a short trial, such people as Yakir, Uborevich, KORK, and the head of the command department FELDMAN (actually the head of the army personnel department) were immediately shot, amazed even me, a person accustomed to fast pace and sharp changes in Russia and knowing that for Russia such cases are a common occurrence. I think that both Colonel KASAHARA and Colonel HATA were amazed.

2. Validity of the case

There is no material to accurately assess how the case arose. The Soviet authorities announced that the defendants were connected with the leadership of the army of a certain foreign power and supplied it with espionage data, and also that they were plotting an uprising against the current government, but this cannot be believed at all. If we take examples from the past, then a common Russian tactic is to transfer internal events to the field of external relations and turn the mood of the people against foreign countries. Both in the current trial and in the trial of the parallel center, especially the second one, the name of the OTA ambassador present here, or the name of the Japanese, denoted by the letter "X", was mentioned in order to propagate the extent to which Japan and Germany incited the activities of the parallel center. The current communiqué of the authorities on the case of TUKHACHEVSKY and others is the same propaganda

444

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

yes, in which there is not a word of truth, but one must see in it a device of Bolshevik incitement aimed at inciting people's hatred of foreign countries, while the version of a connection with foreign powers can by no means be trusted. Therefore, it is impossible to do an analysis on the basis of a government report. On the other hand, there are no phenomena that would make it possible to make an estimate. We can make various assumptions, but they will all be equally unfounded, and it is better to refrain from baseless assumptions. If, however, one follows the path of various conclusions, then the matter can perhaps be reduced to the following narrower framework, which I will try to outline.

First of all, you need to think about what TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, EIDEMAN and others, who were now shot, were like. TUKHACHEVSKY - a native of the aristocracy, guards officer. He was a company commander in the war, returned from Germany at the time of the revolution and immediately joined the revolutionary army, took part in the war on all fronts and especially distinguished himself by defeating Poland as commander of the Western Front. The army of TUKHACHEVSKY became famous in the Soviet-Polish war. He then held various posts and became Deputy Minister of War. Along with a natural mind, he apparently possessed some political abilities. In general, he brought the Red Army to its present, enormous size and was its supreme leader.

from a specifically military point of view. It can be said without exaggeration that the current Soviet plan of defense and the great expansion of the Red Army carried out over the past year or two were born entirely from the head of TUKHACHEVSKY.

Yakir graduated from the tsarist military school in 1917 and had some experience in officer service even before the revolution, that is, to be more precise, he was trained in a military school and, one way or another, differed from commanders who came from workers. In German circles, they even say about Uboevich that he is a bigger figure than TUKHACHEVSKY. YAKIR and UBOEVICH occupied the most important posts of commanders of the districts on the western border, they were entrusted with the best and most powerful units of the army, they belonged to the stratum of the highest military specialists in the Red Army. All the rest - both EIDEMANN and CORK - are officers of the tsarist army. All of them were representatives of the so-called military intelligentsia, and they carried out special leadership of the army.

If we talk about the leader of the Red Army VOROSHILOV, then he did not receive a systematic military education at all, and his military experience consists in the fact that he was the commissar of the 1st Cavalry, commanded by BUDENNY. He himself did not command the troops, but was a pure party worker who played the role of an observer at BUDENNY. Since then, he has had the experience of 12 years in the post of People's Commissar, but during this time he did not enter the military academy and did not receive any military education. His current military bearing and military knowledge is the result of his 12-year tenure as People's Commissar for Defense. VOROSHILOV, consequently, belongs to a completely different type than TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR and UBOEVICH, and is a purely political figure.

Inasmuch as military specialists such as TUKHACHEVSKY and others have recently played an exceptionally large role in the greater expansion and strengthening of the Red Army, Voroshilov's popularity has somewhat faded in the past year. But at the same time, from my point of view, if the commanders led by TUKHACHEVSKY expanded and strengthened the Red Ar

DOCUMENTATION

445

mission, they did it not in the interests of pure state defense in the communist spirit, but, as purely military specialists, with the aim of creating a powerful defense army. Previously, in the Red Army, due to the presence of a parallel system of commanders and commissars, the command of the troops encountered great difficulties, and now one can imagine that the idea of establishing one-man command by eliminating the commissars was also probably born in the environment of Marshal TUKHACHEVSKY.

Thus, if we carefully analyze the VOROSHILOV and TUKHACHEVSKY groups, we can get an idea of the current process. Ultimately, STALIN could not help but extend his purge of the country to the Red Army. In other words, it is easy to imagine that STALIN, faced with the need to move the Red Army up and down, right and left at will, had already discovered the presence of an organization of military specialists who were not entirely on communist

positions—although it never came to such an organization—or, in any case, the existence of a certain stratum of the intelligentsia that hindered or tried to hinder the purge in the country. If we had not reacted to this, then the popularity of TUKHACHEVSKY and others in the army would have increased even more, and their influence could not have been broken. Probably, STALIN and VOROSHILOV had fears that this, especially with the weakening of VOROSHILOV, could lead to an attempted coup d'état.

The question arises - was it really necessary to shoot a whole group in one gulp just out of antipathy. Of course, there must be some motive. My personal opinion regarding this motive is that there was no plan of insurrection, not even terrorist plans. As far as we can imagine, it is quite possible that military specialists responded to STALIN's attempt to carry out a complete purge among the army with certain opposition, proceeding from the need not to reduce the combat effectiveness of the army. TUKHACHEVSKY and others could, for example, protest in some form against the intention to shoot PUTN, PRIMAKOV and persons associated with them in one go, or against the involvement of new persons in the case. You might think that only for such an opposition one could not have been shot, but that is what the Japanese think, who judge Russia on the basis of the situation in Japan, while in Russia, in the event of a train collision, the head of the station is immediately shot, who bears for this responsibility. Human life is valued cheaply in Russia, and if they tell me whether it is not funny for people to be shot for such opposition, I will say that there is nothing funny. And for Russia it is quite possible.

Various assumptions can be made, but probably no one will be able to dispute that the current process is connected with the purge carried out by STALIN in the country, in other words, that it is aimed at strengthening the dictatorship of STALIN. Consequently, in this case, some kind of painful process took place - whether in the form of the intentions of the TUKHACHEVSKY group to overthrow the government or in some other form, and against this the knife of the Stalinist power fell, that is, the initiative came from the Stalinist power. At the time of the TUKHACHEVSKY trial, the newspapers wrote under huge headlines "The Collapse of the Red Army", but I personally felt even then that this was absolutely not the case. Since the newspapers started to write about the "collapse", naturally they had to continue in the same spirit, and now they write "the repression continues" and so on. This has given rise to the contradiction that now the newspapers are forced to write about all the arrests that are made - about any

446

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

to whom unknown to the Central Executive Committee, the outlying republic or the head of the railway. But this kind of repression, given the duration of the purge policy pursued by STALIN, will probably take place in the future, and it would be erroneous to see this as a turmoil generated by discontent against the TUKHACHEVSKY case.

3. Impact of the incident and the future of the central government

The question is asked what impact the current incident had on Red

Army or even the Soviet Union. Two moments arise here that are incomprehensible to us Japanese, who have not truly boiled in the cauldron of Russian life. The first is how much pressure the Stalinist government exerts on the people, the second is how patient the people are and how powerless they are in the face of a strong government.

Even until now, the 165 million Soviet people have been led by Stalin's dictatorship, submitting to the force of oppression. The conductors of this oppression are: the GPU itself, the GPU's network of spies, and the GPU-led network of mutual surveillance among the people themselves. It transcends all imagination. Even before the recent incidents, the people in a state of complete confusion and panic looked at the policy of repression. I would like to note in brackets that in the year before last, or three years ago, that is, since the beginning of the 2nd Five-Year Plan, the living conditions of the people gradually improved and softened. The population gradually began to forget about confusion and fear, more and more people began to appear who sang the praises of Stalin's policy. This is true, but the Stalinist policy of repression is so strong that it cannot be imagined.

The second is the patience of the people, that is, their ability to submit to a force that they are not able to resist. This trait of the national character was brought up by centuries of tyranny of the tsarist system and at the same time is rooted in the natural conditions of the country - its vastness and sharp climatic changes, before which man is powerless. It is amazing how strong this capacity for patience is among the Russian people.

If both of these factors are taken into account, one can imagine in general terms how the current incident is reflected in the people. As Colonel KASAHARA has already said, thanks to the current incident, mutual suspicion and anxiety among the command staff, especially the top command staff of the Red Army, will deepen, further, thanks to further repressions, the atmosphere of mutual distrust and anxiety will intensify in the leading stratum of the central bodies. All this harms the spiritual cohesion of the people, and there is no doubt that from the point of view of synthetic defense power or state defense in the broad sense, the moral weakness of the USSR will be more and more pronounced, and that the current incident will serve as a source of disaster. in future.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the dictatorship of STALIN is extraordinarily strong and that the present trial has been carried out to strengthen the dictatorship of STALIN, that is, that the trial as such is a success. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone will be able to object to the thesis that as a result of this process, the dictatorship of STALIN will be further strengthened. At the same time, the people are characterized by humility, silent obedience to power. The people are only worried about what if the next turn is mine, but they are still incapable of resisting. I always assert that if this fear turned into hatred, then one could speak of a shock to the Stalinist regime, but in the current situation, the people rather forgot about their former hatred and are in the grip of fear alone. Not so easy to do

this fear is hate. The Stalinist policy of repression will probably continue. From this point of view, those who, in connection with the process, speak of a shock to the Stalinist regime or the possibility of such shocks in the near future, are based mainly on their own hopes.

It is possible that some of you look at things this way - even if the dictatorship of STALIN is strengthened, but since anxiety and fear reign among the people, does this not speak of the weakness of the USSR and is it possible that the current government cannot collapse. I am against such an assessment of the situation. Let us turn to examples of how military commanders acted on the battlefield during the Civil War, and you will understand what I want to say. At the moment when the operations or the situation of the battle unfolded unsuccessfully, the commanders resorted to the strongest repressions, to terror and executions against their subordinates, and then the course of the operation changed for the better and the battle took a successful turn. Examples of this, as they say, were observed, in particular, during the Siberian events. I think this is true. In any case, the mood is this: if I don't follow STALIN's instructions and sincerely put them into practice, they will put me in jail. My conclusion from this is that it is premature to speak of a weakening of the defensive power in general, on the grounds that the people are seized with fear.

I have heard the opinion that although Britain, France and Germany are closely watching the events in Russia, only the Japanese army gives a serious, reserved assessment of these events. It seems that this opinion was also expressed in the newspapers. I want to say on this occasion that the Japanese General Staff and the Japanese military circles know Russia best of all, and that the bodies responsible for the defense of the state cannot afford to give a frivolous assessment of events. You may say that this cautious assessment is based on sophisms, but I was in Russia and observing Russian conditions, and the first thought that flashed through my head when the present case arose was the thought: "Well, now the dictatorship of STALIN will be strengthened," and by no means the thought that her song has been sung. I deliberately express it in an artless way, how the people feel.

I repeat once again: there is no doubt that the present incident has weakened the spiritual solidarity of the Red Army, that this incident is fraught with great dangers in the future, that when we have to fight with you, we will have to use this weak spot of the enemy to the maximum extent, and that we should strive to use it. But if, on the basis of this one incident, they conclude that the state power of the USSR has greatly decreased or that the combat effectiveness of the Red Army has fallen to a greater extent, then I want to correct this view, especially since the modern USSR, carrying out the Stalinist purge inside the country, seeks specifically to increase its defense capability.

4, Relations between STALIN, VOROSHILOV and BLUKHER

Newspapers write about tense relations between STALIN and VOROSHILOV, or between VOROSHILOV and BLUKHER, which allegedly arose as a result of the TUKHACHEVSKY affair. There is a lot of talk about this topic. I want to express my opinion on this matter.

Both STALIN and VOROSHILOV, as I have already said, are the leading figures of the Politburo or the government, such as MOLOTOV, KALININ, MEZHLAUK, MIKOYAN, KAGANOVICH and so on, then none of them has such popularity and energy as VOROSHILOV. People often talk about KAGANOVICH, but he belongs to the Jewish nation, which

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

most of the 170 million population of the USSR does not like it, and does not have the data to lead the state. Ultimately, only VOROSHILOV remains. First of all, he is the leader of an army of 1,800,000. Even STALIN, with all his courage, cannot ignore this enormous force and plunge his knife into it. In carrying out such decisive measures, STALIN undoubtedly acts hand in hand with VOROSHILOV, and, besides, he, besides VOROSHILOV, at the moment has no one to rely on. MOLOTOV is the type of school teacher, KALININ is just a redneck, among the rest there are no big people. However, given the growing suspicion of STALIN, there is no guarantee that STALIN will not fail VOROSHILOV in the future, especially considering the rapid pace of change in Russia, which Colonel KASAHARA spoke about. Perhaps, while I am speaking here, a message from Moscow has already appeared in the evening newspapers: "the execution of VOROSHILOV" (although, of course, judging by today's situation, this is still impossible).

But here's who you need to pay attention to - this is Ezhov from the GPU. Isn't he? Ezhov is still young and in many ways resembles the deceased KIROV. Thanks to the present process, he has grown even more, and if his popularity grows further, he may perhaps be able to become STALIN's mainstay. In any case, to speak in connection with the present trial about the dissension between STALIN and VOROSHILOV is to express arbitrary hopes.

Further, about the relationship between BLUCHER and the center. If there were actions against the authorities on the part of BLUCHER, he would by no means be kept in the isolated Far East, at the head of an army of 300,000 with 1,200 aircraft and 1,200 tanks, against Manchuria and Japan, who inspire them with such big concerns. This is proof that the current government, and especially STALIN, trust Blucher. If there were even the slightest symptoms of the hostility that Blucher supposedly harbors, then he went to Moscow several times last year and the year before, and he could have been disposed of at any moment. This, however, was not done. From the point of view of BLUCHER himself, he can do nothing in the distant Far East, no matter what the central government undertakes, but on the other hand, without undue ambition, in his present position he is the king of the Far East. If everything goes smoothly, then maybe a moment will come when a tidbit will fall to his lot, and there is no need to go on the rampage against the authorities. Therefore, I assert that all the rumors about the opposition of BLUCHER to the combination of STALIN-VOROSHILOV, about the existence of some complications or disagreements, are also based on hopes, and not on facts. However, what changes this may undergo in the future is unknown.

5. Influence on the combat capability of the Red Army

Some express the following point of view: "The elimination of such major military specialists as TUKHACHEVSKY and others led not only to a weakening of the moral cohesion within the Red Army, but, probably, to a decrease in combat capability on the intellectual side, especially

but also to a decrease in the quality of the leadership of the high command.

I don't argue with that. There is no doubt that the simultaneous loss of a commander with experience in leading large armies, like TUKHACHEVSKY, people who had commanded military districts for a long time, like Yakir and Uborevich, or the head of a military academy, like KORK, led to a decrease in the quality

DOCUMENTATION

449

supreme command. But the question is the degree of this reduction - by one or two steps. There are no coefficients here, and nothing can be said about this. But I would like to point out (although it is difficult to make such comparisons) that it would be a mistake to think that the top of the Red Army has been cut off, just as all the members of the Supreme Military Council resigned after the events of February 26 in our country. The number of those who in Russia have the rank of full general is 40-50 people. If now 7-8 generals have been eliminated, then 30-40 still remain. Among them there are upstart generals from the workers, there are also military specialists from former officers, so that there is no shortage of senior command personnel.

Here the question arises whether there are people who can replace intelligent commanders, like TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH or KORK. I want to answer this: if you look, you will find it. This is, first of all, SHAPOSHNIKOV, who has now become Chief of the General Staff. He is an excellent connoisseur of military affairs, who was a staff officer in tsarist times, and during the Polish war served as chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the main command. Then he gradually rose in rank, during my stay in Moscow he was the head of the Military Academy, then the commander of the district in Leningrad, and now, after the process, he became the chief of the general staff. He belongs to the category of military theoreticians and, from the point of view of special military knowledge, is superior to TUKHACHEVSKY, perhaps inferior to him in terms of political abilities. There is also Marshal EGOROV - although not a major figure, but, in any case, a former staff officer. In addition to them, among the prominent generals in the center there is, for example, SEDYAKIN - also a former officer, a rather knowledgeable person, there is a young energetic commander of the Air Force Alksnis, there is the first deputy of the general staff LEVICHEV. Of those with whom I have come into contact and talked, the listed persons undoubtedly possess military knowledge and are real commanders. Therefore, it cannot be said that the combat effectiveness of the Red Army in relation to the supreme command has declined so sharply.

III. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY TRAINING OF THE USSR 1. Expansion of the Red Army over the past two years

You have probably already heard more than once how much the Red Army has grown stronger of late, and I will not dwell on this question in detail. I want to elucidate only one question - what could result in the future large expansion of the armaments of the Red Army, carried out during the two years of my stay in Moscow. I arrived in Moscow on March 1, 1935; on the 16th of the same month Hitler's well-known declaration followed. It could be assumed that this declaration would have an impact

influence on the defense plan of the USSR and will cause a turning point in the Red Army. And indeed, the year before last, an increase in the personnel military forces, a change in the proportions of personnel and territorial units, the strengthening of aviation, the restoration of the Cossacks, and so on, were carried out. Thus, in 1935, in connection with the fear caused by the remilitarization of Germany, a large expansion of the army was hastily carried out, and TUKHACHEVSKY in the same year declared that the system of state defense of the USSR was built on new foundations. Formerly it was supposed to wage war as far as possible against one adversary, without creating enemies for oneself.

450

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

simultaneously in the west and east, in 1935 the principle of simultaneous independent operations on the western and eastern fronts was established. This principle differs from SCHLIEFEN's plan - first, to defend on the eastern front, in order to strike France with all the might through Belgium and then, with the already freed forces, to lead the offensive to the East. Russia is in a different position: they knew that Hitler not only made a declaration on remilitarization, but also proclaimed an anti-communist policy, in connection with which, there is a danger of a simultaneous outbreak of war on the eastern and western borders. At this moment, the only Siberian railway line will be absolutely incapable of providing the necessary transfer of troops. Consequently, such operational readiness is needed so that it is possible to simultaneously wage war separately in the west and east. This is the Russian principle of simultaneous war on two fronts. Measures such as the increase of the standing army from 960,000 to 1,300,000, or the transformation of territorial divisions into personnel divisions, are urgent measures designed for a simultaneous war on two fronts. This was accompanied by such measures as the appointment of first-year soldiers who passed a kind of "test" as officers, or the appointment of agronomists as junior lieutenants. In 1936, the hasty expansion of the army was brought into the system, and a plan was drawn up for a large expansion of armaments of the second stage. Now the USSR is implementing a two-year plan for the expansion of armaments, which, as far as I can imagine, began to be carried out in the autumn of last or the beginning of this year.

The plan must be completed in all its parts within two years, that is, by the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939. The army (not counting the variable territorial units) will be increased to 1,800,000 men, the number of infantry divisions to at least 100, the cavalry divisions to 37; which were at my disposal, it could be concluded that the organization of about 95 infantry and 30 cavalry divisions had already been completed. There should be 60 air brigades, about 10 motorized mechanized corps, that is, strategic formations, the core of which are tanks. These forces are distributed on the eastern and western fronts on the basis of the general principle of simultaneous warfare on two fronts. Based on the current deployment, as well as wartime mobilization capabilities, and so on, one can presumably say that the troops that will be thrown into the Far East will amount to from 1/3 to 1/4 of the total size of the Soviet army. This figure, when compared with the number

our army does not give us grounds for calm.

This is especially true for the air force. 60 air brigades is such a figure that does not allow for the slightest optimism on our part. Here, on the wall in front of me, there is a table in which the figure is given - 5,200 aircraft. It often happens that the number calculated by us, who are at air posts, does not agree with the figures that are published in the center. It will be necessary, of course, to compare them with the data available in Japan, but it seems to me that in fact there are slightly more aircraft than 5,200. After all, these are only military first-line aircraft, but if we add civil aviation and a second-line reserve, the figure there will be much more. In addition, the number is growing all the time, and in general, it is possible, without exaggeration, to determine the total of 6,000 cars. If a third of this number is on the eastern front, this will amount to 2,000 aircraft.

DOCUMENTATION

451

2. The state of aviation requires the greatest attention

I believe that the ARAKI doctrine of the possibility of defeating large military forces with small forces is unacceptable to the operations of modern air armies. With all the qualitative superiority, it is also necessary to have the number of aircraft capable, in general, of resisting the enemy. But the question of the number of planes is a question of the second priority, while what I am most concerned about at the moment, and in relation to which I would like to see the cooperation of all those present here (if I am clumsy, I ask Colonel KASAHARA to correct me) - it is the circumstance that we do not keep up with them in regard to the progress of the technology of aircraft construction. Among the first-line aircraft that Russia currently possesses, there are, for example, bombers that began to be produced in the autumn of the year before last, and today all first-line units have already been re-equipped with them. These new vehicles, called SBs, have a top speed of over 400 km/h. They are now active on the Spanish front and are causing a lot of trouble to German and Italian aviation. In Europe, these Russian SB bombers enjoy a good reputation. Further, there is a new model of fighters - I-16, which is a modified American Boeing, with a speed of over 450 km / h. At the May Day parade in the year of my arrival in Moscow, more than 50 of them unexpectedly appeared, much to the surprise of the spectators. It was the first time I myself saw such aircraft, and they also made a great impression on me. A year later, at the May Day parade last year, there were already 210 of them. By this time, units of the first line in the most important directions were already armed with I-16 aircraft. At present, most of the advanced formations have been re-equipped with I-16 fighters or, simultaneously with them, a new model of I-15 released.

I will refrain from characterizing the state of Japanese military aircraft, but I want to emphasize that the quality of Russian aircraft is currently the subject of attention of all the powers of the world, and that we need to be especially vigilant about the fact that they have the ability to produce aircraft in large quantities. . How did they achieve

this? Due to the fact that the state places maximum emphasis on the development of the aviation industry.

As for the production capacity of the Soviet aircraft industry, I believe that last year the number of aircraft produced in Russia reached 6,000. If only half of them are military aircraft, then 3,000 aircraft of new types were put into service in a year, and, consequently, in two years all aviation will be completely re-equipped. Such a productive capacity of aircraft construction is truly awe-inspiring. My first thought is that, in connection with this, we in Japan must by some means achieve the development of our aircraft industry.

It must be borne in mind in this connection that the progress of the technology of aircraft construction depends on the state of aviation research bodies. In Russia, the largest body of this kind is TsAGI in Moscow. It bears the name of the Aerodynamic Institute, but in reality it is 100% an aviation research body. To the extent that I was able to find out, it is divided into about 5 sections - heavy bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, fighters, transport aircraft, and so on. As far as I remember, the total number of engineers in all

452

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

sections - more than 2,000 people. TsAGI is not only a theoretical research body, but each of the sections has a plant, and all these plants occupy a huge area in one of the districts of Moscow. If I remember correctly, it is under the jurisdiction of the newly organized NKOP. All research work is carried out at the expense of the state. TsAGI sends many workers abroad who do not talk about how to get or buy a new aircraft that has appeared somewhere, but immediately buy new foreign models. At the same time, they are not stingy and buy not 1-2 aircraft, but immediately a large batch, carry out all kinds of tests, use the best, correct defects and begin to build such aircraft as the current SB or I-16. In addition, they non-stop building all kinds of prototype aircraft. The mere concentration of knowledge and resources on this matter already has a great effect.

Let us turn to the situation in Japan. Research bodies are fragmented - there is an army institute, a navy institute, Mitsubishi, Nakajima, Aichi Tokei. Each of the aviation firms is forced to retain the best engineers, each must buy prototypes of aircraft and engines abroad. As a result, one has to carry out painstaking research work in one's small laboratory, in other words, there is no possibility of using available forces in a certain direction. Experienced aircraft, which cost a lot of money, have to be redone if they do not meet the requirements of the army in army tests. Experienced aircraft require enormous expenditures. Meanwhile, all firms are commercial enterprises that cannot but reckon with such costs. Consequently, in the final analysis, the costs of experimental work are reflected in the prime cost of aircraft. The rulers suffer greatly as a result of this.

stvo, and aviation firms. I believe that without the unification of all these scientific research bodies into one powerful Japanese aviation research institute, which would be run by the state and in which a wind tunnel would be built, accommodating an entire aircraft and giving a wind speed of 300 -700 km / h, we will not be able to keep up with the Russian TsAGI. We do not keep up with them, not only in terms of improving the quality, but we also do not have enough aircraft, and our entire people are truly to blame for our dear comrades - officers and young aviation non-commissioned officers, who every two days give their lives to post. I feel this especially keenly, because I saw the powerful development of TsAGI in Moscow. The army alone cannot solve this problem; it is necessary that the whole nation unanimously make efforts to develop aviation.

There is another question related to this. The replenishment of aviation and the progress of aviation technology depend on the construction of new factories and the concentration of scientific research bodies, but in peacetime, and especially in wartime, the most important issue is the training and replenishment of flight personnel. In Russia, in the current situation, of course, the army is also involved in personnel training, but there is also a civilian air fleet that trains civilian pilots, although this is not expressed in large numbers. However, the work on the popularization and training of aviation, which is carried out by Osoaviakhim, requires our greatest attention. At the Congress of Soviets last November, Air Force Chief of Staff Khripin stated: "Germany claims to have 70,000 pilots. If so, then we must have 100,000." This was met with thunderous applause from the congregation,

DOCUMENTATION

453

and the very next day, the workers of a Leningrad factory called: "100,000 is not enough, let's train 150,000 people." This has been put on a practical footing, and Russia is currently training 150,000 pilots. This mass training began around the beginning of last year, under the leadership of the Air Force headquarters through the Osoaviakhima civil flying club system. Such clubs exist everywhere. At the end of the year before last there were 137 of them; each of them has about 10 training aircraft and about 20 students at all times. Mostly workers or peasants are engaged, who at the same time do not give up their main job. In this way, by the end of the year before last, Osoaviakhim trained 2,850 pilots, corresponding to pilots of the 3rd class.

According to data published in June last year, the number of flying clubs increased by 30 in just six months and reached 167, and the number of civilian pilots of Osoaviakhim reached 7,250 by the summer of last year. According to the figures that I received immediately before my departure from Moscow, Osoaviakhim now has 9,500 pilots. This is the growth rate from 2,850 to 9,500 in just a year and a half. If they continue at the same pace, the task of training 150,000 men will by no means be impossible.

Regarding the growth of flying clubs: there are highways from Moscow towards Kazan and towards Leningrad. And so, when you drive along these highways by car, for 200-300 km you see airfields located every 10-20 km.

set aside from the highway. Airfields are small and are simple landing sites with primitive hangars. They have at least 7, sometimes up to 40-50 U-2 aircraft with a 100-horsepower engine. All this has appeared over the past year, and young people are really studying hard.

I bow to the leaders of the Soviet government, who turned their attention to this problem. In Japan today they look at airplanes like this - if you fly, you will fall, and it is considered strange if serious people are flying. Forgive me, but probably among those present here there are persons who are unlikely to fly even on a passenger plane. It's embarrassing for me to say this in front of older people, but if there are people among today's youth who are afraid of airplanes and are cowardly before flying, then you need to influence them. Now an airplane is already a little different from a car, but newspapers are trumpeting about aviation accidents, and very little is written about car accidents. Meanwhile, according to persons related to aviation, the number of car accidents, oddly enough, is greater than aviation accidents. It is desirable to help eliminate the fear of aviation among the people or create such a mood that even if there is some danger, then in the interests of national defense, the youth should direct their forces towards aviation. This is mostly prevented by fathers and mothers. I want to say whether the older generation is a hindrance to the development of aviation in Japan. It is necessary to resolutely raise the campaign for the popularization of aviation, and if the USSR has 150,000 people, then Japan must have at least 50,000. train 50,000 pilots. They say that in the absence of airfields, the fields will have to be damaged, but for light training aircraft you can find as many airfields as you like, and what an area it will be throughout the country if we equip a hundred sites. Is it not possible, as a last resort, to use the local parade grounds on Sundays? Planes with a 100-horsepower engine are very cheap. Of course, it will probably be difficult for the government to

454

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

to include this in the budget, and I ask you, the representatives of the leading circles of the whole country who are present here, to consider ways in which this can be done. This is a problem that seriously bothered me even when I was there.

RIGHT:

Head of the 7th department of the GUGB
NKVD, Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank SLUTSK RGASPY. F. 558. Op.
11. D. 188. L. 105-146. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "My archive. St.".

No. 265

INFORMATION UNKVD IN THE NOVOSIBIRSK REGION

IN THE CASE OF EMRO

December 13, 1937

REFERENCE

on the composition of those arrested in the case of the officer organization of the ROVS

1. Princes - 2
2. Rear admirals - 1
3. Generals - 8
4. Colonels - 42
5. Captains and staff captains - 43
6. Lieutenants, second lieutenants and ensigns - 102
7. Royal ranks - 61
8. Officials of the police and gendarmerie - 69
9. Nobles - 27
10. Manufacturers and landlords - 35
11. Popov - 9

Wreed. head of the 3rd department of the UGB UNKVD,
lieutenant of state security CYKLIN AP RF. F.
3. Op. 58. D. 205. L. 134. Original. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Shoot everyone" and Poskrebyshev's note: "Fulfilled. A telegram was sent on 16.X11.37.

No. 266

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH ON
THE DISCLOSURE OF THE "CONSPIRACY* EMRO" (66)

December 13, 1937

No. 62740

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending copies of telegrams No. 5670, 5671, 5672, 5673 of the head of the NKVD Directorate of the Novosibirsk Region, comrade. GORBACH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

455

Owls. Secret

MEMORANDUM No. 49577, 49571, 49581, 49602

From Novosibirsk
December 10, 1937

People's Commissar VNUDEL USSR comrade. Ezhov

The well-known Kolchak general Anatoly Nikolaevich PEPELYAEV, born in 1891, who was arrested by us in Voronezh, testified that after the defeat of Kolchak, he, living in Harbin in 1920, received 10,000 yen from the representative of the military circles of Japan, Colonel YOKOHAMA to organize among the officers of the "Military Union" who fled to Harbin, who trained personnel for the fight against Soviet power. In 1921, he established contact with the leaders of the Harbin Socialist-Revolutionary organization "Siberian Committee" SAZONOV, GOLOVACHINSKY, GRACHEV, whose task was to create a Siberian Autonomous Republic. In 1922, he accepted the offer of the "Siberian Committee" to organize and lead the overthrow of Soviet power in Siberia. To this end, having received weapons and ammunition from Japanese warehouses in Harbin, he organized the Siberian Volunteer Squad in Primorye, with which in August 1922 he went through the D-East to the port of Ayan Yakutia. The squad near Yakutsk was defeated in June 1923, PEPELYAEV was taken prisoner. By the decision of the tribunal of the 5th Army in 1923, he was sentenced to VMN, with the replacement of imprisonment for 10 years. While serving his sentence in the Yaroslavl detention center, PEPELYAEV used the benefits provided to him in prison, which weakened the regime, through the criminals VOLKOV Ivan and GOLUBEV Alexei, who had a free exit from the detention center, and in 1927 restored organizational ties with the colonel living in Yaroslavl, a member of the ROVS KISELEV Mikhail, through whom at the same time he established a written connection with an active participant in the Russian All-Military Union, General VISHNEVSKY, who lives in Harbin, is the commander of the Pepelyaev army corps. PEPELYAEV conducted correspondence with VISHNEVSKY through a Japanese subject in Moscow. VISHNEVSKY informed him about the agreement reached in Harbin between the ROVS, Japanese military circles, Siberian regionalists, on the creation of a "buffer state" on the territory of Siberia under the slogan "through free Siberia to the revival of Russia." Representatives of the officers of the Social Revolutionaries were planned to be part of the Siberian government. The overthrow of Soviet power was planned by organizing an uprising at the time of Japan's military attack on the USSR. After the overthrow of Soviet power, Japan was promised the provision of the Siberian market, concessions, timber, and coal. In 1935, PEPELYAEV accepted, transmitted by VISHNEVSKY, the proposal of Japanese intelligence circles and the Harbin leadership of the ROVS - to organize an insurrectionary c.-r. in the USSR. organization, to lead the armed overthrow of Soviet power in Siberia at the time of Japan's war against the USSR. Being interrogated about the reasons for the granting of benefits in the Yaroslavl political prison, Pepelyaev testified that in January 1936 he was called from the isolation ward.

lyator to Moscow, where he was adopted by the former. the head of the NGO GUGB GAEM in a conversation made it clear to PEPELYAEV that he was aware of the K.-r. activities of the latter. As PEPELYAEV testifies, GAI promised him support in this work. In July 1936, Pepelyaev was summoned to Moscow for the second time, where

456

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

GAI announced to him a release order and a warning about caution in his work, financial assistance was provided with the issuance of 1,000 rubles on Yagoda's personal order, after which PEPELYAEV was sent to the place of his choice of residence in Voronezh. In Voronezh, PEPELYAEV met the head of the 00 UNKVD, ESTRIN, who, referring to an order received from Moscow, gave PEPELYAEV a job, giving him the opportunity to live in a hotel room paid by the NKVD. In December 1936, the NKVD of the Voronezh region provided additional financial assistance to Pepelyaev, with the issuance of 250 rubles. In the personal file-form of PEPELYAEV there is a special instruction from the GAI to the NKVD Administration of the Voronezh Region to provide PEPELYAEV with special assistance. Using the opportunities provided and guided by the instructions received from Harbin, through Kiselev he established an organizational connection with the White Guard officers known to him: in Chita - with Captain MIKHAILOVSKII Boris Mikhailovich; in Irkutsk - Colonel IVANOV Boris Ivanovich; in Saratov - with Captain NUDATOV Erast Pavlovich; in Gorky - with Captain GOLUBEV Alexei; in Moscow - with Lieutenant Zuykov; in Novosibirsk - with General ESKIN, who instructed the deployment of c.-r. work in the direction of: a) broad recruitment of insurgent personnel; b) creation of terrorist and sabotage groups. The question of the structure of the organization was left to local decision. The regrouping of insurgent cadres into combat organizations along the lines of regular troops was planned to be carried out in the first days of the uprising. Pepelyaev testified that from the reports of members of the organization associated with him, he knew about their extensive work to create insurgent sabotage personnel, from the report of ESKIN he knew about the presence of a rebel K.-R. in Zapsibkrai. organization with several thousand members. The ROVS organization, created on the territory of the b. Western Siberia, partially liquidated. The leadership of the regional insurgent headquarters consisting of b. generals ESKIN, MIKHAILOV, SHEREMETEV, EFANOV, princes GAGARIN, DOLGORUKOV, who directly led the formation of the insurgent underground and sabotage and terrorist groups. In total, 15,203 people were arrested and convicted in the case of the West Siberian Organization of the ROVS. In November, in Novosibirsk, the reserve insurgent headquarters of the K.-R. was additionally opened and liquidated. rebel organization created by ESKIN, which included former colonels of the army of Kolchak Alexander Alekseevich NUDNER, Nikolai Lvovich POPOV, Nikolai Maksimovich TYUMENEV, Gavriil Semenovitch POLYNOV.

At the same time, a widely branched k.-r. was discovered in the Siblag system. rebel organization ROVS, covering 17 camps. The organization was created at the suggestion of General PEPELYAEV Anatoly by the head of the regional headquarters of the ROVS, General ESKIN in 1935, who contacted the brother of General PEPELYAEV, Staff Captain Mikhail PEPELYAEV-

VYM, serving a sentence in Siblag, to whom he entrusted the formation of an organization. Accepting ESKIN's proposal, using free movement around the camps for the decoration of clubs, Mikhail PEPELIAEV launched a wide recruitment work, created the headquarters of the organization from among those serving sentences in the camps of Colonel TULUBEV, Colonel NAMESTNIKOV, Captain BERNGARD, Captain LAZAREN

DOCUMENTATION

457

KO. At the suggestion of the headquarters for the management of the organization and command during the uprising, PEPELYAEV Mikhail involved in the organization connected by the ROVS circles during emigration in Bulgaria, now serving a sentence in the camp, a member of the Don Cossack military circle ÿ Major General SHUMILIN *, the latter, accepting the proposal to lead the organization and command during the uprising, he repeatedly gave instructions to Mikhail Pepelyaev on the development of the organization's activities. The uprising was planned together with the ROVS organization of Western Siberia at the start of the war with Japan, the organization was created on the basis of a military unit. First of all, officers were selected, recruited and appointed from among the serving officers, who, in turn, indoctrinated in an anti-Soviet spirit and trained ordinary rebels. Staff Captain PEPELYAEV Mikhail, being appointed adjutant of the insurgent headquarters, maintained regular contact with the regional ROVS headquarters, General ESIN, and received instructions from him. In addition, 357 people were arrested, including 1 former generals, 7 former colonels, 4 former lieutenant colonels, 140 other officers, 20 police gendarmes, 6 metropolitan bishops, 69 priests, 139 kulaks, punishers. , their cases are also considered. We continue to liquidate. We send interrogation protocols.

9.XII-37

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 205. L. 136-141. Script. Typescript.

On the first page is Stalin's resolution: "To Yezhov. According to Gorbach's note, all former officers and generals should be shot."

— circled, in the margins of Stalin's litter: "shoot".

No. 267

CODE TELEGRAM E.G. EVDOKIMOVA I.V. STALIN ABOUT
KARTASHEV

December 13, 1937

input No. 2824/
sh Top secret

From Rostov-on-Don

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

Director of Rostselmash Kartashev must be removed immediately and his arrest allowed. He cannot supervise the work, about which I have repeatedly raised the question on the departmental line. Now we have materials from the investigation about his participation in a wrecking gang.

I ask for an arrest warrant. We will give a candidate for director from among the local cadres within 24 hours.

EVDOKIMOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 101. Original. Typescript.

On the sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "For the arrest. I. St. *.

458

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 268

CODE TELEGRAM E.G. Evdokimova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT V. MEZHLAUK

December 13, 1937 Strictly secret entry. No. 2825/
sh - From Rostov-on-Don

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

The regional committee decided to dismiss the head of the construction of the State District Power Plant, Nesvetai Mezhlauk Valentin, for disrupting construction, wrecking management, staffing the construction apparatus with wrecks.

I ask you to authorize the removal and prosecution.

EVDOKIMOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. II. D. 65. L. 102. Original. Typescript.

On the sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "For. I. St.

No. 269

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO YA.A. DEYCHA

December 15, 1937

No. 62807

Top secret

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 178. Beg. UNKVD for the Rostov region comrade DEYCH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

No. 49975

From Rostov-on-Don December 13, 1937

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. Ezhov

The arrested commander of the 4th Cossack Corps, previously served as deputy. Inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army, commander KOSOGOV Ivan Dmitrievich additionally testified that in 1926, while on an internship in Germany, he was recruited for espionage activities by Oberleutnant of the Reichswehr SHPALKE. At the same time, KOSOGOV handed over to SHPALKA full data on the cavalry units of the Red Army, their location and characteristics of some cavalry commanders and cavalry inspection workers, for subsequent communication with German intelligence, KOSOGOV received a password.

In the USSR, a German resident established contact with KOSOGOV - b. Commander of the 8th Cavalry Division OKDVA TREYMAN August Yakovlevich. KOSOGOV testifies that he learned from TREYMAN that the following persons are conducting espionage work in favor of the Germans: Ernst, former commissar of the headquarters of the first cavalry army JUBIT, former head of the administrative department of the North Caucasus Military District APOGA, pom. early department of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army SVERCHEVSKY, an employee of the Intelligence Directorate KRASICHKOV, an employee of the repair department of the RKKA KOTOV, an employee of the inspection of the cavalry of the Red Army AKVELYAN, pom. inspector of the Red Army cavalry MARTYANOV, commander of the 67th cavalry regiment Shtral and com. regiment of the 16th cavalry division LVO SKVORTSOV.

DOCUMENTATION

459

KOSOGOV, through TREYMAN, handed over to German intelligence a number of important espionage materials on the inspection of the Red Army cavalry. Since 1934, KOSOGOV was associated with the former head of the department of the beginning of the espionage activities in favor of the Germans. composition of the Red Army by FELDMAN, from whom, in particular, he received the task to develop for German intelligence a plan for the defeat of formations of a cavalry-mechanized group as part of the troops of the Kiev Military District of the Western Front, given that he was in wartime early. headquarters of this group.

The protocol of interrogation of KOSOGOV is being sent.

11.XII. No. 178

DEYCH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 70-72. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Yezhov. It is necessary to arrest all the persons noted by Kosoy. I. St.

No. 270

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE COLLECTION OF THE APPARATUS OF THE EDITORIAL OF "Izvestia"

December 17, 1937

49 - 0 contamination of the apparatus of the editorial office of Izvestia.

1. The apparatus of the editorial office of Izvestia, which for a number of years has been the object of Trotskyist-Bukharin sabotage, continues to be in a difficult state and has not yet been completely cleared of Radek-Bukharin and Talev roots.

2. Remove R.Yu. Krivitsky from his job as not inspiring political confidence. Suspend Kutuzov-Golenishchev D.I. from work in Izvestia. (with the transfer of his case to the NKVD), Loginov E.N., Volgina M.G. and Kopelevich V. Ya ...

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 994. L. 9. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 56.

No. 271

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SPEAKER AT THE MEETING OF THE MOSCOW ASSET ON THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VChK-OGPU-NKVD" (67)

December 19, 1937

84-0 speaker at a meeting of the Moscow activists on the 20th anniversary of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD.

To oblige Comrade Mikoyan to make a report at a meeting of the Moscow activists of party, Soviet and trade union workers on the 20th anniversary of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 994. L. 17. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 56.

460

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 272

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) ON AWARDS

December 19, 1937

85 - 0 awarding of Berman B.D., Karutsky V.A., Krivey E.F., Lupeka on G.A., Sokolinsky D.M., Fedorova N.N. and etc.

Approve the draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 994. L. 18. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 56.

No. 273

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EXEMPLARY AND CLEAR PERFORMANCE
OF THE RESPONSIBLE TASK OF THE GOVERNMENT
BY THE EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNKVD DVK AND THE FAR EASTERN RAILWAY

December 19, 1937

86 - On the exemplary and precise fulfillment of the responsible task of the Government on transportation by employees of the UNKVD DVK and the Far Eastern Railway (decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

For the exemplary and precise fulfillment of the responsible task of the Government for transportation, to express gratitude to the head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory Comrade G.S. Lyushkov, the entire team of employees of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory and employees of the Far Eastern Railway, completing this task.

To oblige the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the People's Commissar of Communications to present especially distinguished employees of the UNKVD DVK, as well as employees of the railway transport of the Far Eastern Railway, for awards.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 994. L. 18. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 56.

No. 274

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE ORGANIZATION OF A SHOW PROCESS IN KIESEL

January 7, 1938

244 - Question of the NKVD.

To allow an open show trial to be held against the saboteurs operating in the Kizelovsky coal basin.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 333. L. 178. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 56.

DOCUMENTATION

461

No. 275

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH
ABOUT THE "AGENTS" OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

January 7, 1938

No. 100122

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 6502 from Comrade Gorbach, head of the UNKVD for the Novosibirsk region.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

From Novosibirsk on
January 4, 1938.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. Ezhov

In November, in Tomsk, we arrested and prosecuted agents of German intelligence, the former director, professor of the scientific research institute of mathematics and mechanics, Lev Alexandrovich VISHNEVSKY, and a professor of the same institute, a German subject, former artillery officer of the Reichswehr, NETHER Fritz.

VISHNEVSKY testified that Yakov Aleksandrovich ZHELEZNYAKOV, the former head of the scientific and technical department of the GAU RKKA, was recruited for intelligence work in favor of Germany in 1933.

According to the testimony of VISHNEVSKY ZHELEZNYAKOV, through the line of Intelligence

The NPO's senior management repeatedly traveled to Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and other states, where on one of these trips he was recruited by the intelligence department of the General Staff in Berlin.

According to the testimony of VISHNEVSKY and NETER, the presence in the artillery department of the NPO, subordinate institutions, research institutes, artillery, air academies of large reconnaissance sabotage organizations of German intelligence is established. Among the participants, VISHNEVSKY named Colonel KIRILLOV-GA BETSKY, head of the artillery committee of the artillery directorate, former military attaché in France, ZHELEZNYAKOV, former head of the scientific and technical department of the artillery directorate of the Red Army, ZAKHODER, early. Leningrad Artillery Institute, UPORNIKOVA early. the first department of the same institute, STRUSELBA early. Research Department of the Artillery Academy, GRAVE early. ballistic laboratory, MECHNIKOVA early. external ballistics, DROZDOV, designer of artillery systems, GLOBUS early. research department of artillery, CARDE engineer of the artillery academy, former engineer of the German company Krupp, WENTZEL professor of the Zhukovsky Air Academy, 'NUMEROV * former director of the Leningrad Astronomical Institute, * GERSHKOVA * former head. the first department of NCOs, FRENKEL professor of the Leningrad Technological Institute and others. According to the testimony of VISHNEVSKY, as well as Nether, a member of the organization FRENKEL, being connected through the all-Union society

462

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

cultural ties with foreign countries, a society for assisting German scientists in Zurich, performs special tasks for German intelligence to transfer its agents to the territory of the USSR. The Society for Aid to German Scientists, as VISHNEVSKY shows, is widely used by the intelligence department of the Reichswehr for the purpose of military-political espionage in almost all countries without exception.

NETHER, who was arrested by us, testified that he was transferred to the USSR for intelligence work in 1934 by Reichswehr General BEKKER and Major of the Intelligence Department MULLER through the Society for Assistance to German Scientists with the active participation of FRENKEL and CHERNYSHEV members of the organization. NETER from German intelligence had the task of comprehensively monitoring the work of the defense institute in Tomsk, identifying the interests of the army leadership in artillery and influencing the institute to influence the people's commissariat of defense in the sense of the wrong direction of research artillery work. By proving the absurdity of carrying out the topics proposed by the People's Commissariat of Defense, to break the organic connection of one topic with another.

To compel the People's Commissariat of Defense to accept orders from military factories for arming the army with low-quality projectiles and weapons by suggesting false research experiments. Submit to the General Staff data on the work of the institute on ultra-speeds, ultra-long-range shooting, and new types of weapons. NETER from German intelligence had a turnout to ZHELEZNYAKOV and ex. German Consul in Novosibirsk *GROS-

SCOPFU*.

According to Neter's testimony, he traveled twice from Tomsk to Berlin to communicate with the intelligence department of the General Staff.

From 1936 to the present, KRE MER maintained intelligence communications through Grosskopf and the secretary of the German consulate in Novosibirsk. Neter, through VISHNEVSKY, established contact with the reconnaissance and sabotage organization and the artillery department of the NPO to contact the work.

According to the testimony of Neter and VISHNEVSKY, they involved in intelligence work at the Tomsk Ballistic Institute a number of persons from the anti-Soviet part of the teaching staff: MOYIN, ROMANOV, MALEEV, TRAPEZNIKOV and "others**.

The organization in Tomsk carried out extensive reconnaissance and sabotage work in the direction of transferring to German intelligence information about the especially important activities of NPOs in the field of arming the Red Army and disrupting the most important tasks in the field of researching the latest types of weapons in order to weaken the country's defense capability.

I'm sending you the interrogation protocol.

2.1.38 No. 6502

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 84-88. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "It is important to talk to Savchenko." *—* Surnames are circled.

— There is Stalin's note in the margin: "What others?"

DOCUMENTATION

463

No. 276

CODE TELEGRAM A.Ya. STOLYAR I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
EXCLUSION OF MEMBERS OF THE "COUNTER-
REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION FROM THE PARTY

January 7, 1938

No. 27/sh - From Sverdlovsk Strictly
secret

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

Based on the materials available in the regional committee and the testimony of five arrested employees of the apparatus authorized by the CPC in the region, they were exposed as enemies of the people, as active participants in the counter-revolutionary organization headed in the Urals by Kabakov - Bukharin authorized by the CPC and secretary of the party collegium Nosov.

I ask you to authorize the expulsion from the party and the arrest of Bukharin and Nosov.

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks STOLYAR

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 107. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten marks on the sheet: "For the arrest. I. St. "; "Report. Comrade Yezhov. P.*.

No. 277

NOTE I.V. STALIN N.I. Ezhov ABOUT SRs (68)

January 17, 1938

T. Yezhov.

1. The line of Socialist-Revolutionaries (left and right together) has not been unwound. Fishman, Paskutsky lead the NKVD by the nose. If Belov himself had not begun to unwind along the line of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the NKVD would have sat in the dark. Belov said something, but did not say everything. Paskutsky, Uritsky and Fishman should complete Belov. It must be borne in mind that we still have quite a few Socialist-Revolutionaries in our army and outside the army. Does the NKVD have a record of the Socialist-Revolutionaries ("former") in the army? I would like to receive it as soon as possible. The NKVD has an account of the "former." Socialist-Revolutionaries outside the army (in civilian institutions)? I would also like to receive it in 2-3 weeks.

2. What has been done to identify the Social Revolutionaries on the basis of Ryskulov's well-known testimony?

3. What has been done to identify and arrest all Iranians in Baku and Azerbaijan?

4. I inform you for orientation that at one time the Social Revolutionaries were very strong in Saratov, in Tambov, in Ukraine, in the army (commanding staff), in Tashkent and in general in Central Asia, at Baku power plants, where they still sit and harm in the oil industry.

We need to act faster and smarter.

5. A very important task: to strengthen the DVK regions with new KGB forces from outside. This is much more important than the strengthening of the regions of Kazakhstan, which can be done next.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 330. L. 18. Original. Typescript.

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 278

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT IRANIAN CITIZENS (69)

January 19, 1938

308 - Question of the NKVD.

1. Propose to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan to immediately notify all citizens of the regions bordering Iran on registration of Soviet citizenship within 10 days if these citizens consider themselves citizens of Iran.
2. All those Iranian citizens who obtain Soviet citizenship should be resettled within a month in Kazakhstan, following the example of the resettlement of Kurds from the Nakhichevan Republic.
3. All those Iranian citizens who refuse to transfer to Soviet citizenship and wish to remain subjects of Iran are subject to immediate deportation to Iran and, in case of refusal, to arrest.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 89. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 56.

No. 279

FROM THE SPEECH OF I.V. STALIN AT THE RECEPTION OF THE
DEPUTY OF THE USSR SUPERIOR COUNCIL IN THE KREMLIN

January 21, 1938

You and I are rich and greedy countries and fascist states began to pay attention to us. What means do we have to fight against them? - uproot their agents, uproot them - that is our means of struggle with you (stormy applause. "Hurrah," "Long live Comrade Stalin").

You are all trying now to be vigilant wherever you work. This is good, but one works as a business executive, the other in production, the third is a cooperator, the fourth is a trader, the fifth is a propagandist, the sixth is an aviator, the seventh is a military man - they are always ready for war, but they cannot wait for war, however, one must prepare - when there is no war (Applause). But we have one organ of vigilance, because We can all miss something in the process of work. They are vigilant for all of us. They should always and everywhere be on the alert. (Applause. Shouts of "Hurrah" and "Long live Comrade Yezhov.") You can't take anyone's word, comrades, I apologize to you, it may be unpleasant, but it is extremely necessary. (Applause.)

For the organs of vigilance on an all-Union scale, for the Chekists, for the smallest and largest.

We have tens of thousands of Chekists, and they lead their modest,

useful work. For Chekists small, medium and large. (Applause, shouts of "Hurrah." "Long live Comrade Yezhov.")

Tov. STALIN continues. Take your time, comrades, haste is a bad thing, sit still, calm down. I propose a toast to all Chekists and to the organizer and leader of all Chekists, Comrade Yezhov.

(STORM APPLAUSE)

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 1121. L. 19-20. Script. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

465

No. 280

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN
and V.M. MOLOTOV ON THE
PREPARATION OF A SHOW TRIAL IN KIESEL

January 21, 1938

No. 27 forest

Top secret

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - comrade. STALIN I.V.

SNK of the USSR - comrade. MOLOTOV V.M.

By a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated January 7, 1938, it was allowed to conduct a show trial of saboteurs operating in the Kizelovsky coal basin.

Based on the report of the military prosecutor of the Ural Military District, I report:

Subject to trial on charges of sabotage activities in the Kizelovsky coal basin and espionage on the instructions of German intelligence:

- 1) ERSHOV - ex. manager of the Kizelugol trust;
- 2) WINTER - ex. mining technical inspector, German citizen;
- 3) Gasman - ex. Chief Engineer of Mine No. 6, who is also the Chief Engineer of Kizelstroy;
- 4) DEMENEV - ex. chief mechanic of the trust;
- 5) SMIRNOV - ex. head of the department of capital works of the trust;
- 6) DEMIDOV - ex. chief engineer "Giproshakht";

7) MIKHAILOV - ex. head of ventilation of mine No. 4;

8) BALTIS - ex. mountain foreman of the Kalinina mine, German subject.

All the defendants pleaded guilty.

Please approve the proposals:

1. The case of spies and saboteurs who operated in the Kizel coal basin, to be considered by the visiting session of the Military Tribunal of the Ural Military District in the city of Kizel with the participation of the prosecution and defense.

2. In relation to all those guilty of sabotage and espionage, to apply execution.

3. Give a brief report on the verdict in the local press.

I ask for instructions.

A. VYSHINSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 333. L. 180. Original. Typescript.

No. 281

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "On Comrade Egorov"

January 25, 1938

Item 2 - On comrade Egorov (Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establish that:

a) First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Comrade Egorov A.I. During his tenure as chief of staff of the Red Army, he worked extremely unsatisfactorily, ruined the work of the General Staff, entrusting it to the hardened spies of the Polish, German and Italian intelligence services, Levichev and Mezheninov.

466

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks consider it suspicious that Comrade Yegorov not only did not try to control Levichev and Mezheninov, but had unlimited trust in them and was on friendly terms with them.

b) Comrade Yegorov, as is evident from the testimony of the arrested spies Belov, Grinko, Orlov and others, obviously knew something about the conspiracy existing in the army, which was headed by spies Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik and other scoundrels from the former Trotskyites, rightists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, white officers and so on.

Judging by these materials, Comrade Yegorov tried to establish contact with the conspirators through Tukhachevsky, as Belov, a spy from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, speaks about in his testimony.

c) comrade Yegorov, unreasonably dissatisfied with his position in the Red Army and knowing something about the conspiratorial groups existing in the army, decided to organize his own anti-party group, into which he involved comrade Dybenko and tried to involve t Budyonny.

On the basis of all the above, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

1. To recognize as impossible the further abandonment of Comrade Egorov A.I. in leadership work in the central apparatus of the People's Commissar of Defense due to the fact that he cannot enjoy the full political confidence of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

2. Release comrade Yegorov from the job of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

3. To consider it possible, as a last test, to give Comrade Yegorov the job of commander of one of the non-basic military districts.

Invite Comrade Voroshilov to submit to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR his proposals on the work of Comrade Yegorov.

4. The question of the possibility of leaving comrade Yegorov as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to be discussed at the next Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

5. Send this resolution to all members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and commanders of military districts.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 330. L. 112-113. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

No. 282

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT T. DYBENKO" (70)

January 25, 1938

p. 3 - On comrade Dybenko (Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks consider it established that:

a) T. Dybenko had suspicious connections with some Americans who turned out to be intelligence officers, and, unacceptably for an honest Soviet citizen, he used these connections to receive benefits for his sister living in America.

b) The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks also consider the report published in the foreign press that Comrade Dybenko is a German agent deserving of serious attention. Although this report was published in the hostile White Guard press, nevertheless, one cannot ignore this, since one of the same kind of report about Sheboldaev's former provocative work turned out to be correct when verified.

DOCUMENTATION

467

c) T. Dybenko, instead of conscientiously fulfilling his duties in the leadership of the district, systematically drank, decomposed in a moral and domestic respect, which set a very bad example for his subordinates.

In view of all this, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

1. Consider it impossible to keep Comrade Dybenko at work in the Red Army.
2. Remove comrade Dybenko from the post of commander of the Leningrad Military District and recall him to the disposal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
3. Invite comrade Malenkov to make his proposals on the work of comrade Dybenko outside the military department.
4. Send this resolution to all members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and commanders of military districts.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Secretary of the Central Committee

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 330. L. 113. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

No. 283

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE MEASURES OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE
ACCUSED AT THE PROCEEDINGS IN KIZEL

January 26, 1938

Item 16 - Question of Vyshinsky. (PB dated 7.1.38, pr. No. 56, p. 244).

1. The case of spies and saboteurs who operated in the Kizel coal basin, to be considered by the visiting session of the Military Tribunal of the Ural Military District in the city of Kizel with the participation of the prosecution and the defense.
2. In relation to all those guilty of sabotage and espionage, to apply execution.
3. Give a brief report on the verdict in the local press.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 333. L. 179. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

No. 284

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC
AUCP(b) "ON ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS"

January 31, 1938

Item 48 - On anti-Soviet elements.

a) Accept the proposal of the NKVD of the USSR on the approval of an additional number of former kulaks, criminals and an active anti-Soviet element subject to repression in the following territories, regions, republics:

1) Armenian SSR - 1000 hours for I cat. and 1000 hours according to II cat.

2) Belarusian USSR - 1500 - "-

3) Ukrainian SSR 6000 - "-

4) Georgian SSR - 1500 - "-

5) Alerbij. SSR - 2000 -"-

468

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

6) Turkmen SSR -

1000

—“—

7) Kyrgyzstan. SSR -

500

8) Tajik. SSR -

1000

and 500 hours according to II cat.

9) Uzbek SSR -

2000

500

10) DVK -

8000

2000

11) Chita region —

1500

500

12) Buryat-Mongol. —

500

-«-

13) Irkutsk region —

3000

500

14) Krasnoyarsk kr. —

1500

500

15) Novosibirsk region —

1000

—“—

16) Omsk region -

3000

2000

17) Altaysk. cr. —

2000

1000

18) Leningrad region —

3000

—“—

19) Karelian ASSR -

500

200

20) Kalinin region —

1500

500

21) Moscow region —

4000

—“—

22) Sverdlovsk region —

2000

—“—

b) Propose to the NKVD of the USSR that the entire operation in the above regions, territories and republics be completed no later than March 15, 1938, and in the Far East no later than April 1, 1938.

c) In accordance with this resolution, to extend the work of the troikas to consider cases against former kulaks, criminals and anti-Soviet elements in the regions, territories and republics listed in paragraph "a".

In all other regions, territories and republics, the work of the troikas must be completed no later than February 15, 1938, so that by this date all cases will be completed and considered within the limits established for these territories, regions and republics.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 155-156. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov - everything; regional committees, regional committees,
the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties - respectively.

No. 285

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE PROLONGATION OF REPRESSION AMONG
THE POPULATION ON THE BASIS OF ETHNICITY (71)

January 31, 1938

p. 49 - The question of the NKVD.

1. Allow the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to continue until April 15, 1938, the operation to defeat espionage and sabotage contingents of Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Harbins, Chinese and Romanians, both foreign subjects and Soviet citizens, according to existing orders of the NKVD of the USSR.

2. Leave until April 15 the existing extrajudicial procedure for consideration

the cases of people arrested in these operations, regardless of their citizenship.

DOCUMENTATION

469

3. Propose to the NKVD of the USSR to carry out a similar operation before April 15 and smash the cadres of the Bulgarians and Macedonians, both foreign nationals and citizens of the USSR.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 90. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

No. 286

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DEFLECTORS" (72)

January 31, 1938

50 - About defectors.

It has been established that foreign intelligence services are sending their massive espionage and sabotage network of agents to the USSR mainly under the guise of defectors, from among those allegedly seeking political asylum in the USSR, better material conditions due to unemployment, deserters from army units and border guards, re-emigrants and emigrants.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides:

- 1) To propose to the NKVD of the USSR that all defectors detained at the border, regardless of the motives for their transition to the territory of the USSR, be immediately arrested and subjected to thorough interrogation.
- 2) All defectors in respect of whom it will be established directly or indirectly that they crossed into the territory of the USSR with espionage, sabotage and other anti-Soviet intentions - to be brought to trial by the Military Tribunal, with the mandatory use of execution.
- 3) Cases of all defectors, in respect of which it will be established that they crossed into the territory of the USSR not maliciously, to be transferred to the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, with the application of a penalty of 10 years in prison.
- 4) To propose to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, together with the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, within a decade, to submit for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposals on revising the conventions existing with Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan on simplified border crossing, so that a regime was established in these areas border crossing similar to the western borders.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 53. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov - everything. Potemkin - 4, Vyshinsky - 2.

No. 287

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE NKVD IN THE FAR EAST"

February 1, 1938

p. 61 - Questions of the NKVD in the Far East, (decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).

Make the following decision (see appendix).

PREV. SNK USSR SECRETARY OF THE CC

470

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

FROM THE

APPENDIX to clause 61 of pr. PB No. 57

1. On the forbidden border zone and the border regime.

In order to strengthen the protection of the state border of the USSR with Japan, Korea, Manchuria and the Mongolian People's Republic, as well as to establish a special regime on the territory of the USSR adjacent to the said border, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

5) * Entrust the NKVD of the USSR with foreigners who do not have either Soviet or foreign passports from the Far Eastern Territory. To evict the Chita region and the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and to arrest all those suspected of espionage, sabotage or other anti-Soviet activities and to consider their cases in the existing extrajudicial procedure on troikas, regardless of the citizenship declared by the repressed.

18) Accept the proposal of the NKVD of the USSR on the approval of 12 thousand prisoners additionally scheduled for repression in the Far Eastern camps, convicted of espionage, terror, sabotage, treason, rebellion, banditry, as well as professional criminals. Cases for these categories of prisoners to be considered before April 1, 1938 at the troikas to consider the cases of former kulaks, criminals and anti-Soviet elements. All 12 thousand people will be repressed in the first category.

19) From now on, to oblige the NKVD of the USSR in the Far Eastern camps convicted of espionage, terror, sabotage, treason, rebellion and banditry,

as well as professional criminals not to be sent. Also, do not send people of Japanese, Chinese, Estonian and Finnish nationalities and Harbin residents to these camps, regardless of the nature of the crime for which they were convicted.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 157-157v. Copy. Typescript.

* The application is published in part. Protocol number 57.

No. 288

CODE TELEGRAM YA.A. POPOKA I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE ADDITIONAL LIMIT

ON CONSIDERATION OF THE CASES OF ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS

February 2, 1938

No. 79/sh - From Engels.

Top secret

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

The troika for examining the cases of former kulaks, criminal, anti-Soviet elements has completely exhausted the limit, the work of defeating active elements has not yet been completed.

I ask you to set an additional limit for one thousand people until February 15.

Secretary of the non-mobile committee of the
CPSU (b) POPOK RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 108. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "For. I. St.

DOCUMENTATION

471

No. 289

CODE TELEGRAM Yu.M. Kaganovich I.V. STALIN
and N.I. Ezhov ON INCREASING THE LIMIT
OF THE GORKY REGION

February 4, 1938

No. 95/sh - Gorky.

Owls. secret

The trio is done. Within the limits of the region, 9,600 kulak, Socialist-Revolutionary insurgents and other anti-Soviet elements were repressed and convicted. Additionally, kulak-White Guard elements carrying out subversive work are exposed. In total, up to 9,000 anti-Soviet elements were counted in the region.

The regional committee asks for the establishment of an additional limit of the first category of 3 thousand, the second two thousand. Extend the operation until March 20.

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Y. KAGANOVICH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 158. Copy. Typescript.

No. 290

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL OF M.L. RUKHIMOVICH (73)

February 8, 1938

No. 100680

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the second protocol of the interrogation of the former People's Commissar for the Defense of Industry, RUKHIMOVICH, Moisei Lvovich, dated January 31, 1938.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL*

RUKHIMOVICH Moisei Lvovich dated January 31, 1938

Question: During the previous interrogations, you hid a lot from the investigation. You did not name a number of participants in the anti-Soviet organization, whose criminal activities are sufficiently known to you, just as not all of them personally spoke about their hostile work.

Do you intend to tell everything in full, without hiding anything from the investigation? Answer: I have nothing to add to the previous testimony.

Question: Right. Understand, RUKHIMOVICH, that your attempt to preserve the reserves of the members of the underground anti-Soviet organization is doomed to an obvious failure. Most of them have already been arrested and are citing a number of facts from your treacherous practice that you hid from us.

Answer: I repeat that I did not hide anything from the investigation and told everything I knew in the most conscientious manner. I ask you to consider that after all that I have already said about myself, there is hardly any point in hiding anything.

472

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Question: All right, then tell us about your criminal connections with PYATAKOV.

Answer: I have already stated that I had no connection with PYATAKOV for anti-Soviet work. I was his personal enemy.

Question: In this case, we are again forced to incriminate you, RUKHIMOVICH.

You are read the testimonies of the arrested Naum Gavrilovich FILIMONOV, the former head of Glavenergoprom, where FILIMONOV declares that he was associated with you in anti-Soviet activities.

Do you confirm that you knew FILIMONOV as a member of the organization?

Answer: Yes, I do. I was associated with FILIMONOV for sabotage, personally gave him sabotage assignments and knew about his involvement in the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights.

Question: Since when have you been associated with Filimonov in criminal work?

Answer: I contacted FILIMONOV in the second half of 1936.

Question: How did you contact him?

Answer: I don't remember now.

Question: You continue the line taken from the very beginning of the interrogation. This line consists in the desire to lie as long as possible. When you are unable to come up with some kind of lie to hide the real state of things from the investigation, you refer to the dulling of memory.

Read for yourself the excerpt from FILIMONOV's testimony, where he says that Pyatakov connected him with you.

What do you say now?

Answer: It only remains for me to acknowledge the correctness of FILIMONOV's testimony. I am ready to tell about my connection with Pyatakov.

Question: Why haven't you done it yet?

Answer: It seems to me that this is clear even without my explanations. I wanted to reduce the number of my crimes.

Question: When did you get in touch with PYATAKOV about anti-Soviet activities?

Answer: I got in touch with Pyatakov on anti-Soviet activities shortly after my appointment as Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry for Fuel.

As I have already shown earlier, BARINOV was brought in by me to carry out subversive work in the oil industry. From BARINOV I definitely learned for the first time that Pyatakov was the organizer of sabotage in heavy industry and that he directed BARINOV's sabotage activities.

The information communicated to me by BARINOV found complete confirmation in my observations of Pyatakov's work. I could not fail to see the so-called "blunders" that cost the state many millions of rubles and hindered the development of industry. Immediately after I became reliably aware of Pyatakov's anti-Soviet activities, I reported this to RYKOV.

RYKOV told me that he was well aware of this and that he himself wanted to inform me already that an organization headed by PYATAKOV was operating in the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry.

RYKOV told me that the anti-Soviet center of the organization of the Rights through RADEK, who was in close friendly relations with the BU

DOCUMENTATION _ 473

Kharin managed to establish business contact with the second (as RYKOV then put it) center of the Trotskyists.

When I asked what kind of second center this was, RYKOV told me that such figures as Kamenev, MURALOV and other most active Trotskyists had also irrevocably compromised themselves, just like he, RYKOV. Therefore, the leadership of the entire Trotskyist organization was entrusted to PYATAKOV, RADEK and a number of other persons who held leading positions in the country's national economy and were considered people devoted to the Party leadership.

From these individuals the Trotskyists formed a second center. Here RYKOV told me that the Rights, too, had decided to create this kind of "reserve" center in order to insure the organization against the failure of its leading head.

Question: You will be interrogated about the reserve center of the Rights in this protocol in even more detail than before. In the meantime, tell us about your connection with Pyatakov.

Answer: I already knew from RYKOV earlier about blocs of the Rights with the Trotskyites. In the same conversation, I received an order from RYKOV to establish the closest contact with PYATAKOV and his organization, in this way to intensify subversive work in the People's Commissariat, to wrest right-wing formations in the NKTP from the influence of the Trotskyists (here I first learned how about participants in the organization rights about KRUGLIKOV and SEREBROVSKY) and try to organize their activities in such a way as to eventually make it possible to isolate the Trotskyists and subvert all heavy industry exclusively by the forces of the Rights.

Question: Why was it necessary to isolate the Trotskyists from the leadership of subversive work in the NKTP?

Answer: Wreckers, sabotage and terror served both the rightists and the Trotskyists as a weapon to prepare for the overthrow of Soviet power and the seizure of power into their own hands. Already in 1934, both organizations developed a contract

a military plan of action that assumed a coup d'état in the very near future, determined by the degree of readiness for war of German fascism.

After the coup, the question of power was to become. The Rights (RYKOV, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY) considered it possible to admit Trotskyists to the future government, but not in such proportions as to ensure the hegemony of the Rights. This should have been prepared in advance, while still underground. This explains the fact that in their organizational activities the rightists tried to bring all the main anti-Soviet formations in the country under their influence. I had a particularly great work to do in this direction, since the opposite situation existed in the NKTP: there the right-wingers (KRUGLIKOV, SEREBROVSKY and their like-minded people) were under the influence of PYATAKOV, that is, the Trotskyites.

Question: Where and when did the conversation you describe with RYKOV take place?

Answer: This conversation took place at my apartment in September-October 1934.

Question: How did you carry out RYKOV's instructions?

Answer: The successful solution of the task set before me by RYKOV required, first of all, the restoration of good relations with PYATAKOV, since until 1934 I was at odds with him.

Taking advantage of one of the business meetings with Pyatakov in his office, I told him that I had an instruction from RYKOV to establish contact with him along the anti-Soviet line. PYATAKOV said that he had already been waiting for my conversation on this subject and was very glad that, at last, he had the opportunity to talk with me without feeling any hostility towards me on my part.

474

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

He declared that my wrecking work would not only help to undermine the foundations of Soviet heavy industry, but would also make the right-wing Trotskyist bloc in the NKTP system stronger and more reliable, since it was difficult for him to unite the motley anti-Soviet public into a Trotskyist organization. It was here that Pyatakov told me that he had succeeded in forming something like a people's commissariat center for the right in heavy industry. This center, which included KRUGLIKOV, SEREBROVSKY, KANNER, OSIPOV-SCHMIDT, and to which SMIRNOV (Gosplanovsky) was attached, led the cadres of the right in heavy industry, but is not active enough, because it does not have proper leadership from the center of the organization right.

Pyatakov and I agreed that at first I would direct my activities towards the creation of a wrecking organization in the fuel industry of the Union and gradually, as I became aware of the course, I would extend my wrecking activities to other branches of heavy industry.

Pyatakov, on the other hand, undertook subversive work in chemistry and the military industry, which, as he said, solves questions of war and must turn from an instrument of victory into a means of defeating the Soviet Union.

Question: We have information that, in addition to leading the organization of the Rights, you were associated with and directed the subversive activities of a number of Trotskyists. How did you establish contact with the members of the Trotskyist organization?

Answer: I intend to talk about this in detail. The point is that for a long time Pyatakov did not want to inform me about the composition of the Trotskyite organization. Obviously, he was guided by the same desire to secure priority in the anti-Soviet circles of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry.

However, circumstances forced him to change this line.

As you know, the murder of S.M. Kirov and the subsequent arrest of Kamenev and Zinoviev forced Pyatakov to make a double-dealing statement in the press. After these events, Pyatakov repeatedly told me that his position had become very unstable, that he was "walking on the edge of a dagger," and it was precisely these circumstances that forced him to inform me about the belonging of a number of workers of the NKTP to the Trotskyist organization.

Question: Who did PYATAKOV tell you?

Answer: He named to me as members of the organization a number of people, including MYASNIKOV, BABAYEV, TODORSKII, SEDASHEV, IVANCHENKO, KHARITONEKO, TATARIYSKY, NEKRASOV, FILIMONOV, PETROVSKY (Electrozavod), RASKIN, ALPEROVICH.

Question: Have you been personally involved with any of these people?

Answer: Personally, I was associated in anti-Soviet work only with RASKI NIM, through whom I carried out the appointments I needed. After the arrest of PYATAKOV, he was supposed to contact others, but he could not do this, since the unfolding events did not allow it.

Question: What exactly prevented you from contacting these people after Pyatakov's arrest?

Answer: Before the trial of Pyatakov, I did not take any steps to establish contact with the members of his organization, since I did not know which of them could be arrested.

I decided to put it off until the wave of Trotskyist arrests had passed, so as not to risk failure unnecessarily.

But soon I was appointed people's commissar of the defense industry and set my main task - the development of subversive work in the NKOP.

DOCUMENTATION

475

I would like to remind you that in my previous testimony I disclosed my connection with the Trotskyist group of TODORSKII, whose belonging to an anti-Soviet organization I also learned from PYATAKOV.

Question: Tell us how you established contact with KRUGLIKOV, SEREBROVSKII, SMIRNOV and other members of the anti-Soviet center in the NKTP?

Answer: I was connected with this center through KRUGLIKOV. I first learned about his involvement in the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights and about the existence of a center of the Rights in the NKTP from RYKOV and then from PYATAKOV. I got in touch with KRUGLIKOV at the beginning of 1935 and since then directed the subversive activities of this center through KRUGLIKOV in planning, SEREB ROVSKY in the gold industry, Kanner in ferrous metallurgy. Personally, I was associated only with KRUGLIKOV and SMIRNOV. Through them he gave wrecking installations and received information about the activities of this center.

As I have already shown in the first protocol, I knew from SMIRNOV about the terrorist activities of this center.

Question: Now tell us about the subversive activities in the defense industry that you conducted jointly with PYATAKOV after his arrest. In particular. What kind of sabotage have you carried out in the field of mobilization plans?

Answer: As a result of the sabotage activities of PYATAKOV and SMIRNOV, and then mine, the enterprises of the defense industry did not have a real mobplan. Since 1934, there was the so-called "M-3" mobplane, which, due to the rapid motorization of the army, the deployment of the army and the new complex tasks assigned to the army from a tactical point of view, in no way took into account the needs and requirements of NGOs in wartime. Moreover, the M-3 mobile plan did not actually exist at enterprises, but was only on paper. The question of providing a certain number of tools, necessary devices, stocks of raw materials and other things at any of the factories, as a rule, was not resolved.

shen.

Suffice it to say that the M-3 plan itself was so outdated that already in 1937 it required adjustments to increase by more than two times.

In addition to providing the material part of the mobplane, none of the defense industry factories had a plan to satisfy the workforce in case of war. There was not even a plan for the use of labor in terms of shifts during the day.

By organizing this sabotage, Pyatakov and I had in mind to create chaos and confusion during the mobilization period, which proceeded from the directives of the Rights and the Trotskyists to defeat the USSR in a future war.

Question: What was your personal participation in this wrecking?

Answer: I am guilty here of sabotaging the supply, promotion and resolution of the issue of compiling a new mobplan, thus continuing Pyatakov's sabotage in this direction.

Question: Give evidence about sabotage in the field of capital construction and the production of artillery and shell enterprises.

Answer: PYATAKOV and PAVLUNOVSKY, relying on the Trotskyist organization created by PYATAKOV, carried out a major wrecking campaign.

but in the field of capital construction in the military industry, completely disorganizing this military construction. In particular, in connection with motorization in the army, the need for artillery should be sharply increased.

476

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

personal. Despite the huge increase in the requirements of the People's Commissariat of Defense for artillery, for all 5-6 years of PYATAKOV's work, only two new artillery factories No. which, in the event of a war, would put the deployment of artillery units of the army in extremely difficult conditions.

Also, the production of shells was largely disorganized. Here sabotage was carried out along two lines: firstly, the production of shells was based on an old worn out fleet of machine tools and low-power factories, and, secondly, operations for the manufacture of shells, which are usually produced at various factories, were organized in such a way. Thus, the period of manufacture of the projectile, together with loading, lasted from 3.5 to 5 months. This was achieved by the fact that regional centers or bushes were not organized close to the supply of hulls to equipment factories and to the corresponding storage bases of the People's Commissariat of Defense and there was no corresponding base of new powerful machine tools and apparatus for mechanizing equipment. All this was done in order to reduce to a minimum the production of shells in case of war.

For 5-6 years, the production of shells was sabotaged in every possible way without internal processing, which radically reduces both the number of machine tools needed for the production of shells and part of the workers for wartime.

In the field of shell manufacture, great sabotage was carried out to disrupt the production of shells from steel cast iron and cast steel. Both of these methods were used by the Germans and the French during the World War, were successfully developed in a short time in Spain and significantly reduce the cost of shells.

The question of the production of cast shells and shells from steel cast irons was raised by a professor in Leningrad, and I was forced to start their production. At the same time, I instructed MARTINOVICH to slow down work on the production of shells from steel cast iron on the pretext that this production would be carried out at a plant under construction in Lipetsk.

Thus, in 1937, I deliberately thwarted the development of a very cheap and profitable method of producing shells.

Question: Tell us about sabotage at gunpowder factories.

Answer: PYATA KbVGPAVLUNOVSKY and KOTG carried out a huge sabotage work in this branch.

Over the past four years, there have been several points for the construction of gunpowder factories, and then these points were repeatedly mothballed, and until 1937, that is, until the moment the sabotage was opened, none of the new points was completed, not one of the factories for artificial fiber to meet the needs. The gunpowder industry was not built during the war and none of the existing gunpowder factories was reconstructed, the disproportions of individual workshops were not eliminated to obtain more power at existing enterprises. In particular, plant No. 100 in the Aleksino district (Moscow region) has been under construction for four years and until 1937 was half-conserved; at plant No. 101 (Kamenskaya), started in 1934, until 1937, almost nothing was done in the field of industrial construction; also at plant number 98 in Perm, although a lot of money was invested in all these plants.

In this industry, I continued PYATAKOV's sabotage at all plants, except for Kamensky (No. 101) and Kemerovo, where I had to let go

DOCUMENTATION

477

means in order to create the appearance of my desire to do something in the field of establishing a gunpowder industry.

Question: In what way did they harm in the production of poisonous substances?

Answer: In the production of poisonous substances, PYATAKOV harmed in two ways: firstly, by disrupting the construction of the plants that had been started, and, secondly, by agreement with FISHMAN, Narkotyzh, in the person of PYATAKOV, deliberately opened a discussion about what the needs of the People's Commissariat of Defense we are in the OV, and under the cover of this discussion, for two years, disrupted the provision of defense needs in the OV. Thus, Plant No. 96 has been under construction for four years; Plant No. 91 has been under construction for 3 years; construction has not yet begun in Kemerovo; the construction of plant No. 97 in the east near Irkutsk was mothballed.

Here, too, I took measures for the urgent completion of plant No. 96 and 91, and the rest of the plants were wreckably left in their original position, that is, on conservation.

The sabotage carried out by PYATAKOV and FISHMAN in the production of gas masks, both for military and for the needs of the population and the horse staff of the army, was expressed in the following: all gas masks manufactured before 1937 are pierced by the corresponding types of poisonous substances invented and put into production in Germany and other countries in recent years. And they are useless. This type of sabotage during the war could be decisive for the defeat of the Red Army, since literally all the soldiers could be hit by strong poisonous substances and would find themselves in the position of the troops of the tsarist army at the moment when poisonous substances were used for the first time during the war, that is, the army would be completely defenseless.

This sabotage was revealed and the question of eliminating its consequences was raised by the Defense Commission in August 1937.

I could not do anything and had to put in place work to improve the gas mask for people.

At the same time, in order not to eliminate this situation completely, I did not give funds for work on a horse gas mask, and as a result, the army does not have a horse gas mask, and the horse composition will be defenseless during a chemical attack.

The sabotage carried out over the course of five or six years by PYATAKOV and PAVLUNOVSKY also manifested itself in the construction of military factories, even with hot shops, and especially aircraft factories, with wooden ceilings. This facilitated the possibility of sabotage during the war by setting fire to workshops with wooden ceilings and created the possibility of fires in peacetime.

There was a special order from STALIN to replace these floors with iron ones, but I deliberately disrupted this work, replacing 8-10% of the wooden floors in 1937.

Thus, I created a direct opportunity for sabotage.

Wrecking was also organized in the field of the use of substitutes for non-ferrous metals during the war. Here, sabotage in the field of using substitutes at defense industry enterprises was expressed, first of all, in the unwillingness on the part of the People's Commissariat of Defense (Efimov) to use, and on the part of PAVLUNOVSKY, to produce and hand over iron cartridges instead of brass or bimetallic ones.

At the same time, work on the introduction of an iron shell for shells instead of a brass one was frustrated. The practice of world war has shown that large

478

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

wars cannot be waged without substitutes, since the manufacture of a large number of projectiles is limited by the presence of non-ferrous metals.

Thus, taking into account the facts that I have listed above, it becomes completely clear what a huge amount of work was done by PYATAKOV and myself to ensure the defeat of the Red Army in a future war.

Question: You didn't say anything about the wrecking concentration of defense industry enterprises on the borders of the USSR.

Answer: You are absolutely right. Over 20% of the workers employed in the defense industry are concentrated in Leningrad at factories producing the most important defense products. As, for example, all marine instruments, almost all radio engineering, capsule production, the production of optical instruments and the production of precision mechanics. As you know, Leningrad is subject to enemy air raids, since it is located in close proximity to the border. Thus, all these

enterprises are under direct threat of destruction, which threatens the army with the deprivation of the most important defense products.

Question: Also, what acts of sabotage took place in the defense industry?

Answer: In addition to the above, the fact of wrecking over the past years is the disruption in the construction of repair bases for the needs of aviation, artillery and tanks. This work was especially frustrated at the enterprises of the East. In particular, in Khabarovsk, the construction of plant No. 106 for the repair of artillery, which began to be built in 1933 and has not been completed to this day, was thwarted; plant No. 105 for the repair of tanks began construction in 1934 and has not been completed to the present; aviation repair plants were not built in the Far East; a repair base has not been built in the European part of the Union to provide for the Western Front.

Thus, the aviation, tank and artillery parks would be significantly weakened in wartime, since aircraft, tanks and guns, even with minor damage, would have to fail.

A great deal of sabotage was carried out in the field of supplying the needs of the army with cartridges and pyrotechnics. All calculations were deliberately made on the basis of the old method of warfare, and therefore new bases, new cartridge production plants and a raw material base for pyrotechnics were not set up, as a result, by 1937, the defense industry came out with the old base of cartridge factories, with a complete absence of pyrotechnics. And everyone knows what importance pyrotechnics has now, especially illuminating shells and cartridges, incendiary shells and cartridges, and tracer shells and cartridges.

The sabotage by Gosplan and Pyatakov was carried out along the lines of inhibiting the development of armored factories in order to disrupt the construction of a large navy, neither Izhora nor Mariupol received any development. Also, the plant for the manufacture of tank armor did not develop. Capital work to meet the needs of the Red Army along the lines of the battery industry and radio engineering was also sabotaged.

nick.

In order to disrupt capital construction in the defense industry and get rid of any kind of control, PYATAKOV and PAVLUNOVSKY cultivated for a number of years the rule: to work at military plants without any projects and without estimates, as a result of which By the beginning of 1937, not a single project had been approved by the enterprises of the defense industry and there was no estimate for new facilities under construction and for the reconstruction of existing ones.

DOCUMENTATION

479

At the same time, Pyatakov raised a number of questions in the Defense Commission about increasing capital investments, as a result of which in 1937, according to all previous decisions, it was necessary to allocate 6 billion rubles to the defense industry, and Pyatakov achieved the approval of 5.4 billion rubles by the highest authorities. This amount is by no means

could be mastered, since until that time capital investments had not exceeded 1.4 billion rubles. In addition to the fact that Pyatakov wanted to kill colossal capitals by this sabotage act, intending to build boxes of buildings, knowing in advance that it was impossible to equip them with equipment within one year, he wanted to disorganize the entire national economy, since the withdrawal of six billion rubles from the budget would cause an outflow of funds from other branches of the national economy and the need to issue large emissions. In addition to wrecking in the capital construction of defense industry plants, PYATAKOV, PAVLUNOVSKY and a number of other members of the Trotskyist and right-wing organizations carried out subversive work in the field of operating existing plants. So, for example, if we take the work of the battery industry plants over the past 5-6 years, then even an uninitiated person becomes completely clear that colossal subversive work has been carried out in the field of these industries. The factories of the battery industry are completely not equipped with any technology and are workshops that work on old recipes and produce almost completely defective products.

The most painful sabotage in the battery business was reflected in 1937 and should have been reflected during the war in the submarine fleet, which to this day does not have batteries that ensure the combat capability of the submarine. On the quality of rechargeable batteries manufactured by the plant. Lieutenant Schmidt and the Saratov Lead Batteries Plant, can be evidenced by at least such facts as repeated explosions on submarines as a result of excessive gas release from batteries.

It was quite clear to me that in Leningrad at the plant. Lieutenant Schmidt and saboteurs are working in the Central Battery Laboratory.

At the factory. Lieutenant Schmidt worked under the contract with the Italian SKAINI.

This Italian, who provided the plant with significant assistance in the production of accumulator tanks, essentially slowed down the production of accumulator plates, justifying inactivity by the requirements of decoupling the ammonium and powder processes.

Throughout the existence of the plant, it has never produced good batteries.

At TsAL (Central Accumulator Laboratory) the formulation and technological process of AFA were obtained. This material was received in May 1936. However, to date, the production of batteries according to this recipe has not been mastered. It took my energetic intervention to get this thing going. In order to disrupt the production of batteries, I entrusted it to PROSKUROVSKII, who knows nothing about the battery business and cannot cope with it.

Question: You didn't say anything about the state of tank production.

Answer: I must tell the investigation that the People's Commissariat of Defense had a great influence on the design, development of the design and construction of tanks on the part of the ABTU apparatus headed by KHALEPSKII. I don't have information

480

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

about whether KHALEPSKY is a member of an organization of right or trots kists, but his activity indicates that the development of tank production and new types of tanks was hampered by the apparatus of the Khalepsky-ABTU.

At the same time, they disrupted work along the line of the defense industry - NEYMAN, the former head of the tank trust, designer GINZBURG, who designed the T-46 machine under the leadership of BARYKOV. The sabotage in this area was expressed in the following:

Almost every month, certain changes and additions were made to the design of tanks, in connection with which the tank itself became significantly heavier, overloaded with all kinds of additional devices, the weighting reached 40-50% or more against the initial sample, moreover, the motor itself, the gearbox and the undercarriages were generally not strengthened, leaving the tank too heavy and unfit for combat. This is exactly how the T-46 tank was designed, which as a result was brought to the point of absurdity, and the government in 1937 removed it from production.

I knew that the NKVD had material on BARYKOV and was raising the question of his arrest.

I received BARYKOV, but did not dare to contact him on anti-Soviet activities, but simply left him at work, believing that he would continue wrecking without me, deciding at the same time to establish contact with him, having previously studied him closer.

At the same time, for the current production of already operating or adopted tanks, as a rule, ABTU (KHALEPSKY) also made dozens of changes (other technical conditions). Moreover, all this was done directly by agreement with the director of enterprises and violated the normal production of tanks.

So, thanks to the chaotic additions made, which dramatically changed the technological process, tanks were not produced at the Kharkov tank plant for almost 6 months. The same picture was observed in Leningrad at the plant im. Voroshilov, where the T-26 tank is produced.

Question: Now testify about sabotage in the radio industry.

Answer: Here I must tell the investigation the following:

Wreckage in the radio industry has been taking place for a number of years, but it has been revealed most clearly now when checking the use of technical assistance from the American firm Radio Corporation. A large amount of currency was paid for the contract with this firm and we had the opportunity during this time to transfer to our factories the latest and latest technology in radio engineering. Meanwhile, although the treaty has been in existence for about a year and a half, and hundreds of young engineers have been sent to America to study this matter, so far almost nothing has been done in this area.

At first, LYUTOV, the former head of the

5th Directorate. After him, the current head of the 5th Directorate, SINYAVSKY, who was involved by me in the organization of the right, disrupted all the work.

Except for the installation of some threads for the production of metal lamps in Leningrad on the "Svetlana" and the purchase of equipment for the Voronezh plant for the production of radio receivers and radiograms, nothing has been done. Suffice it to say that the contract for capacitors (and this is an essential part of radio engineering) was additionally concluded only in July 1937, that is, with a delay of more than a year.

DOCUMENTATION

481

But the most important fact of sabotage in radio engineering is that the army still does not have a combat radio station for fighters.

Here, according to my direct instructions, SINYAVSKY did harm.

A lot of sabotage has been carried out in the field of naval shipbuilding, and it was organized by MUYUIEVICH together with PYATAKOV and the UVMS (ORLOV) and was expressed as follows:

On the cruiser, side armor of 50 mm was designed, which was clearly wrecking ski, and only by a government decision in 1937 was this sabotage corrected.

On the cruiser itself, fire control is organized simultaneously from three guns, which, if jammed, could disable all three guns at once.

On the cruiser itself, the inner drum of the turret is located at a distance of 20 mm from the walls of the outer drum, while on foreign ships the minimum distance between the inner drum and the outer one is about 70 mm. Jamming of this drum also disables the tower system.

A major sabotage was the construction of destroyers (destroyers), where the engine room was located in a linear order, instead of echelon order, as a result of which the destroyer had half the survivability, since when a torpedo hit the engine room, the entire destroyer failed.

In 1937, when considering this issue, the government proposed that further construction be carried out using the echelon method to eliminate the consequences of sabotage.

Another type of sabotage carried out by MUKLEVICH in recent years was reduced to the construction of minesweeping ships that could not mine without ballast.

Question: Everything you have shown up to now about sabotage in the defense industry, for the most part concerns Pyatakov and his organization. You should also tell about the people recruited by you to put into practice the installations of the right center proposed by you on

sabotage in the defense industry.

Answer: In order not to seem insincere, I want to tell the investigation about the situation in which I found myself when I came to the defense industry.

The point is that PYATAKOV's wrecking activity was literally coming out. When it became clear that it was impossible to fight with a base brought to such a state, the Defense Commission actually headed the defense industry.

To recruit people and spread sabotage as widely as I did in the fuel industry meant to surely fail. Here it was even impossible to keep the industry in the state to which Pyatakov had reduced it, since I could not solve every even the slightest important question without raising it at the Defense Commission.

Yes, and I myself, having taken up the preparation of terrorist acts, decided to harm the defense industry, as carefully as possible so as not to compromise myself at first.

This was all the more necessary because the fuel industry, which until that time I had directed, was in a dilapidated state as a result of my sabotage activities and did not meet the country's needs for fuel.

482

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-19EV

Based on these considerations, I proactively raised questions about the need to streamline the work of individual factories and made every effort to create the appearance of intense organizational work on my part and protect myself from suspicion, and at the same time, as I showed above, I did everything everything in my power to slow down the development of the defense industry.

Establishing anti-Soviet ties and recruiting new members of the organization was also hindered by the fact that before the arrest of Pyatakov and my appointment to the NKOP, a series of arrests of directors of military factories, who were known to me as members of the Trotskyist organization, followed. So, for example, the director of the Barrikady plant - BUDNYAK, the director of the Bolshevik plant - ORE, the head of the construction of plant No. 179 in Novosibirsk - BELOV, the director of factories Marty in Nikolaev STEPANOV and others were arrested.

Question: At the previous interrogation you testified that in your conversation with BAUMAN you substantiated the need for sabotage by saying that anti-Soviet cadres, by participating in sabotage, retain their combat readiness. Now it turns out that you refused to expand your organizational ties and harmed mainly using your official position.

Explain this contradiction.

Answer: There is no contradiction here. It is clear from my testimony that I used a number of members of the Pyatakov organization for sabotage in the defense industry.

KATSVA, with whom I contacted on terror and who, in addition, on my direct orders, disrupted the supply of machine tools and equipment to plant No. 19. The same work on plant No. ... was carried out under my leadership by the Trotskyist SHABASHVILI, about whom, as a member of the organization, I knew from Pyatakov.

As a result of the sabotage of KATSVA and SHABASHVILI, the production of very important DB-3 aircraft was disrupted for a long time.

As a result of sabotage, organized on my instructions by POLZU KHIN, the director of Plant No. 42, the production of clocks, which was occupied by the pipe factory in peacetime, was disrupted.

But I could not, in the short term of my stay in the NKOP, given the defeat of the Trotskyist cadres and increased vigilance, carry out much organizational work, especially since a huge part of my attention was directed to the organization and preparation of terrorist acts, especially the terrorist attack of the 7th November 1937. The preparation of GORSKY, the establishment of a connection with TODORSKII, the observation of the preparation of the terrorist act took away a lot of attention.

This case distracted me from the great development of wrecking work, since terror in this period of time, as I have already shown, was the most decisive factor in the underground work of the center, and in particular in my personal anti-Soviet activity.

Question: Now tell me, RUKHIMOVICH, which of the members of the anti-Soviet center of the right have you concealed?

Answer: I did not hide anyone. All my anti-Soviet activities are set forth in the testimony I have given. I have told everything, and I have nothing more to show.

Question: Once again we note your stubborn desire to preserve the successors of your vile work. However, your efforts are in vain, another member of the center of the right known to you has been arrested and is giving evidence about his criminal work.

DOCUMENTATION

483

Stop, finally, unnecessary perseverance. Who else is a member of the anti-Soviet center, which you were a member of, except for the persons previously named by you?

Answer: All right, I will tell the investigation about this. The fourth member of the anti-Soviet center of the right, which headed the organization after the failure of BUKHARIN and RYKOV, was Valery Ivanovich MEZH LAUK.

Question: But maybe you are provoking an investigation again?

Answer: You say that another member of the center has been arrested and that he is giving evidence. No one other than MEZHLAUK can testify that he is a member of the center.

I speak the truth and you know it well.

Question: In that case, tell us what you know about the treacherous work of INTERLAUK.

Answer: I have already said that he was the fourth most secretive member of the center of the right. Relatively few people knew about the anti-Soviet activities of MEZHLAUK, and therefore I did not expect that he would be exposed so soon.

MEZHLAUK was to lead the entire work of the anti-Soviet organization in the event of the failure of BAUMAN, BUBNOV and myself.

Question: Is that why you didn't testify about him?

Answer: Yes, I wanted to keep it and the remnants of the organization.

Question: Were you personally connected with MEZHLAUK?

Answer: Of course.

Q: How did you contact him?

Answer: I knew from RYKOV and BUKHARIN that MEZHLAUK, not being a member of the organization of the Rights, covered up a number of facts known to him of the anti-Soviet activities of BUKHARIN and the members of his "school" in which MEZHLAUK took part in 1926.

It was known from the conversation between Mezhlauk and Bukharin, Antipov and other leaders of the Rights that Mezhlauk sympathized with them, that in fact, like all Rights, he did harm in the State Planning Commission, but shunned the organization, as Bukharin believed, out of caution.

I was instructed to speak with MEZHLAUK, suggesting that he take part in organizational activities.

I had such a conversation with MEZHLAUK at the beginning of 1935. Since that time, MEZHLAUK became one of the leading figures in the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights and headed the wrecking work in the State Planning Commission.

It is thanks to INTERLAUK that widespread wrecking in the area of the plan, which I have shown earlier, has become possible. SMIRNOV, shown by me as the head of the Gosplanov anti-Soviet organization, acted on the direct orders of MEZHLAUK.

Question: Was the activity of MEZHLAUK limited to the State Planning Commission?

Answer: No, MEZHLAUK participated in the adoption of the main decisions of the center. He was well aware of the conspiratorial activities of BUKHARIN, RYKOV, and YAGODA.

He participated in the decision to develop terrorist activities after the failure of BUKHARIN, RYKOV, YAGODA and the suicide of TOMSKY. He knew about my personal terrorist activities, and in particular about the preparation of a terrorist act on November 7, 1937,

which was led by me.

484

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

I must make a reservation that I did not dedicate the details of my preparation of the terrorist act to MEZHLAUK, informing him only that such an act was being prepared.

Question: What else do you know about the organizational ties of INTERLAUK?

Answer: I would like to inform the investigation that MEZHLAUK and BAUMAN are Latvians by nationality and were associated with a Latvian organization of the national-fascist type.

Question: What do you know about the activities of this Latvian organization?

Answer: I have already shown that communication with the Letts was carried out by BAUMAN and MEZHLAUK. Therefore, they should tell in detail about the composition and actions of this organization. I only know that this organization was headed by RUDZUTAK and APKSNIS. The organization was closely connected with the Latvian and German intelligence services and had rather large counter-revolutionary cadres.

In particular, in terms of the "palace coup", the armed detachments of the combat Latvian organization were to be used.

Question: Is that all you can show about the anti-Soviet activities of MEZHLAUK?

Answer: I could tell a lot about his practical activities in Gosplan, but I have already spoken about this without naming MEZHLAUK's name.

Everything I have said about wrecking in the plan applies to MEZHLAUK to a greater extent than to SMIRNOV, for the latter could not and did not take a single step without MEZHLAUK.

The testimony was written down from my words correctly and read by me.

RUKHIMOVICH

Interrogated:

Head of the 14th Department of the 3rd Department of the GUGB
NKVD Captain of State Security Dagansky

Assistant to the head of the 14th department of the 3rd department of the
GUGB, lieutenant of state security MESHIK

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 332. L. 61, 71-86. Script. Typescript.

*

The protocol of interrogation is published partially.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten resolution: "T.t. Molotov, Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Chubar, M. Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Kulik, Vannikov, Bondar. Rukhimovich's testimony deserves attention, because. makes it possible to facilitate the

types of sabotage in the defense industry. I. Stalin.

Crossed out: "Important. Read*.

No. 291

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT IRANIAN CITIZENS

February 9, 1938

132-06 Iran.

Propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to enter into negotiations with the Iranian government on the reception of the arrested Iranians, with the exception of those against whom there are not only serious suspicions, but also evidence.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 93. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 57.

DOCUMENTATION

485

No. 292

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE SRs

February 10, 1938

No. 100777

Top secret

In connection with your instructions about the destruction of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization, I report the following:

1. In total, 25,218 members of the underground anti-Soviet organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were arrested in the USSR in 1937.

2. The investigation into the case of the underground anti-Soviet organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries created:

a) the existence of a widely ramified united Socialist-Revolutionary organization in a significant part of the regions of the Soviet Union;

b) leadership of the underground anti-Soviet organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the field

carried out the so-called All-Union United Socialist-Revolutionary Center or the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, consisting of: GOD, TIMOFEEV, GINDELMAN, VEDE NEKIN, PODBELSKY (Right Socialist-Revolutionaries), SPIRIDONOV, MAYOROV, TRUTOVSKII, SAMOKHVALOV (Left Socialist-Revolutionaries);

c) so-called Regional committees, or Regional bureaus, were created to manage the activities of grassroots organizations.

Such committees, or bureaus, were created:

in Arkhangelsk (Northern Regional Social Revolutionary Bureau), consisting of: GEL FGOTA, RASNERA, KAMKOV, BOGACHEV and PINUS;

in the Ural region, consisting of: USHAKOV, POPOV, BEREZOV, SI GOVA and YUSUPOV;

in Moscow, consisting of: RAKITNIKOV, PAVLOVSKY, ALEKSEEVSKY and AUERBACH;

in Alma-Ata, consisting of: VOROBYEV, KORENEV, STRAKHOV, ALEXEEV and NEVLER;

in Saratov - the Volga Bureau, consisting of: KONOONOV, BELIMO PASTERNAKOV and SHMERLING-VOLIN.

The Volga Bureau of the AKP united illegal SR organizations in the Stalingrad Territory, the Kuibyshev Region, the Gorky Territory, the Tatar and Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics.

Illegal regional committees or bureaus were also opened in a number of other regions (Voronezh, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, and others).

3. As established by the investigation, the underground anti-Soviet organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries set itself the following as an immediate practical task:

a) preparation of an armed struggle against the Soviet power and the creation of insurgent organizations;

b) organization of wrecking and sabotage acts;

c) the implementation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and right government.

For this purpose, militant terrorist groups were created in Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Ufa, Alma-Ata and other regions of the Soviet Union, from among the old cadre terrorist SRs.

4. The All-Union Socialist-Revolutionary Center established a connection with the emigrant centers of the Socialist-Revolutionaries abroad. In particular, such a connection was established with the head of the TKP MASLOV in Prague and with the well-known Socialist-Revolutionary STEINBERG in Berlin.

Through emigrant centers and directly, many prominent Social Revolutionaries were connected with foreign intelligence services.

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

5. The most active development of the sabotage, sabotage, insurrectionary and terrorist activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is closely connected *) with the conclusion of a bloc with the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights and Trotskyists. By agreement with the Rights and the Trotskyists, the Socialist-Revolutionary organization stepped up its terrorist activities and organized a number of terrorist groups in Moscow, Leningrad, Kalinin and other places. In particular, on behalf of BUKHARIN, the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist SEMENOV created militant terrorist groups in Moscow and Leningrad, which included old SR militants: USOV, STAVSKAYA, VASILIEV, KONOPLEVA, NAUMKIN, AFANASIEV and others.

6. The investigation established that many members of the underground Socialist-Revolutionary organization were also members of the CPSU(b), who joined the ranks of the party on the direct instructions of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization, in order to disguise their anti-Soviet Socialist-Revolutionary activities and undermine the unity of the CPSU(b) from within (members of the CPSU (b), former Socialist-Revolutionaries, more than 275 people were arrested according to incomplete data).

7. Despite this relatively extensive defeat of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR made a number of mistakes.

Of these, the main ones are:

a) operations against the Socialist-Revolutionaries mainly affected the exiled Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Socialist-Revolutionary asset, which is on the operational register and is widely known to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs;

b) operational measures almost did not affect the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are in the ranks of the CPSU (b) and continue to conduct active anti-Soviet underground work in contact with the right. This is all the more unacceptable because, according to the testimony of a number of active Socialist-Revolutionaries, it was already known that the Socialist-Revolutionaries at one time joined the ranks of the CPSU (b) after a special directive from the Socialist-Revolutionary centers in order to disguise and continue their anti-Soviet activities;

c) the operations had very little impact on the Social Revolutionary organizations in the Red Army and the Cheka;

d) the connections of the Socialist-Revolutionaries with foreign Socialist-Revolutionary centers and with foreign intelligence services are poorly revealed;

e) the links of the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the right wing, Trotskyists and other anti-Soviet groups have not been specifically identified, despite a number of direct indications knowledge, both from the right (BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TSEITLIN, and others), the Trotskyists (KELMANSON), and from the Socialist-Revolutionaries (GODA, KAMKOV, BESSONOV, SHVETSOV, SEMENOV, and others).

8. In pursuance of your instructions of January 7-1938, I inform you:

a) an order was given to all organs of the NKVD to continue and intensify intelligence and operational measures to liquidate the existing illegal organizations of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and reveal their organizational ties with foreign Socialist-Revolutionary centers, rightists, Trotskyists and foreign intelligence services;

b) on the operational record of the NKVD of the USSR at the time of your instruction, there were 5,388 people of the Social Revolutionaries, including 1,014 in the ranks of the CPSU (b) and 244 people

century of military personnel.

It must be borne in mind that only those Socialist-Revolutionaries on whom there are certain compromising materials are on our register;

c) of the 5,388 registered Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2,000 people have been arrested at the present time on my orders;

9. As a result of recent arrests, a number of Socialist-Revolutionary organizations have been uncovered and liquidated.

The most important of these organizations are the following:

a) An underground Socialist-Revolutionary organization in the Kursk region. Since 1934, this organization has been in contact with its anti-Soviet activities with a right-wing organization. Headed by the former chairman of the Kursk region

DOCUMENTATION

487

Regiment Tsarev. The leading members of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization for the Kursk region included: RYAZANOV, VDOVIN, SOLOMUKHA, and SKAL'SKY.

All these leading members of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization in the past were active Socialist-Revolutionaries and at different times, with double-dealing goals, joined the CPSU(b). Occupying responsible positions in regional, Soviet and economic organizations, they established extensive ties with the rams not only of Kursk, but also of Tambov, Oryol and Voronezh regions;

b) in the Gorky region, an underground anti-Soviet organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, consisting of former members of the society of political prisoners, was opened. The organization was created by an active Socialist-Revolutionary and organizer of fighting squads - K. I. BUROV, who at the same time is a member of the CPSU (b);

c) in the Stalingrad region, an underground Socialist-Revolutionary organization was liquidated, consisting mainly of former career Socialist-Revolutionaries, most of them working as teachers in various schools. The organization was led by prominent and active SRs in the past: PODGORNOV, SAURIN, ORLYANSKY and others.

This organization at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant created a terrorist and sabotage youth organization consisting of 12 people;

d) an underground SR organization was liquidated in Armenia, of which more than 40 people were arrested from among its active members. The organization was headed by the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who was elected in 1928. This organization, in its anti-Soviet activities, formed a bloc with the Dashnaks and stood in the position of an armed struggle against the Soviet power.

10. At the same time, the investigation also uncovered a branched anti-Soviet military-SR organization that carried out its subversive activities in the ranks of the Red Army.

Along with the leading center, formed in the composition of the old Socialist-Revolutionaries: BELOV, FISHMAN, GRYAZNOV, BELETSKY, CHERNETSKY, VELIKANOV, EFIMOV and others, the military-SR organization had its branches in a number of military districts.

Based on the testimony of members of the military-SR organization BELOV, FISHMAN, BELETSKY, CHERNETSKY, VELIKANOV and others, it was established that as early as 1918 the SRs decided to join the CPSU (b) and infiltrate the Red Army in order to seize command positions and carrying out subversive work in the interests of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization.

It has also been established that the military Socialist-Revolutionary organization was connected with the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights and Trotskyists, as well as with a group of military fascist conspirators.

The military-Socialist-Revolutionary organization, through EIDEMAN, BELETSKY and others, had its branches in the Osoaviakhim system, using various circles of Osoaviakhim work ("Voroshilov horsemen", rifle and aviation circles) in order to form insurgent groups.

The military-Socialist-Revolutionary organization was also connected with its emigrant centers (with the head of the TKP MASLOV in Prague and the heads of the TKP AGAPOV and GRACHEV in Harbin and Mukden) and foreign intelligence services.

So: BELOV has been an agent of British intelligence since 1918; IVANOV Boris agent of British intelligence since 1918; FISHMAN - agent of the German and Italian intelligence services since 1923; YEFIMOV has been an agent of Japanese and German intelligence services since 1931 and the like.

11. According to your request, about the fate of the Socialist-Revolutionaries passing on the testimony of RYSKULOV, I inform you that they have all been arrested.

With this note I send:

- 1) a statistical summary of registered Socialist-Revolutionaries in the USSR;
- 2) the payroll of the former Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Red Army.

488

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

STATISTICAL SUMMARY of
the arrested SRs in Moscow and the periphery in accordance
with the directive of the deputy people's commissariat. FRINOVSKY (No. 17089
of 18/1-1938)

(according to data received on January 25, 1938)

No.

p/p

Name of regions

TOTAL

arrested

Of these, members of
the CPSU (b)

1.

Moscow and Moscow region

744

112

2.

Leningrad region

300

—

3.

Ukraine

705

29

4.

Altai region

2610

37

5.

Smolensk region

867

52

6.

Vologda Region

702

—

7.

Sverdlovsk region

666

44

8.

Kursk region

575

—

9.

Chita region

537

2

10.

Stalingrad region

370

50

eleven.

Byelorussian SSR

226

34

12.

Tula region

227

37

13.

Oryol Region

198

—

14.

Kuibyshev region

310

—

15.

Yaroslavl region

178

—

16.

Tatar ASSR

192

6

17.

Uzbek SSR

198

29

18.

Saratov region

150

—

19.

Tambov Region

156

—

20.

Arhangelsk region

184

12

21.

Ivanovo region

112

—

22.

Kalinin region

105

—

23.

Krasnodar region

104

—

24.

Gorky Region

178

27

25.

Mari ASSR

100

—

26.

Far Eastern Territory

120

—

27.

Novosibirsk region

87

—

28.

Crimean ASSR

92

12

29.

Kirghiz SSR

82

—

thirty.

Ryazan Oblast

86

1

31.

Bashkir SSR

80

—

32.

Orenburg region

75

25

33.

Irkutsk region

68

—

34.

Omsk region

52

6

35.

Mordovian ASSR

51

7

36.

Kazakh SSR

58

3

37.

Tajik SSR

42

38.

Voronezh region

87

39.

Armenian SSR

39

—

40.

Kirov region

36

5

41.

Rostov region

25

—

42.

Georgian SSR

20

—

43.

Komi ASSR

21

—

44.

Buryat-Mongolian ASSR

18

2

45.

Chechen-Ingush ASSR

13

3

46.

Turkmen ASSR

29

5

47.

ASSR of Volga Germans

12

—

48.

Azerbaijan SSR

15

4

TOTAL

11 349

553

489

In the Kabardino-Balkarian and North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chelyabinsk Region, single individuals were arrested.

From the Udmurt, Chuvash, Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, there was no information about the arrest of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov AP RF. F. 3.
Op. 24. D. 322. L. 93-102. Script. Typescript.

Published without a list of Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Red Army. On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "About the Socialist-Revolutionaries."

ÿ293

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION OF THE NKVD" (74)

February 17, 1938

67 - Question of the NKVD.

Additionally, allow the NKVD of Ukraine to arrest kulak and other anti-Soviet elements and consider their cases in troikas, increasing the limit for the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR by thirty thousand.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 161. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 58.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Frinovsky".

No. 294

NOTE I.V. STALIN L.Z. MEHLIS ABOUT THE
CASE AVIATION QUEEN

February 20, 1938

T. Mehlis.

This matter was discussed in detail with the call of the Queen. Comrade Yezhov conducted the case. They could not get anything intelligible from Korolev (he turned out to be not quite normal). The case is considered liquidated.

I. STALIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 334. L. 222. Copy. Typescript.

ÿ295

CODE TELEGRAM OGURTSOVA A.A. ANDREEV ABOUT THE
FIRE OF THE ORPHANAGE BUILDING

February 22, 1938

No. 171/sh - From Chelyabinsk.

Top secret

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade ANDREEV

On the night of February 21 this year in the village of Kipel, Yurgamyshsky district, the building of the orphanage of preschool children was destroyed by fire,

490

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

12 children. The cause of the fire is drying clothes near the stove. The culprits have been arrested and an investigation is underway. A special commission was sent to the scene.

Secretary of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee
OGURTSOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. II. D. 65. L. 111. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "Arrest. St.".

No. 296

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE CASE OF BUKHARIN AND OTHERS

February 28, 1938

18 - Case of Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda and others.

4. The indictment on the present case shall be published in the press after its announcement at the court session.

In the indictment, which is to be read out in a court session and published in the press, to exclude passages containing references to foreign governments and the names of official representatives of foreign states in the USSR.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 336. L. 159-159ob. Copy. Typescript.

No. 297

DECISION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON TOV. EGOROV"

February 28 - March 2, 1938

2. - About Comrade. Egorov

In view of the fact that, as Comrade Yegorov's confrontation with the arrested conspirators Belov, Gryaznov, Grinko, and Sedyakin showed, Comrade Yegorov turned out to be politically more filthy than one might think before the confrontation, and taking into account that his wife his nee Peshkovskaya, with whom comrade Egorov lived in perfect harmony, turned out to be a long-standing Polish spy, as is clear from her own testimony, - the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to exclude comrade Yegorov from the list of candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks .

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 338. L. 4. Copy. Typescript.

No. 298

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF A COPY OF THE MEETING
I.Ya. LAVRUSHIN ABOUT FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR

March 4, 1938

No. 101550

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the memorandum of the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Gorky region, Comrade LAVRUSHIN, No. 3/3452, on the results of the operation on former prisoners of war.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION _ 491

Top secret

In this memorandum dated January 13, 1938, we reported on a large concentration of Russian former prisoners of war who were in Germany, Austria and Poland during the imperialist war.

In addition, intelligence and operational measures taken in the region revealed more than 2,500 former prisoners of war who returned to the USSR after the October Revolution, and mainly in 1919-1920, penetrated large defense enterprises, state farms, MTS, MTM and collective

households.

A significant part of the former prisoners of war come from large kulak families who in the past were individually taxed and repressed by Soviet authorities.

Among them there is a significant stratum of former officers, participants in the K.R. uprisings, former members of the CPSU (b), expelled for k.r. manifestations, former churchmen and ministers of religious worship.

Undercover development of former prisoners of war established that they are

They are a base widely used by German intelligence agencies for espionage, sabotage and insurgent purposes.

The materials at our disposal pointed directly to organized fascist activity in favor of Germany, carried out under the leadership of German intelligence agents, both from among former prisoners of war and former German subjects.

In order to deliver an operational strike against this German intelligence base, we arrested 441 former prisoners of war from January 1 to February 25, including:

former kulaks and merchants - 112 people

former whites and former officers - 9 - "-

churchmen - 15 - "-

expelled from the CPSU (b) - 9 - "-

individual farmers - 122 - "-

The investigation found:

A significant part of the former prisoners of war in Germany and Austria were recruited by intelligence agencies for provocative and demoralizing work among revolutionary-minded Russian prisoners of war.

nyh.

The German intelligence agencies, through their agents, conducted active KR in the camps. religious treatment of prisoners of war, planting Baptist cells among them, under the slogan "For the Fatherland and Religion."

Before leaving for the USSR, German intelligence agents, recruited from among prisoners of war, received assignments for the deployment of active insurrectionary activity in the USSR.

The well-known agent of the German intelligence GALIMZHAN IDRISSEI deserves special mention.

In order to carry out the tasks of the German intelligence agencies, the recruited agents from the very first days of their arrival in the USSR from captivity launched an active counter-revolutionary activity, becoming in a number of cases at the head of the K.R. formations.

492

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The German agents and K.R. were especially active. part of the former prisoners of war began to show from the moment Hitler came to power, spreading

provocative rumors among the population about the inevitable death of Soviet power and the establishment of a fascist regime in the country. This can be seen from a number of cases liquidated by us, for example:

THE CASE OF A.N. SCHREIDER'S GERMAN RESIDENCE

The residency of German intelligence, created by the former prisoner of war of Germany - SCHREIDER Alexander Nikolayevich, from among the former officers of the tsarist army, was opened.

SHREIDER A.N. - a nobleman, a former officer, during the imperialist war was taken prisoner by Germany and placed in the officers' camp "Bashefsfred". In 1919 he returned to the USSR as a prisoner of war
nym.

Before returning to the USSR, SCHREIDER was recruited for intelligence work in favor of Germany by the camp's senior officer, Russian General BYKOV.

Recruitment was preceded by a systematic indoctrination of Russian officers, and in particular SCHREIDER, by the German authorities in an anti-Soviet spirit, the leitmotif of which was provocative fabrications about "the atrocities of the Bolsheviks against the former. officers and their families.

Before leaving for his homeland, General BYKOV instructed Schreider to get a job in the USSR in one of the enterprises that had previously been part of the joint-stock company of the bone-processing industry, the bulk of the shares of which belonged to German firms.

At the same time, Bykov gave Schrader a password by which a German intelligence agent would contact him.

In pursuance of these instructions, SHREIDER got a job at GUBZHIR in Nizhny Novgorod, which united the bone-processing enterprises of the province.

At the end of 1919, he established contact with SCHREIDER using the password given by BYKOV, a German employee of the Glavkost FICHNER Ernest Ludwigovich, and gave the task of creating a German intelligence station in order to collect espionage information about the formations of the Red Army, about the industry working for the Red Army, about the nature and quantity of the output of this industry.

In order to carry out these instructions, SHREIDER involved in intelligence work six people of the former officers of the tsarist army who served in parts of the Red Army.

With the end of the civil war, SCHREIDER (in 1923) - FICHNE ROM was given the task: "To use agents in the context of the ongoing preparations for an armed clash between the USSR and Germany. It is necessary to expand the recruitment of new agents for the extraction of materials of the USSR's military readiness. For recruitment, Fekhner recommended a contingent of the commanding and commanding staff of the Red Army and the reserve command staff, which, with the outbreak of war, would have to be taken into the army. I accepted these instructions for execution" (testimony of SCHREIDER).

According to these guidelines, SCHREIDER recruited for espionage work three former officers who were in the reserve of the Red Army and were serving periodic fees, at the same time working at defense plants, through which

DOCUMENTATION _ 493

and received materials on the Gorky garrison and the defense industry.

In 1933, with the establishment of the fascist regime in Germany as well, the c.r. activities of the residency, as SCHREIDER shows: "In 1933, I received the task from Fechner to develop a plan for sabotage and terrorist activities in the event of a declaration of war. This plan was to cover the entire Gorky garrison.

To one of the agents recruited by him, NOVIKOV, SHREIDER instructed: 1. Set fire to and blow up the depots of ammunition and clothing allowances; 2. Disrupt the supply of foodstuffs to units of the Red Army, for this purpose acquire the necessary agents; 3. Organize mass poisoning of Red Army soldiers in the garrison.

In the subsequent period, German intelligence showed particular interest in the work of aircraft factory No. 21.

Five people were arrested in the case, confirming Schroeder's testimony.

We continue the investigation.

CASE OF ORGANIZER K.R.

FASCIST-REBELLION GROUP OF RERICH

Opened k.r. fascist, insurgent organization in the national Tatar region, organized by the German ROERICH.

Roerich Ivan Andreevich - a German, a native of the ASSRNP, in 1931, in the order of dispossession, he was exiled to Kazakhstan, from where in 1933 he fled and lived illegally, first in the ASSRNP, and then in the Gorky region.

In 1935, his brother RERICH Ivan Ivanovich, who worked at the Saratov combine harvester plant, was recruited into the K.R. an insurgent fascist organization created on the direct instructions of the German consulate in Moscow, with whose employee Roerich I.I. had direct contact.

From his brother RERICH I.A. received the task to create a c.r. fascist insurgent group at their place of residence, that is, in the Kyzyl-Oktyabrsky Tatar region, Gorky region. Roerich was instructed to recruit former prisoners of war who were in German captivity.

In order to fulfill the assignment received by RERICH I.A. were recruited into the K.R. a group of 10 people from former prisoners of war, who, in turn, attracted to participate in the c.r. organization 27 more people.

Members of the group led by RERICH I.A. led, active k.r. activities to disrupt the activities of the party and government in the field of collectivization of the region, disorganized the production activities of the collective farm, spread slanderous fabrications about the defeat of the Soviet Union in the upcoming war with Germany, propagated fascism and

planted insurrectionary moods, preparing insurgent cadres for armed action against Soviet power.

One of the participants of the c.r. organization AKHMYATOV KUDTUS, confirming the testimony of RERIKH I.A. fascist organization led by RERICH I.A., carried out active counter-revolutionary activities.

1. Systematically conducted anti-Soviet agitation among collective farmers and individual farmers and slandered the leaders of the party and government.

494

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

2. He incited collective farmers to leave the collective farm, and dissuaded individual farmers from joining the collective farm. As a result of my and other members of the organization of activities - in our village. To this day, 500 households of individual farmers stubbornly refuse to join the collective farm.

3. By spreading all sorts of provocations, he incited the peasants to sabotage the activities of the party and the Soviet government, in particular economic and political campaigns.

4. Conducted defeatist agitation, proving the inevitability of the overthrow of Soviet power and the establishment of a fascist regime.

5. Carried out wrecking activities by spoiling the seed and forage fund of the collective farm, thereby causing dissatisfaction among the collective farmers.

24 people were arrested in the case, most confessed. We continue the investigation.

THE CASE OF GERMAN AGENT BELOGLAZOV AND OTHERS

In the Varnavinsky district of the Gorky region, a spy K.R. was liquidated. fascist group of 7 people, created by the German intelligence agent BELOGLAZOV.

Former prisoner of war of Germany BELOGLAZOV S.F. in 1920, before returning to the USSR, he was recruited by German intelligence for the K.R. and espionage work on the territory of the USSR.

Settling in the Varnavinsky district of the Gorky region, BELOGLAZOV organized a k.r. a fascist espionage group of former prisoners of war from Germany, Austria and Poland, which embraced its K.R. subversive work of the collective farm and the villages of Prudovka, Bratukhino and Rusenikh.

The group created by BELOGLAZOV for a long period carried out active fascist activities among the population, called for the commission of terrorist acts against party and Soviet activists, spread provocative defeatist rumors, organized sabotage on collective farms and disrupted the agricultural campaign in the countryside. .

Member of the c.r. fascist group SEREBRYAKOV shows: "The goal of our k.r. group was to carry out subversive work on the collective farms and disrupt the activities of the party and government. We set ourselves the task of preparing the masses for action in the rear in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the fascist countries.

SEREBRYAKOV's testimony is confirmed by all the participants in the c.r. fascist group.

THE CASE OF THE GERMAN SPY VESELOV

In the Sharya region, a former prisoner of war, VESELOV, was arrested, who testified that in 1918, while in captivity in Germany, he was recruited for provocative activities among Russian soldiers.

During the dissolution of the prisoners of war, VESELOV remained in Germany and only in 1924 was transferred to the USSR with espionage and sabotage missions.

VESELOV testified about his activities in captivity: "In 1918, while in a prison camp, I was recruited for provocative work among revolutionary-minded soldiers by an agent of German intelligence, the White Guard emissary KARASYUT. On assignment from KARASYUT, I monitored the soldiers, revealing their moods, and collected information about the USSR from the letters received by the soldiers. At the time of the invasion of the USSR, the German occupation

DOCUMENTATION

495

In 1918, the German intelligence agent KARASYUTA, through me and other provocateurs, distributed Kolchak's appeals calling for the protection of religion and the church from the Bolsheviks and created among the soldiers a White Guard counter-revolutionary organization, the so-called "Union of Members for the Defense of Religion and Church".

VESELOV was associated with KARASYUT until 1924. He took an active part in the processing of prisoners of war in the c.r. religious spirit, after which, on the instructions of German intelligence, he filed a petition with the embassy for permission to leave for the USSR. Before leaving for the Soviet Union, VESELOV was given the task of conducting an active cr. work on planting k.r. Baptist groups in the countryside.

Living in the Sharyinsky district, VESELOV established contact with V.A. SMIRNOV, a German intelligence agent who had previously arrived from captivity. (arrested), together with whom he carried out active fascist work and collected espionage information about the political and economic state of the region.

THE CASE OF THE GERMAN SPY MALYSHEV, etc.

In the same Sharyinsky district, a fascist espionage group created by the prisoner of war MALYSHEV, who was held captive in Germany from 1915 to 1924, was liquidated.

Being recruited for provocative activities, MALYSHEV systematically provided the gendarmerie with information about the revolutionary moods of prisoners of war.

According to him, a number of arrests were made, including the communist MICHEL.

MALYSHEV was transferred from Germany to the Soviet Union in 1924, having the task of organizing recruitment at the place of residence among former prisoners of war who were in Germany.

Arriving at home, MALYSHEV established contact with a resident of the German intelligence service BER (living in Siberia), who worked at the sleeper plant, on whose instructions he recruited the Polish woman TEPEREVA and the former prisoner of war KOSTIN for espionage work.

Later, he recruited the former chairman of the settlement council, NOGIN. Through them, MALYSHEV obtained a number of espionage information about the political and economic state of the region and collective farms.

MALYSHEV testified: "I plead guilty to the fact that I was indeed recruited by the German secret police to carry out provocative work among prisoners of war.

Transferring me to the Soviet Union in 1924, the German Okhrana gave me the task of establishing contact with former German prisoners of war and Germans living in the USSR. Assignment received from German intelligence,
I fully complied."

We continue the investigation into this case.

THE CASE OF THE GERMAN SPY SOLOGUB NA.

At the Gorky Automobile Plant. Molotov arrested the accountant SOLOGUB, a former nobleman, officer of the tsarist army. Brother shot for k.r. activity.

SOLOGUB, being a prisoner in Germany from 1915 to 1918, was recruited for espionage and sabotage work in the USSR.

496

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Before leaving for his homeland, SOLOGUB received an order from a German officer to penetrate into the military units of the Red Army and prepare a series of explosions of military and food depots in case of war.

In this he was supposed to be assisted by the German intelligence agent SANDLER, to whom he received a turnout.

Arriving in the USSR, SOLOGUB established contact with agent SANDLER, whom he supplied with a number of valuable espionage data on parts of the Red Army until 1924.

In 1925, SOLOGUB joined the existing White Guard officer organization called the Union of Officers. He took part in it until 1930, i.e. until its liquidation by the NKVD. Personally, SOLOGUB managed to escape at the time of the liquidation of the organization and escaped repression until recently.

We continue the investigation.

According to the preliminary results of the operation on former prisoners of war, it is established that the contingent of former prisoners of war is one of the largest bases for the deployment of C.R. espionage, fascist and sabotage work of German intelligence agencies on the territory of the USSR, for example:

Of the 189 investigative cases completed by us on former prisoners of war, it was admitted:

in espionage and provocative activities
on the instructions of German intelligence - 47
people.

participants of the c.r. fascist groups - 67 people. saboteurs
and pests - 35 people.

We have identified a significant concentration of former prisoners of war at industrial enterprises of the military, heavy and machine-building industries, especially in areas where defense enterprises are concentrated (Dzerzhinsk - 208 people, Sormovo - 113 people, Avtozavod - 22 people).

There are also large numbers of prisoners of war in agricultural areas. So, in one Kyzyl-Oktyabrsky district - 224 people.

The materials at our disposal indicate that the majority of former prisoners of war who returned from captivity in 1918-20-21, having settled in districts and enterprises, are actively engaged in fascist reconnaissance and sabotage and sabotage activities in favor of Germany and represent a serious base for German intelligence.

In this regard, I ask for your authorization for the further prompt removal of former Russian prisoners of war from industrial and agricultural areas, who are engaged in fascist and sabotage, sabotage and espionage work, and the direction of this category of cases for consideration in accordance with your orders, order No. 00485.

Head of the UNKVD for the Gorky Region, Major of the
State. security LAVRUSHIN

February 28, 1938

No. 3/3452

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 105-119. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a handwritten note: "Former Russian prisoners of war should be taken into account. I. St.

DOCUMENTATION

497

No. 299

CODE TELEGRAM I.I. Alekseeva I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE
MURDER OF THE TACCESSOR SHABALINA

March 4, 1938

No. 220/sh — From Novosibirsk

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

On the night of March 3rd in Prokopyevsk, in the mines in the Chernaya Gora mine, the hauler Shabalina was brutally killed while working. The corpse was found on a coal dump, three haulers and a mining foreman from special settlers were arrested.

The investigation is conducted by the NKVD. The created commission of the regional committee and the regional executive committee went to the place, I will inform you about the results of the investigation seriously.

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party of Bolsheviks Alekseev

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 58. L. 8. Original. Typescript.

The text contains a handwritten resolution: "Novosibirsk. Regional Committee Alekseev, Gorbach. In connection with the villainous murder of the hauler Shabalina, I propose that urgent measures be taken to uncover the gang of murderers, bringing the perpetrators to justice using VMN. Stalin. 5.III-38".

ÿ300

CODE TELEGRAM E.G. Evdokimova I.V. STALIN AND N.I. Ezhov
O M.B. SHENKMANE

March 4, 1938

N° 219/sh — From Rostov-on-Don.

Top secret

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN, EZHOV

The director of the aircraft plant in Taganrog Sherkman Matvey Borisovich, by order of the People's Commissariat, is transferred to another plant and has already been removed from the register. The People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry did not inform us about his replacement. I learned about this by phone from the secretary of the Taganrog City Committee.

There is compromising material on Sherkman about his connections with a certain German Shefter, who worked for Sherkman when he was *on Podol-

plant *, * her daughter and son were allegedly arrested by the NKVD *. In Podolsk, he was also allegedly connected with Bogomolov, whose wife was Gamarnik's sister, and other very suspicious connections of this kind, requiring vigorous verification by the NKVD.

The other day we considered on appeal the case of a certain Marushchenko-Meshcherin, an employee of the same plant who was in charge of the supply department. He presented himself to us as a notorious scoundrel, a completely obvious enemy, we had to be surprised that he was "walking" free. After being expelled from the party, Marushchenko was arrested, it turned out that he was being held according to testimony. ** With his arrest, it is not clear why Taganrog was delayed **.

498

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

It is appropriate to note in connection with which I have a question about Shenkman about Marushchenko: Marushchenko **came from Taganrog in Shenkman's car** to the bureau meeting.

I bring to your attention, I consider it necessary to properly clarify Shenkman, without assigning him to the 18th plant, where he allegedly left on the orders of Mikhail Kaganovich. I have the impression that he *flew away* from Taganrog.

EVDOKIMOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 112. Original. Typescript.

There is Stalin's handwritten note on the sheet: "Arrested or not?*

__ circled.

__ underlined in pencil.

ÿ301

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE CHINESE FROM THE FAR EAST

March 5, 1938

62 - Question of the NKID.

1. Accept in principle the proposal of the Chinese embassy on the resettlement of Chinese from the Far East to Xinjiang, Kazakhstan and some areas of Western Siberia.

2. To entrust the implementation of this decision to the NKVD in agreement with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (in order to possibly take into account the wishes of the Chinese government and make this resettlement voluntary).

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 101. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 59.

No. 302

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION INO GUGB NKVD USSR I.V. TO
STALIN O S.S. MASLOVE

March 9, 1938

The following intelligence message was received from Prague by telegraph:

1. Sergey Sergeevich Maslov, reading Bessonov's name in a newspaper, said: "Isn't this our friend from Vologda?" One could understand that Maslov was connected with Bessonov until recently.
2. Alarmed by radio reports about Bessonov's testimony, Butenko (Maslov's closest assistant in the TCH) burned compromising documents in the premises of the Central Election Commission of the TCH all night from March 6 to 7.
3. In the afternoon of March 7, the Czech secret police carried out a surface examination in the premises of the Central Electoral Committee of the TCH and on the same day arrested Maslov in his apartment.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 338. L. 111. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "T. Stalin. Yezhov. 9.W.*.

On a separate sheet there is a special message from INO dated March 9 that S.S. Maslov was released the same day. There, l. 112.

DOCUMENTATION

499

No. 303

INSTRUCTIONS I.V. STALIN ON INTERROGATIONS (75)

March 13, 1938

- 1) Beat Ryabinin to the fullest, why didn't he betray Vareikis.
- 2) Press on Paskutsky about handing over the Left Socialist-Revolutionary group (possibly Belov and others).

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 339. L. 199. Original. Manuscript.

No. 304

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE EXPIRY OF THE FRENCH SUBJECT V.K. BOZIC

March 16, 1938

No. 101961

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The NKVD of the USSR completed the investigation into the case of the arrested Vasily Konstantinovich BOZHICH, a citizen of France.

BOZHICH V.K., born in 1885, Russian by nationality, a native of the village of Umanskaya byv. Kuban region, from 1904 to 1908 he was a member of the RP (b). In 1908 he emigrated to France and took French citizenship. In 1930 he was invited to the USSR as a former foreign specialist. Head of Glavtsvetmet SEREBROVSKY A.P. and worked as a consultant before his arrest

Glavnikelolovo.

The investigation established that before leaving for the Soviet Union in 1930, BOZICH was involved by French intelligence in the person of its agent DUCASS TEL, the director of the French joint-stock company Le Nickel, in subversive espionage work in the non-ferrous industry of the USSR. For this purpose, BOZICH arrived in the USSR.

DUCASTEL is known to us as an old French intelligence officer who visited the Soviet Union and was arrested by the Cheka in 1919 for intelligence activities and expelled from Soviet Russia.

During his work in the Soviet Union, BOZHICH systematically transmitted information to French intelligence about the state of construction and commissioning of nickel enterprises, about the operation of existing nickel plants, about
nickel reserves and the possibility of using them.

For wrecking purposes, BOZHICH delayed the design of the Ufaley and Orsk nickel plants for a year and disrupted the work of the experimental nickel plants in Polevskoy and Orsk.

According to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the French government, through its ambassador in Moscow, repeatedly raised the issue of deporting BOZICH from the USSR to the NKID. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs deliberately used this circumstance in negotiations on the removal of the arrest from the Pokrovsky steamer detained in the French port.

I ask you to consider the issue of expelling BOZICH from the USSR.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 193-194. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "We should not release Bozic (he is not a Frenchman and has done a lot of evil with us). Art.*.

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GU GB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 305

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON POLISH
INTELLIGENCE WITH A LIST OF AGENTS (76)

March 22, 1938

No. 102182

Sov. secret

Starting from the second half of 1937, the Vilna exposition of the 2nd department of the Polish General Staff intensified its work on the systematic illegal transfer to our territory of agents who had passed special intelligence courses*.

At this time, the NKVD of the BSSR contains 9 people of agents of the Vilna exposition, who graduated from special reconnaissance and sabotage courses in Poland.

Training was carried out on an individual basis*, directly by experienced Polish intelligence officers in safe houses. All arrested agents of the Vilna Exposition carefully studied the organization of the Red Army, radio, topography, photography, cryptography, cipher and code, as well as the Russian language and the life of the Soviet population.

In order to consolidate knowledge, most of the agents underwent intelligence practice on their territory.

During the transfer to the USSR, the detained agents were supplied with military weapons, passwords, appearances, forged Soviet passports, letterheads and documents of Soviet institutions.

Until now, broad sections of the Polish population do not know about the actual failures of Polish intelligence in the USSR, about the fact that we catch agents who are transferred and shoot them.

This makes it possible for the Poles, when recruiting and sending agents to the USSR, to this day to operate with the "old truth" about the safety and impunity of espionage work in the USSR, that if an agent is detained, no serious punishment threatens, except for a short-term imprisonment in a camp. This also explains the ease with which agents, just recruited for espionage work, agree to be transferred to the USSR.

All the testimonies of the now arrested agents of the Vilna Exposition very clearly characterize the insidious methods of Polish intelligence, which, without prejudice to our further work, can be published for general information*.

The presence of espionage material evidence - false passports, documents and weapons
- will give the process of this group of spies a special force.

Based on this, please consider organizing over the group

spies in the amount of 7 people open process in the mountains. Minsk**.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

501

March 22, 1 \$38 Sov. secret

LIST OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE AGENTS
WHICH CASES ARE PLANNED FOR CONSIDERATION
AT THE OPEN JUDICIAL SESSION OF
THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN MINSK

1. Iosif Grigorievich MOZHEIKO, born in
1901, Lithuanian, father, owner of a steam mill,
secondary education, treasury official.

Recruited in 1933 by the head of the Vilna exposition
No. 1, Colonel BURKHARD. In Vilna, he took a
10-month intelligence course. I crossed
the border illegally into the Soviet Union 5 times,
with a spy, a diver. tasks. During the last
crossing, a Mauser pistol with 18 cartridges,
strychnine, and various forged documents
of Soviet institutions were confiscated from
MOZHEIKO.

2. KRANEVSKY Ivan Iosifovich, born in
1909, resident of Poland, Latvian, mechanic by
profession. From 1930 to 1932 he served in the
Polish army in aviation as a flight mechanic,
from 1933 to 1935 as a police officer. Lately no work.

Recruited by the Vilna Exposition No. 1 in 1937.
He graduated from intelligence courses in Poland.

During the arrest, a revolver of the Nagant
system with 19 cartridges and a number of forged
documents of Soviet institutions were seized.

3. MYSHKEVICH Nikolai Nikolaevich,
born in 1916, ur. Poland, Belarusian, worker, literate,
ex. member of the committee

say KIZU.

Recruited by the captain of the Vilna Exposition No. 1 FRIESENDORF. He graduated from a six-month reconnaissance course in Vilna. During the arrest, a Browning revolver with

2 clips with 16 cartridges, a fake Soviet passport and a number of other documents
cops.

4. MILSKAYA Bazhenya Fadeevna,

1907, ur. Berlin, a German, a resident of the city of Poznan, from a family of a handicraftsman, the father of MILSKAYA is a major agent of the 2nd department of the PGSH.

Recruited on September 15, 1937 by the captain of the Vilna Exposition No. 1 VIKHROVSKII.

She graduated from intelligence courses in Vilna.

During the arrest, a revolver of the Browning system No. 1.7 pieces of a live cartridge was seized.

5. NOVAK Adam Alexandrovich, aka SHEVCHUK Taras Nikolaevich, born in 1910, son of a policeman in Pinsk, member of the fascist organization "Zvenzek Reservists", from 1932 to 1933 served in the Polish army with the rank of sub-officer.

Recruited in August 1937 by the captain of the Vilna Exposition No. 1 NOVITSKY.

He graduated from a six-month reconnaissance course in Baranovichi.

During the arrest, they seized a Nagant with 17 live cartridges, appearances, photographs of Polish intelligence agents in the USSR, and a number of forged documents of Soviet institutions.

502

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

6. TRIFONOV Aleksey Gennadievich, born in 1904, Russian, resident of Danzig, from the townspeople, driver, ur. city of Leningrad.

Recruited on 12/X-37 as Lieutenant of the 2nd Division of the Primary School of Staff POLONSKY.

He graduated from intelligence courses in Vilna.

During the arrest, a "Nagant" and 7 live cartridges, a number of forged documents of Soviet institutions were seized.

7. VYSOTSKY Alexander Ivanovich, aka MALYAVKA Philip Vasilievich, born in 1905, Pole, from peasants, postal worker.

Recruited in June 1937 by the captain of the Vilna Exposition No. 1 NOVITSKY.

He graduated from a 6-month reconnaissance course in Baranovichi.

During the arrest, a "Nagant" with cartridges and forged documents of Soviet institutions were seized.

Nan. 3 sec. 3 departments of the GUGB NKVD
St. lieutenant of state security RUBINSTEIN

March 22, 1938

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 195-198. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: ÿ Don't. Art.*.

- underlined in pencil.

*ÿ—** underlined in the margins with two lines.

ÿ306

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

«ABOUT DEFENSE INDUSTRY STAFF»

March 23, 1938

256 - On the personnel of the defense industry.

To recognize it as abnormal that a large number of Germans, Poles, Latvians, Estonians work at enterprises, in main departments and in the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry.

Instruct t.t. Yezhov and Malenkov, together with comrade. Kaganovich M. to clear the defense industry of the persons of these nationalities.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254a. L. 199. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 59.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Ezhov, Malenkov, Kaganovich M.M.*.

DOCUMENTATION

503

No. 307

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM S.I. LEBEDEV ON THE
PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION ON INO-NATIONALITY

March 24, 1938

No. 102210

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 3/1909 from the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Tula region, comrade. LEBEDEV about the course of the operation against the Germans, Estonians and others.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Owls. secret

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR TO THE GENERAL COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY
comrade Ezhov N.I.

MAIL-TELEGRAM

on the progress of the operation by orders of the NKVD No. 00485, 00439 and 00593

According to your Directive No. 233, from October 1, 1937 to March 20, 1938, we arrested 1,646 people, of which 824 were arrested along the Polish line, 299 along the German line, 230 along the Latvian line, 21 along the Estonian line, on the Romanian line - 13, on the Finnish line - 7, on the Harbin line - 136, on the Chinese line - 35, on the Iranian line - 48, on the Greek line - 33 people.

Including for the reporting five-day period from March 15 to March 20 of this year. we arrested 127 people, of which: 91 on the Polish line, 12 on the German line, 17 on the Latvian line, 1 on the Harbin line, 5 on the Chinese line, and 1 on the Romanian line.

During the five-day reporting period, the following counter-revolutionary formations were discovered and liquidated:

1. According to the testimony of the arrested TSEKHANOVICH, the Latvian espionage-sabotage and terrorist group "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" is established, which is directly connected with the Latvian intelligence agencies.

Tsekhanovich during interrogation testified that in this group in the mountains. Thule, she was attracted in 1935 by the head of ShPAK, on whose instructions she contacted the members of the counter-revolutionary organization "BRP" in Latvia - PETROV and ZUBAREV. As part of the opened espionage-sabotage and terrorist group "BRP" in the mountains. Thule included: SHPAK, TSEKHANOVIV, SAKHANKO, DOMOGATSKY and UZEMBO.

2. In addition to the testimonies of the members of the opened Latvian spy and sabotage organization KUSHKE and LAPSA, the arrested Yagodovsky testified that he, being a defector and hostile to the Soviet system, was attracted to this organization in 1936 by KUSHKE and

504

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

On his assignment, he collected secret materials on the work of industrial enterprises in the mountains. Tula. Yagodovsky named the active members of the spy and sabotage organization directly connected with KUSHKE as KOCHINSKY, KOCH, YARKEVICH, BUSHLIN. All are arrested.

3. The arrested Pole SHERSHEVSKY testified that he was an active member of the Polish spy sabotage group operating at the Kosogorsk and Novo-Tula metallurgical plants. In this group, SHERSHEVSKY was recruited in 1935 by the Pole DONILEYKO, and on his instructions for sabotage work in 1936 he recruited a worker center

ral power plant of the Kosogorsky plant HOVELKO. SHERSHEVSKY collected secret information about the manufactured military products (shells) by the turning shop of the Kosogorsk plant and transferred them to the resident of the Polish intelligence service DONILEYKO.

4. Arrested former deputy. early of the transport department of the Arms Plant DOMBROVSKII testified that he was involved in espionage work in 1933 by the Pole Ivitsky (convicted).

According to the testimony of DOMBROVSKY, it is established that there was a spy residency at the Tula Arms Plant, the participants of which are: KONDRASHOV, NIKITSKY, PILIPCHUK, DUBLENSKY and SUDIN - all employees of the arms factory.

The specified Polish residency collected information about the nature, quality and quantity of products manufactured by the arms factory, about the activities of intra-factory transport and the recipients of the weapons sent.

5. According to the testimony of the arrested VOITOVICH, a spy-sabotage group is opened in the system of state trade in the mountains. Tula, which collected secret information about the provision of the city and the region with food and consumer goods. In addition, the group deliberately spoiled food and prepared to poison them during the war. The arrested VOITOVICH testified that, having been recruited in 1935 in the

embassy, on the instructions of the latter, he created a spy-sabotage group of 3 people, employees of state trade.

6. Arrested PROSIN shows that, being in 1926 in the Polish embassy in the mountains. Moscow on the issue of obtaining a visa to leave the USSR, was recruited for espionage work by an employee of the embassy who spoke with him (he does not know his last name). PROSIN passed on secret information about the House of the Red Army in the mountains. Moscow and about the mood in military units.

7. The arrested Pole KHMELNYTSKY testified during interrogation that, being in 1921, he was recruited by the Polish defector DRUZHKOVA in the mountains. Minsk, systematically engaged in the transfer of Polish intelligence agents across the border to the side of Poland. The Polish intelligence agents who came to Khmelnytsky had conditional passwords from DRUZHKOVSKY, who at that time lived in the mountains. Vilna.

8. The arrested Polish defector GORDON testified that, while living in Poland, he was recruited by Polish intelligence agencies for espionage and sabotage activities in the USSR. In 1925, Polish intelligence was transferred to the territory of the USSR, where in the military factories of the mountains. Tula created a spy-sabotage residency of 13 people. The members of this residency collected secret information about the quantity, quality and rate of fire of the weapons manufactured by the arms factory, prepared acts of sabotage at the factory's vital centers during the outbreak of war.

9. In addition to the testimony in the case of the espionage and wrecking group that existed at the Tula post office and telegraph, the arrested TKACHEV testified that he was involved in espionage work by the former head of the department

DOCUMENTATION

communications - by a resident of Polish intelligence ZHUKOVSKY, on whose instructions he collected secret information about postal and monetary transactions of defense plants and military units of the mountains. Tula. According to the testimony of TKACHEV, it was established that the espionage and wrecking group created by ZHUKOVSKY included - former. the technical head of the communications department, MOKHRYAKOV, and the head of the Radio Center, DOBROVOL'SKY.

10. In the case of the spy group "Union of Soviet Espirants", the arrested ANDREYEV testifies that there was a group of Esperantists in Tula, which was headed by an agent of German intelligence INCERTOV, who came to Tula on business of the "Union of Militant Atheists". Members of the espionage group of Esperantists IVANOV, KUUSK, EFREMOV, VERNUKOVSKY, GRISHIN and BULDAKOV collected secret information on heavy industry plants and defense enterprises in the city of Tula and handed them over to ANDREEV, recruited in 1931 for this purpose, the latter, in turn, receiving spy information, sent them to INCERTOV in Moscow.

During the five-day reporting period, a number of lone spies and saboteurs were exposed.

We continue the operation according to your directive.

Head of the UNKVD for the Tula Region, Major of
State Security LEBEDEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 200-205. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Important."

No. 308

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO A.I. USPENSKY ON THE
AUTHORIZED NKID

March 27, 1938

No. 102364

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 654/SN of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Comrade USPENSKY about the authorized NKID BROVTSINOV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE UNION OF THE SSR comrade. Ezhov

Employees of the German consulate STRECKER and WILKE, as established by most of the cases conducted, are the main, long-standing intelligence officers in the city. Kyiv and Kharkov, and VILKA and Tbilisi. STRECKER and WILKE live in Kiev in a private apartment on Kreshchatik Street, house No. 25, apt. Nos. 100 and 101 (passage).

Investigative and undercover data established that the apartments of STREKKER and WILKE were safe houses of German agents. Measures of cultural influence were taken through the house management to relocate STREKKER and WILKE to the building of the German consulate. Commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Kyiv BROVTSINOV for separate stings

506

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

the representative of the German consulate would make them understand with his answers that the measures of influence come from the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The provocative behavior of the authorized NKID BROVTSINOV made it possible for the German consulate to protest.

The behavior of the authorized NKID BROVTSINOV aroused great suspicion, as a result of which we requested the Irkutsk NKVD, where BROVTSINOV had previously worked. It is clear from the reply telegram from Irkutsk that there are materials on BROVTSINOV that expose him to espionage activities. BROVTSINOV, in the past, working in China and Japan as a NKID diplomatic agent, married a Harbin NISENBAUM in 1929.

BROVTSINOV's wife, with the assistance of an exposed Japanese spy, the former head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Trans-Baikal Military District, RUBEN, made her way to work in the Intelligence Department. Through RUBEN, she had access to all mobilization and secret documents, and also gained wide connections among the top command and political staff of the Red Army. During their stay in Chita, BROVTSINOV's wife was closely associated with the Japanese Yamamoto and OOSI, employees of the Manchukuo consulate.

According to the internal consular source of "ANRE" dated March 23 of this year. it is clear that BROVTSINOV went to Moscow, to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, about which he personally informed the German consul GROSSKOPF, who informed the source about this.

In the light of the foregoing, the line of BROVTSINOV's provocative behavior becomes quite clear.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of the authorized NKID BROVTSINOV and his wife BROVTSINOVOY-NISENBAUM.

USPENSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 343. L. 121 - 122. Original. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "For the arrest of Brovtsinov and his wife. I. St. *.

No. 309

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.S. LYUSHKOVA ABOUT

"CONSPIRACERS" IN THE BODIES OF THE COURT AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

March 29, 1938

No. 102388

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 25324 of the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Far Eastern Territory, comrade. LYUSHKOV on the results of the investigation into the case of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in the prosecutor's office and the court.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of ZVYAGIN, DROZDOV, BOBORYKIN, VYATKIN, KRUSHININ, SKURIKHIN, TULEPOV, GARKUSH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

507

Tov. Ezhov

In the course of the investigation into the case of the Right-Trotskyist organization in the region, a serious group of conspirators was uncovered in the organs of the prosecutor's office and the court.

The former regional prosecutor CHERNIN, arrested in Khabarovsk, admitted his participation in the conspiracy, his connection with LAVRENT'EV, KRUTOV and other active conspirators. CHERNIN personally recruited deputy regional prosecutor ZVYAGIN (expelled from the party by the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), the prosecutor of the Ussuriysk region GARUSH, the prosecutor of the Primorsky region LYUBIMOV (a regular Trotskyist, arrested), the assistant to the regional prosecutor BOBORYKIN (a former White Guard) and DROZDOV. According to the testimony of CHERNIN, ZVYAGIN and GARKUSH were connected with the members of the organization - ZLOBIN - the former chairman of the Sakhalin Regional Court and LYSENKO - the chairman of the Ussuri Regional Court. CHERNIN, in his testimony, citing numerous facts, reveals the great treacherous work that these conspirators carried out, taking advantage of their position in the prosecutor's office and the court. It consisted in the termination of cases of wrecking counter-revolutionary activities of enemies, the imposition of unjust sentences, the connivance of prosecutorial supervision, despite flagrant abuses, the deliberately gross distortion of the punitive policy and Soviet legislation in general.

As it turns out, this work was carried out in close contact with the conspirators from the NKVD: DERIBAS, WESTERN, SIDOROV, DIKOV and others. CHERNIN testifies that SIDOROV, who interrogated CHERNIN after his arrest, demanded that he not betray anyone, hold on tight, and even commit suicide in order to preserve his organization.

nization, which, as he declared, has not completely failed.

Of exceptional interest is the statement addressed to you by the former regional prosecutor LYUBIMOV, who was arrested in Vladivostok and was a Trotskyist since 1921. LUBIMOV testifies that in 1935, when he was deputy prosecutor of Azerbaijan in Baku, he had a conversation with the senior assistant prosecutor of the Union, DUBROVSKII, who, referring to ROGINSKY, suggested that LUBIMOV smear a number of cases of anti-state crimes. DUBROVSKII then warned LUBIMOV that he and ROGINSKY knew LUBIMOV's Trotskyist past and that if he did not follow their instructions, they would expose him. At the beginning of 1936, LUBIMOV was sent to the FEC at the suggestion of ROGINSKY, who warned him that in his new work under the leadership of CHERNIN he should act in the spirit of DUBROVSKY's instructions. In May 1936, LUBIMOV had a long conversation with CHERNIN, who gave a number of instructions, including minimizing cases of anti-Soviet agitation and more boldly stopping cases investigated by the NKVD. CHERNIN told LUBIMOV bluntly: "This should serve the common goal of changing the policy of the Party and the government and of exercising democratic freedoms not in words but in deeds." In September 1936, CHERNIN had a conversation with LUBIMOV in connection with the process of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev center. He declared that ZINOVIEV and KAMENEV had acted heroically in not saying everything about the conspiracy and deployed their forces to continue the work they had begun. Regarding the DVK, he stated that there are already

508

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

all the prerequisites for the bloodless capture of it by the Japanese, tk. the conspirators launched work not only in the party and Soviet apparatus, but also in the army and navy. Speaking of Gamarnik, Tukhachevskii and other participants in the military-fascist conspiracy, CHERNIN declared that "the people will not believe the attempts to portray this cause of glorified people-heroes as enemies of Soviet power" and, in a terry-Black-Hundred spirit, spoke about the internal situation in Union. LUBIMOV further testifies that in January 1937 he contacted the assistant chief military prosecutor of the GROT KO, who came to Vladivostok together with CHERNIN. GROTKO told Lyubimov that MALKIS (the former prosecutor of the OKDVA) had amassed a nucleus of conspirators from the military prosecutor's office. From CHERNY NA LYUBIMOV it is known about the participation in the organization of employees of the regional prosecutor's office - DROZDOV, RUNGA and ZVYAGIN, he was personally connected with the latter through LYUBIMOV, recruited his assistants - VYATKIN, KRUSHININ, into the number of conspirators, in Kupyansk - POPOV, the district prosecutor ZIKU and the chairman of the special collegium SHULEPOV. LUBIMOV showed in detail about the circumstances of the recruitment of these persons and specific data from active hostile activity, in particular, about the mass repression of collective farm chairmen to destroy agriculture. After CHERNIN was exposed, ZVYAGIN suggested that LUBIMOV stop working for a while and said that, allegedly, as a Trotskyist, ROGINSKY's secretary had been exposed and that the possibility of ROGINSKY's failure in connection with the arrest of the FRID prosecutor in Siberia was not ruled out.

BERG.

Arrested former military prosecutor of the Amur basin CHOKLO

acknowledged his participation in the organization and names a number of conspirators in the shipping company, who carried out great subversive work to destroy the fleet. Among the accomplices CHOCLOO names: assistant prosecutor SKURIKHIN, as a Polish spy associated with the Polish consulate in Moscow (there are incriminating data about SKURIKHIN in the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office). In connection with all these data, it must be pointed out that ROHI, who was arrested in the case of the military-fascist conspiracy, also testified, according to other conspirators, about the involvement in the organization of the former military prosecutor OKDVA ANTONOV, whose task it was to prevent the disclosure of the conspiracy (from → wearing ANTONOV found that he once acquitted a large group of Japanese spies).

Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that there is a serious organization of conspirators with connections in Moscow in the organs of the court and the prosecutor's office of the region. I ask you to authorize the arrest of the identified conspirators - the former deputy regional prosecutor ZVYAGIN, employees of the regional prosecutor's office DROZDOV, BOBORYKIN (he is also suspected of Japanese espionage), employees of the Vladivostok prosecutor's office*.

LYUSHKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 343. L. 127-132. Script. Typescript.

* Published in part.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "For the arrest. I. Stalin.

DOCUMENTATION

509

No. 310

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION
ON THE LEADING WORKERS OF THE REGION

March 30, 1938

No. 102426

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 7578 of the head of the UNKVD for the Novosibirsk region, comrade. GORBACH.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Arrested in Novosibirsk, the former deputy head of industry

Adolf Mironovich admitted to the transport department of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the RAC that he actively participated in the Right-Trotskyist organization.

The RAC shows that he joined the Right-Trotsky organization in 1936 at the suggestion of V.Ya. - former head of the industrial transport department of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at the present time the manager of the Kuzbassugol plant in Novosibirsk (I raise the question of his arrest).

According to the testimony of the RAC, his entry into the right-wing Trotskyist organization was preceded by a lengthy indoctrination in the spirit of Trotskyism by Konstantin Maksimovich SERGEEV, former second secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b), at present secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b), in Ordzhonikidze, with whom the RAC was familiar with 1928 on joint work in the Syzran District Committee.

In addition to PRINTSEV and SERGEEV, the RAC named the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization I.I. LYASHENKO. - Head of the ORPO of the Novosibirsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (I bet about his arrest), DANILENKO, LOSHAKOV - former instructors of the regional committee (arrested, confessed), KURANICHEV - former instructor of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, currently director of Novosibles, KANIFATOV - former instructor of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, currently an employee of Kuzbass; deputy head of the industrial transport department of the Novosibirsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, ROZIT - the former authorized representative of the Soviet Control of the ZSK, has left at the moment, BASOVA - the former assistant secretary of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Novosibirsk, currently works in the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Ordzhonikidze, KATTEL - the former head of the Kemerovo Combine, YKURGANOV * - the former secretary of the Prokofiev City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at the present time the secretary of the Donetsk Regional Executive Committee and 9 people who have already been convicted members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization, including members of the right-wing Trotskyist center KOLOTILOV, FOMIN, TIMOFEEV, and VORONIN.

510

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The RAC shows in detail about the subversive and destructive work carried out by the participants of the said counter-revolutionary organization in industry, transport, and agriculture.

We continue the investigation. Sending the protocol.

March 27, 1938. No. 7578.

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 343. L. 133-135. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a handwritten note and Stalin's resolution: "What to do with

Sergeev?

Kurganov to be arrested immediately."

»_« the surname is circled and there is Stalin's mark in the margin: "Why Kurganov
Not
arrested?"

No. 311

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM D.M. DMITRIEV ON THE
"COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION

March 30, 1938

No. 102428

Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 8343 of the head of the UNKVD of the Sverdlovsk region,
comrade DMITRIEV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

We arrested the chairman of the Sverdlovsk Regional Consumer Union SAMARIN Dmitry
Ivanovich, who was brought from Kirov by a CARPET, who worked for many years with the
CARPET in Gorky and Kirov and received the appointment of secretary of the regional committee
of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Kirov, he moved with him to the center "his people", to
including SAMARINA.

SAMARIN testified that, while working in the Kirov region, he was attracted by STOLYAR to
the counter-revolutionary organization of the right. STOLYAR resorted to attraction, having found
out that SAMARIN had made major political mistakes, and got entangled in relations with one
woman.

SAMARIN tells in detail about the counter-revolutionary work of the right, led by STOLYAR,
in the Kirov region. SAMARIN named as members of the counter-revolutionary organization of the
right in the Kirov region: GRACH EVA * - former secretary of the Kirov city committee, now chairman

of the regional executive committee in the Sverdlovsk region, *LEGKONRAVOV* - former deputy
chairman of the regional executive committee in the Kirov region, now chairman of the regional executive
committee of the DVK, *DUBINSKY* - head of the agricultural department of the regional
committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (arrested in Kirov), *LOZOVSKY*
head industrial and transport department of the Kirov Regional Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks - son-in-law of * STOLYAR *, * wife of LOZOVSKY * - director
of the institute in Kirov (STOLYAR's sister), * KALININA * - manager of the Kirov regional office
of the State Bank (arrested in Kirov), * VYAZANKINA * - secret

DOCUMENTATION

511

tar of the Kiyasovsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Kirov Region (arrested in Kirov), 'ZYABLITSEVA * - Assistant to the STOLYAR in the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 'Mustafieva * - Secretary of the Sverdlovsk City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, brought by the WORKER from Kalinin, 'GOLDMANA* - former chairman of the Kirov Regional Department of National Economic Accounting, former scientific secretary of RYKOV.

STOLYAR introduced SAMARIN to the terrorist and wrecking tasks of the counter-revolutionary organization and suggested that he develop sabotage work in the system of consumer cooperation.

On the instructions of STOLYAR, SAMARIN disrupted the supply of goods and products to the population, deliberately created a difficult financial situation in the district consumer unions, and artificially delayed loans granted to the lower consumer system.

He conducted all his work, creating sharp discontent and great indignation among the population. STOLYAR dragged SAMARIN from Sverdlovsk in August 1937, who was appointed chairman of the Sverdlovsk Regional Consumer union.

On the instructions of STOLYAR, SAMARIN resumed subversive activities, carrying out wrecking work in the Regional Consumer Union in Sverdlovsk. SAMARIN describes in detail the situation of clamping down, sycophancy, servility that existed in the Kirov organization during the period of STOLYAR's work there.

The members of the counter-revolutionary organization created for STOLYAR the authority of the "leader of the Kirov Bolsheviks" by organizing laudatory speeches addressed to STOLYAR. All this was done with the aim of creating a favorable environment for the development of wrecking work in the Kirov region.

SAMARIN's interrogation protocol has been sent to you today.

I ask permission to send SAMARIN at your disposal for interrogation.

28.III. 1938 No. 8343

DMITRIEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 343. L. 136-139. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "N8*. *—* All names are circled.

ÿ312

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.S. LYUSHKOVA
ON THE MILITARY "CONSPIRACY" IN THE PACIFIC FLEET (77)

March 31, 1938

No. 102463

Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 25343 of the head of the NKVD department for the Far Eastern Territory, comrade. LYUSHKOV on the results of the investigation into the case of the liquidated military conspiracy in the units of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet.

512

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

I ask for an arrest warrant for F.A. MOROZOV, I.P. Safonov, I.M. Sotnikov, S.V. Tikhonov, B.K. Khashchinsky, and I.A. and BOYTSOV V.S.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Tov. Ezhov

During further verification in Vladivostok of the testimony of a number of participants in the organization preparing treason in the units of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, we summoned to Khabarovsk the arrested SHILkin, the former head of the Political Department of the 28th air brigade, TOMASHEVSKY, the former military commissar of the 42nd air brigade, and ABRAMOV, the former commander of the 9th air brigade. th squadron of the 42nd air brigade. I personally interrogated Shilkin and Tomashevsky. Both of their testimonies were confirmed, and SHILkin gives the impression of an embittered traitor who does not hide his hatred of the Soviet power. Tomashevsky tried in Vladivostok and here to retract his testimony, but then he fully confessed and additionally testified about his espionage activities, which he concealed during the first interrogation. Since SHILKIN, TOMASHEVSKY and ABRAMOV testified about a number of persons whom NIKIFOROV and LAVROV did not name, they were given a series of face-to-face confrontations. As a result, LAVROV confirmed a number of Shilkin's testimony, while NIKIFOROV continued to deny his knowledge of the involvement in the conspiracy of the commander of the 42nd air brigade, FEDOROV, and the commander of the squadron, Rozhdestvensky, who were named by those arrested in Vladivostok. Therefore, FEDOROV, RODZHESTVENSKY and SHIROKOGO (commander of the 20th brigade), also named in the testimony, are additionally checked. At the same time, since we are talking about the preparation of treason, I consider it necessary to remove them from the command of units, about which I ask for instructions. At the same time, I ask you to authorize the arrest of the exposed conspirators:

1) Fyodor Alekseevich MOROZOV - commander of the 125th air brigade, captain, born in 1904. Member of the CPSU (b), in the period 1927-1928. studied in Germany. Exposed by the testimony of TOMASHEVSKY and SHILkin.

2) SAFONOV Ivan Petrovich - commander of the 30th squadron, 125th air brigade, captain, born in 1902, member of the CPSU (b). Exposed by the testimony of MILESHKIN and KUZNETSOV.

3) SOTNIKOV Ivan Mikhailovich - commander of the 28th squadron, 28th air brigade, born in 1906, captain. Member of the CPSU (b). SHILKIN's testimony exposes him as participating in a conspiracy in preparation for treason. On his instructions, recruitment work was carried out for sabotage in the squadron.

4) TIKHONOV Sergey Vasilievich - commander of the 17th separate air squadron, major.
Member of the CPSU (b). Exposed by the testimony of LAVROV, MILESHKIN and KOZLOV
TIKHONOV's wife was German, until 1931 she lived in Germany, until 1933 a German subject.
In 1933 she went to Germany to visit relatives, she is suspected of espionage.

5) KHASHCHINSKY Boleslav Karlovich - assistant commander of the 9th squadron,
42nd air brigade, captain, born in 1899, Pole, expelled from the party for the collapse of work. Exposed by
the testimony of LAVROV and TOMASHEVSKY.

6) MILT Ivan Adamovich - head of the 5th department of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, major.
1901 year of birth. Member of the CPSU (b). Exposed by the testimony of LAVROV and MILESHKIN.

DOCUMENTATION

513

7) BOYTSOV Vasily Sergeevich - head of repair train 1, engineer of the 3rd rank. 1903 year
of birth. Non-partisan. Exposed by the testimony of LAVROV, SHILKIN and TOMASHEVSKY.

March 28, No. 25343

Iyushkov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 343. L. 140-143. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten resolution: "T. Yezhov. For the arrest of Morozov and other persons mentioned in
Comrade Yezhov's transmission, as well as for the removal of Fedorov, Rozhdestvensky and Shirokoy from command.
I. Stalin". -

No. 313

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT JAPANESE CONCESSIONS ON SAKHALIN"

April 2, 1938

41 - 0 Japanese concessions on Sakhalin.

5. To reaffirm that prosecution and arrest of Japanese employees and workers on Sakhalin concessions
can be carried out, in necessary cases, only with the permission of the Prosecutor of the Union or
the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs and the NKTP.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 63. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 60.

No. 314

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM S.F. REDENS
ON THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE RIGHT TROTSKIST CENTER

April 3, 1938

No. 102596

Soy. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 205 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the
Kazakh SSR comrade. REDENSA.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

ALMA-ATA

April 2, 1938

No. 16417, 16443, 16445

Arrested members of a right-wing Trotskyist organization: YAKHNOVICH - former People's
Commissariat of Food Industry, RAFAL'SKY - former deputy chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars, VERKHOVSKY - former editor of a republican newspaper, BARANOV -
former deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee - screenings

514

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

They believe that MIRZOYAN, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)K, is the chief
leader of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in Kazakhstan. That they were connected with MIRZOYAN
in the counter-revolutionary work carried out by them on his orders.

YAKHNOVICH shows that, having been recruited into the organization by MIRZOYAN, he was
associated with him in counter-revolutionary activities back in the Urals. Then, on his initiative, he
was transferred to Kazakhstan, where he carried out wrecking work on the instructions of MIRZOYAN.
YAKHNOVICH cites the facts of his anti-Soviet conversations with MIRZOYAN, during which
MIRZOYAN told YAKHNOVICH that the Central Committee of the Party in matters of agriculture
allows excesses, that the policy of collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks led the peasantry to
ruin and deprived the country of bread and agricultural products. YAKHNOVICH says that MIRZOYAN, in
conversations with him, asserted that the Central Committee of the party ruined not only Kazakhstan, but
also Belorussia, Ukraine and other national republics. MIRZOYAN called the policy of the Central
Committee colonial, suggested that he fight for a change in the policy of the party. YAKHNOVICH
says that in 1932, while on vacation with Mirzoyan

in Sochi, he was a participant in the meeting and conversation of MIRZOYAN with 'Chaplin*, in which they openly blasphemed the policy of the Central Committee. YAKHNOVICH relates a conversation in which MIRZOYAN told him that in 1936, while on vacation in Czechoslovakia, he had an unofficial meeting with one of the members of the Czechoslovak government through the Soviet envoy to Hungary, "Bekzad Na**." After MIRZOYAN returned from abroad, BEKZADYAN came to Alma-Ata on vacation, which he spent with MIRZOYAN.

YAKHNOVICH shows that since 1934 he carried out sabotage and wrecking work in the food industry of the Kazakhstan SSR, on the direct orders of MIRZOYAN, and on his orders disrupted the supply of the workers' regions of the Union and the shipment of meat to the Far East to supply the troops, that MIRZOYAN covered this considerations to ensure the interest

owls of the population of Kazakhstan.

RAFALSKY testified that when he was recruited into the organization TOBOLOVYM (former secretary of the Alma-Ata regional party committee), the latter said that MIRZOYAN was the head of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in Kazakhstan, that he - RAFALSKY contacted, at the suggestion of TOBOLOV, with MIRZOYAN and, on his instructions, carried out anti-Soviet wrecking work. RAFAL'SKY asserts that, on MIRZOYAN's instructions, he did harm in supplying the central workers' regions of the Union. He disrupted the shipment of meat for the Far Eastern Army, personally received assignments about this from MIRZOYAN and handed them over to YAKHNOVICH for execution. RAFAL'SKY cites the facts of receiving directives from MIRZOYAN regarding TOZs that distort the charter of the agricultural artel and are aimed at developing individualistic tendencies among the collective farmers.

VERKHOVSKY shows that he was recruited into the organization of the right by MIRZOYAN in 1931 in Chelyabinsk and carried out subversive work along the line of the newspaper. At the direction of MIRZOYAN, VERKHOVSKY says that more than once in conversations with him MIRZOYAN showed dissatisfaction with the party's policy in the field of collectivization and industrialization, he cites a conversation with MIRZOYAN in which he spoke in favor of curbing the pace of construction of new factories in the Urals. VERKHOVSKY claims that the WORLD

DOCUMENTATION

515

ZOYAN was connected with Bukharin, about which he, MIRZOYAN, told him more than once.

VERKHOVSKY testified that MIRZOYAN gave him the task of defending the Trotskyists and the Rights through the newspaper, in pursuance of which VERKHOVSKY created an anti-Soviet group in the editorial office of the regional newspaper, placed right-wing Trotskyist cadres in the regional newspapers and smeared criticism and exposure of the participants in the organization.

BARANOV testified that he was connected with MIRZOYAN as the head of the right-wing Trotskyite organization. He cites a conversation in which MIRZOYAN told him that he considered the party's policy in the field of agriculture to be erroneous, that it had led the country to ruin. In another conversation with BARANOV, MIRZOYAN characterized the defeat by the Trotskyist party and

right, as the removal from the leadership of the old Bolshevik cadres. BARANOV cites one of his conversations with MIRZOYAN, during which MIRZOYAN spoke of the need to change the policy of the party by force, suggesting that work be carried out in accordance with the guidelines of the Moscow center of the right. The testimonies of the arrested YAKHNOVICH, RAFALS KOYO, VERKHOVSKY, BARANOV have been personally verified by me by repeated interrogations of them. YAKHNOVICH, RAFALSKY, VERKHOVSKY and other arrested people testify about the leading role in the right-wing Trotskyist organization *** SVERDLOV - the former secretary of the East Kazakhstan regional party committee and KISELEV *** - the former secretary of the Alma-Ata regional party committee, who are close assistants in the counterrevolutionary work of MIRZOYAN. SVERDLOV and KISELEV, in accordance with your authorization, have been arrested and are being escorted to Alma-Ata.

I am sending the protocols.

April 1, 1938.

No. 205

REDENS

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 345. L. 230-234. Script. Typescript.

The text contains Stalin's handwritten notes: "Important" on the first page. *—* in the margins opposite the surname there is a note: "Ask Chaplin." **—** "Ask Bekzadyan."

***—*• "Ask Sverdlov and Kiselyov."

No. 315

TELEPHONE GRAM A.A. Andreeva I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE NEED TO ARREST SOVIET PARTNER EMPLOYEES

April 7, 1938

A plenum was held in Sverdlovsk with the participation of secretaries of district committees. The plenum removed the chairman of the executive committee, Grachev. I consider it necessary to arrest Grachev and Morozov, the secretary of the Sverdlovsk city committee. I ask for your consent. Both were brought by the Joiner. Both according to the investigative data, and according to their behavior, they are definitely enemies. For the chairman of the executive committee, we are appointing a local worker - the secretary of the Asbestov Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Semenov, and Gusarov, an employee of the ORPO of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who came with me, can be left as the second secretary of the city committee.

516

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Factories operate intermittently due to lack of fuel and energy. Ural-

energo, like a hooligan, turns off individual plants without warning during steelmaking and iron smelting, which leads to accidents at the plants. In Sverdlovsk itself, there were long queues at shops due to a shortage of goods, and in the warehouses of the railway there was a lot of unpurchased manufactory and food products.

There is a lot of disorder and direct sabotage in the region and regions in the preparation of agriculture for spring.

On all these and other issues, we are taking the necessary corrective measures with the regional committee.

Today I'm going to Perm to visit military factories: it doesn't matter where things are going on at the Molotov gun factory. We will use your instructions that you gave on the Tula factories.

ANDREEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 347. L. 78. Original. Typescript.

There are resolutions on the sheet: "Send Morozov and Grachev to Moscow to the Central Committee. For a special folder: on the way, arrest them both and bring them to the NKVD. I. Stalin "and" Reported to the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee, the NKVD. P.".

No. 316

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE APPOINTMENT OF N.I. Ezhov PART-TIME

People's Commissar for Water Transport of the USSR

April 8, 1938

80 - 0 appointment of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs comrade. Ezhova N.I. People's Commissar of Water Transport.

Approve the following draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Appoint the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade. Ezhova N.I. part-time People's Commissar of Water Transport.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 998. L. 21. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 60.

No. 317

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE UNSATISFACTORY WORK OF SOIFER AND KOLETVINOV"

April 10, 1938

91 - 0 unsatisfactory work, etc. Soifer and Koletvinov.

Despite the exceptional importance of the Tula military factories for the defense of our country, ie. Soifer and Koletvinov did nothing to cleanse the defense industry of dubious and hostile elements, as a result of which, until recently, Germans, Poles, Letts, Estonians, Mensheviks remained in these enterprises in large numbers and carried out subversive work. , SRs, former prisoners of war.

<...>

DOCUMENTATION

517

5. To regard as the most important task of the entire Tula party organization the transformation of the arms, ammunition, shell and other Tula military factories into a fortress of Bolshevism. Keep in mind that the defense capability of our country depends on these factories.

Oblige the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Tula region to clear the military factories of Germans, Poles, Letts, Estonians, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and former prisoners of war as soon as possible.

RGASPI. F. 3. Op. 17. D. 998. L. 24-26. Script. Typescript.

Protocol number 60.

No. 318

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING THE LIMIT FOR THE
TROIKA IN THE LENINGRAD REGION

April 13, 1938

115 - Question of the NKVD.

Allow the Lenobkom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to additionally consider cases in a special troika in the first category for 1,500 kulaks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, repeat offenders and criminals.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 169. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 60.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov; Leningrad Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

No. 319

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON ZAKOVSKY"

April 14, 1938

128 - About Zakovsky.

1. In view of the fact that a number of serious shortcomings were revealed in the work of the Leningrad NKVD during the period of work of Comrade Zakovsky, such as: correspondence between prisoners and the spy Grodis in particular, the creation of exaggerated cases; the clogging of the apparatus of the NKVD with spy elements that worked until recently, despite the compromising materials they had - the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers that Comrade Zakovsky cannot now enjoy full political confidence as the head of Chekist work.

2. The Central Committee decides: to release comrade Zakovsky from the duties of deputy NKVD of the USSR and appoint him head of the construction of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric complex, where he must, through his work, restore complete confidence in himself.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 998. L. 34. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 60.

518

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

ÿ320

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT
THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION IN THE CASE
OF THE MISSING OF THE DISTRIBUTION CARD

April 14, 1938

No. 102899

In connection with the loss in October 1937 of the location card in the General Staff of the Red Army, a top secret document of special importance, 14 people were arrested by the 5th Department of the GUGB of the NKVD - employees of the General Staff of the Red Army.

As a result of a thorough investigation, it was established that out of the 14 arrested, 11 people were participants in a military conspiracy and spies for foreign intelligence services.

Arrested:

1. BAMBULEVICH A.V. - former colonel, head of the 2nd department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

2. DUBYANSKY V.A. - former colonel, head of the 3rd department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

3. TSIFEROV G.I. - former colonel, head of the 4th department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

4. SMOLIN K.E. - former colonel, head of the 1st department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

5. Maslennikov A.B. - former fireman, assistant chief of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

6. Prokudin P.I. - former major, assistant chief of the 3rd department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

7. Abramovich I.M. - former major, assistant chief of the 6th department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army, - as participants in the conspiracy and spies, they were convicted by the Military Collegium and shot.

For those arrested:

1. GROZOVSKY A.G. - Major, former assistant chief of the 4th department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

2. Smolina V.I. - colonel, former deputy head of the department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army;

3. MATVEYSHINA A.B. - Colonel, former head of the 10th department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army - the investigation cases were transferred to the Military Collegium as participants in the conspiracy and spies.

The case against the direct culprit in the destruction of the deployment map, the former head of the department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major Alexander Matveyevich MOROV, who confessed that he burned this document, is also completed and is being submitted to the Military Tribunal.

For those arrested:

1. NOVIKOVA N.I. - Major, former assistant chief of the 3rd department of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army and

2. RAPONKINA M.N. - a senior clerk, a demobilized Red Army soldier, a former assistant to the chief of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army, - arrested on suspicion of stealing a deployment card, - the investigation did not establish their involvement in this case, as well as in any other crimes, in for which they are subject to release.

DOCUMENTATION

519

Arrested IVANOV Petr Alekseevich, colonel, former chief of the 1st department of the General Staff of the Red Army (for his work in Spain he was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner) is accused of negligent attitude to the issues of safety of top secret documents of particular importance, since MOROV's map-deployment was stolen from his desk (arrested).

I ask you to authorize the release from arrest of RAPONKIN and NOVIKOV, as well as instructions regarding P.A. IVANOV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov AP RF. F.
3. Op. 58. D. 255. L. 23a-23c. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "For. I. St., V. Molotov.

No. 321

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO A.I. USPENSKY
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE POLISH OPERATION (78)

April 15, 1938

No. 102983
Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 926 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR comrade. USPENSKY on the results of the operation and the investigation into the Poles.

I ask you to discuss the issue of the arrest of KOSIOR Kazimir, the People's Commissariat for Forestry of Ukraine, who is being held on the basis of a number of testimonies of active participants in the POV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

In accordance with your instructions, all organs of the NKVD in Ukraine were given the task of crushing the Polish espionage, sabotage and insurrectionary underground in Ukraine. However, the solution of this operational task was complicated by the fact that some of the leaders of the Peovyatsk * underground LAZOVERT, previously arrested and convicted in 1937 - head. of the Polish bureau of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, BEGAILO - former secretary of the Vinnitsa regional committee of the CP(b)U, KAPTSEVICH - the former commander of the 58th Infantry Division and others did not disclose during the investigation the military sabotage plans of the Polish main headquarters in Ukraine and did not show about those numerous organizations and groups, which for a long time were planted by Peovyak in Ukraine. Based on the investigative data of the ongoing operation to defeat the Polish spy-sabotage underground, it is revealed that in Ukraine for a long time, almost with impunity, a very extensive "Polish organization of troops" (POV) operated. As established by the investigation, the POV began to widely deploy espionage and sabotage activities as early as 1920, immediately after the war. In the subsequent POV,

*

Slang designation of the Polish military organization.

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

carried out this work in accordance with the plan developed by the Polish General Staff, under the leadership of Pilsudski, for the deployment of military sabotage, insurrectionary and espionage work by the Peowyak in Ukraine. The cadres of Peovyatsk spy and sabotage organizations and groups in Ukraine were mainly composed of the local population of Polish nationality and were transferred from Poland for many years by Peovyatsk agents under the guise of political emigrants and defectors. The penetration of the Peovyak cadres into the Red Army, the defense enterprise and installations, railway transport and other important defense sectors was facilitated by the fact that the Peovyak had many of their agents in the party and Soviet apparatus.

It has been established that as early as 1920, under the directive of Pilsudski, the participants of the POV, especially the former associates of Pilsudski in the teaching staff, began to infiltrate the CP (b)U, later some of them penetrated into leading positions in party and Soviet institutions, in the Red Army. Army, transport, industry. Thus, such prominent people as SKARBEEK, LAZOVERT, THEODOR KANETSIY, deputy head of the cultural industry of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U (all were convicted), were in responsible work in the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. They, using their position in the party and Soviet apparatuses, easily carried out the directives of the Polish headquarters on the placement of Peovyatsky and other Polish espionage and sabotage personnel. As a result of this, the Peovyatsk agents penetrated into the party and Soviet apparatus, into economic bodies, into transport, into the army, into the bodies of the NKVD and the police.

Arrested in the case of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist center ZATONSKY, KAPULOVSKY, BORISENKO, PROKOPCHUK and others in their testimony note that the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist center in the person of LYUBCHENKO, ZATONSKY, PORAIKO and others had a complete conspiracy with the Polish government about the joint action of Ukrainian nationalists and Polish fascists at the time of the war against the Soviet Union. In particular, ZATONSKY negotiated this with the Polish government in 1936 in Warsaw, during negotiations with the Minister of Education of Poland SVENTOSLAVSKY and during meetings in Kiev with the Polish Consul General KARSHOSEDLITS KIM.

The arrested KAPULOVSKY, a member of the military headquarters of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist center, ZRAZHEVSKY, the director of the Berdichevsky timber industry enterprise, and others show that the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists and the leadership of the Peovyatsky underground in Ukraine acted in contact, and the lower levels of the Ukrainian nationalist and Peovyatsky underground intertwined and coordinated espionage and sabotage insurgent work on the right bank of Ukraine, especially in areas inhabited by Poles. On the basis of this conspiracy, over the years, espionage and military sabotage activities of the "Polish military organization" and numerous agents of Polish intelligence agencies in Ukraine were widely deployed. Taking advantage of the direct support of the bourgeois nationalists and relying on their agents in the CP(b)U, the Peowyaks, on Pilsudski's directive, managed to carry out great colonial work in the Ukraine over the course of a number of years. In particular, they created the Institute of Polish Culture in Kyiv, the Polish Pedagogical Institute, the Polish office of the Academy of Sciences, Polish theaters in Kiev and locally. Polish newspapers, numerous Polish clubs, a large network of Polish

DOCUMENTATION

521

Polish schools (in 1933 there were 390 Polish national schools in Ukraine) and other Polish institutions that were headquarters for the organization of military sabotage and espionage work, breeding grounds for peovyatsky spy and sabotage personnel, a school for teaching them espionage and sabotage and hiding places and appearances of Polish agents, who were transferred from behind the cordon and scoured all over Ukraine.

As a result of many years of unpunished work of the Peowyaks to expand their Peowyak base, the Poles still have their numerous hidden cadres in Ukraine, who, having penetrated the CP(b)U and disguised themselves as a party card, carry out subversive work, spy, and prepare sabotage. Recently, 1,848 Poles, members of the POV and other anti-Soviet espionage and sabotage organizations and groups that have made their way into the CP(b)U, have been arrested in Ukraine.

A number of those arrested show that the Polish headquarters makes a big bet in wartime on the deployment of subversive, espionage and sabotage-insurgency work by the Poles who have penetrated the CP (b) U, hoping that they, as "enjoying confidence", will remain during the war in the rear of the southwestern front of the Red Army, at a time when the rest of the Poles could be sent deep into the USSR. The Poles most widely carried out espionage, sabotage and insurrectionary work on the right bank of Ukraine: - in parts of the Red Army of the Kiev military district and Kamenetz-Podolsk and Zhytomyr regions, where the Poles had their numerous strongholds in forestry organizations, at sugar and glass-porcelain factories points.

The arrested former commander of the 51st Infantry Division PROKOPCHUK (a native of Poland), who at the same time was a member of the Ukrainian military-nationalist organization and the POV, testifies that the Peovyaks in Ukraine had their own military headquarters, from which he names: KAPTSEVICH, former commander of the 58th Rifle Division (convicted), RACHINSKY, former commander of the Kiev Air Defense Brigade (convicted), YUSHKEVICH, former commander of the 13th Rifle Corps (removed from his post, is in Moscow at the disposal of NGOs). As PROKOPCHUK shows, the Peowyak military headquarters was led by KVVYATEK, the former deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District (arrested, located in Moscow, a request was sent to send him to Kiev). We have a large number of testimonies of POV participants (KAP CEVICH, RACHINSKY, PROKOPPCHUK, SHPERKOVICH - head of the chemical service of the air defense brigade, VOYNO-DANCHISHIN - commander of the division of the 25th artillery regiment, GONSIOROVSKII - head of the 1st part of the headquarters of the 3rd cavalry divisions and others) that, in accordance with the mobilization and sabotage plan for the development of underground work in Ukraine, developed by the Polish General Staff under the leadership of Pilsudski, the Peoviak organizations and groups and all other Polish agents were to launch destructive work in the mobilization period, as well as during the war with the aim of disorganizing the southwestern front of the Red Army and its rear. These diversions were prepared in the direction of:

a) destruction of defense industrial enterprises and artillery

warehouses;

b) destructive work at the main strategic nodes of the southwestern direction (Zhmerinka, Kazatin, Korosten, Grechany, Shepetovka),

522 _ LUBYANKA, Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

as well as the destruction of the Kyiv group of bridges across the Dnieper and bridges across the Southern Bug and Teterev;

c) destruction of bases for supplying the army and the population with food;

d) destruction of the air defense system;

e) disruption of the mobilization of the second-order and third-order units of the Red Army;

f) bacteriological sabotage, by poisoning water pipes, wells, food and fodder

g) treason on the front of the command staff of the Red Army - participants in the "POV", as well as other commanders and Red Army soldiers of Polish nationality, whom the Peowyaks were supposed to process.

In the system of military communications of the Kiev military district, the sabotage organization created by the POV, on the instructions of the Polish headquarters, was liquidated, headed by the head of the military communications department of the headquarters of the Kiev military district KULIKOVSKII and his assistant KULESHO, both Polish agents (convicted). KULIKOVSKY, KULESHO and other members of this organization showed that over the past 3 years they had created sabotage groups at the strategic nodes of Kazatin, Zhmerinka, Korosten, Grechany, Shepetovka, as well as on railway bridges across the rivers Dnieper, Sluch, Teterev and Yuzhny Bug. Along with the preparation of acts of sabotage for wartime, the members of the organization carried out subversive work in the construction of strategic and highway roads and the mobilization system of military communications. Thus, they succeeded in disrupting the construction of the strategic railways Kyiv-Vasilkov and Novomoskovsk-Zoloto Nosh, as well as the construction of loading and unloading sites at the stations of Zhitomir, Novograd-Volynsk and Kurnaya.

The mobilization work of military communications was entangled in such a way that military transportation and concentration of troops in the very first days of mobilization would have been disrupted.

The arrested member of this organization, the assistant to the head of the department of the 3rd department of the headquarters of the Kiev military district of the State Department of Health, shows that he, as a demolition specialist, was entrusted with the leadership of a sabotage group in the Zhmerinsky direction.

The GUZ names a number of participants in sabotage groups.

A sabotage group created by Polish agents was also uncovered: the commander of the 6th railway regiment VOYNOV (arrested) and his assistant PAVLOVSKY (convicted).

VOYNOV and PAVLOVSKY testified that they had set up sabotage groups to destroy the railway junctions of Grechany, Shepetovka

and Korosten.

In the apparatus of the Kyiv mobokrug, a Peovyatsk espionage and sabotage group was opened, which was carrying out work to disrupt the mobilization of Red Army units.

Arrested SKLYAR, the head of the political secretariat of the Department of the Kiev mobokrug, SHADUR, the Tarashchansky district military commissar, and TATARCHEVSKY, the clerk of the mobile unit of the Belotserkovsky district military commissariat, show that, on the instructions of the Polish headquarters, they confused the registration of the rank and file in such a way that at the time of mobilization, not those who assigned to the indicated units, reserve commanders with military registration specialties (motorized troops, aviation, engineers, paratroopers, etc.) were not taken into special account, but were assigned

DOCUMENTATION

523

to rifle units, it was widely practiced to register dead souls with units of the first stage, many reserve commanders and political workers remained unassigned to any units, during the recertification of reserve commanders they received a good mark and were sent primarily for retraining, former Petliurists, White Guards and other anti-Soviet element, the reserve commanders, devoted to the Soviet power, were certified and removed from the register; the postscript to parts of road transport, horses, carts and teams was confused.

Arrested PROKOPCHUK reveals that he was recruited into the POV by KVVYATEK in 1933. In the same year, KVVYATEK connected PROKOPCHUK with the head of the Vinnitsa Regional Committee of the POV BEGAILO, the former secretary of the Vinnitsa Regional Committee of the CP(b)U. KVVYATEK and BEGAILO instructed PROKOPCHUK to carry out subversive work in the mobilization system in order to disrupt the mobilization of the 96th Infantry Division, which was then commanded by PROKOPCHUK, as well as to recruit commanders of Polish nationality and, together with them, organize treason at the front.

To lead the sabotage groups, PROKOPCHUK recruited the former assistant commander of the 288th regiment SHCHITINSKY (to be installed) and the head of the workshops of the tank battalion ZYUBROVSKY (arrested) into the POV. After the appointment of PROKOPCHUK as the commander of the 51st Infantry Division, he laid down sabotage peovyatsky groups in parts of this division.

Arrested on the testimony of PROKOPCHUK, the commanders of units of the 96th Infantry Division, the Poles STRELBITSKY, GALINSKY, SHANTAR, NEMETS and others, confessed to participation in the POV and to their espionage and subversive work. A number of Peovyatsky sabotage groups were opened in the air defense system, created by the commander of the Kyiv air defense brigade RACHINSKY and the head of the chemical service of this brigade SHPERKOVICH. The members of these sabotage groups were supposed to destroy the means of anti-aircraft and anti-chemical defense of Kiev at the moment of mobilization.

The arrested commander of the battalion of the 5th searchlight regiment of the Kyiv

air defense brigade TARCHINSKY, confessed that in the searchlight regiment he headed the peovyatskaya group, which, before its liquidation, managed to render 6 searchlight stations unusable. Members of the Peovyatsk groups in the Red Army, in their sabotage and subversive work, intertwined with members of the Peovyatsk underground among the Polish civilian population. It has been established that the Polish clubs that existed in Ukraine carried out active work to involve the commanders of the Red Army of Polish nationality in the POV.

The arrested chief of the 1st part of the headquarters of the 3rd cavalry division GONSIOROVSKII testified that he was recruited into the POV in 1925 by the head of the Polish club in Belaya Tserkov, ILNITSKY. After moving to Berdichev, GONSIOROVSKII, at the direction of Ilnitsky, contacted the head of the Polish club in Berdichev - KOVALSKI, on whose instructions he created peovyatsky groups in parts of the cavalry division. GONSIOROWSKI names 26 POV participants among the Polish civilian population

niya.

The arrested assistant to the commander of the 132nd regiment of the 44th division of the DOMBROV-SKY testified that in the POV he was recruited by the head of the Polish

524 _ LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

club in Zhytomyr, on behalf of which he carried out recruiting work in the POV in his regiment.

DOMBROVSKY names a number of the members of the sabotage group POV in the regiment that he arrested.

The arrested battalion commander of the 137th Infantry Regiment GLAVATS KIY names 3 commanders of the Red Army who led the Peovyatsk insurgent detachments, in which 80 Poles from the Polish population in Volyn have already been recruited. According to a number of investigative cases, it is established that the UNSHLIKHTA military school that previously existed in Moscow served as a breeding ground for Peovyatsky cadres in the Red Army.

VOYNO-DANCHISHIN shows that the peovyak commanders graduating from the UNSHLIKHTA school were instructed to create espionage and sabotage groups in parts of the Red Army and among the civilian population. VOYNO DANCHISHIN created peovyatsky groups in units of the 51st and 25th rifle divisions in which he served. In addition, VOYNO-DANCHISHIN established contact with the Peovyak groups in the 15th and 95th Infantry Divisions, created by the Peovyak KHAMULYAK and NIZULA who studied with him (it is being established). Over the past month and a half, Peovyatsk groups have been opened and liquidated in the 58th, 15th, 25th, 62nd, 51st, 95th, 96th and 97th rifle divisions, in the 3rd and 26th cavalry divisions, in the Kiev air defense brigade, in 183rd, 80th and 56th artillery regiments, in the 6th railway regiment and other formations of the Red Army of the Kiev and Kharkov military districts. Since February 15, we have arrested 190 commanders of the Red Army of the Poles, who were agents of the Polish intelligence agencies, many of them are members of Peovyatsk organizations and groups. Until recently, in parts of the Kyiv and Kharkov military districts, there are still many Poles in command positions, very dubious, actively developed by us. The dismissal of the Poles from the Red Army and their transfer to the rear districts is almost never carried out. According to incomplete data, there are now 384 Poles in command positions in parts of the Kyiv Military District. There are many Poles among the commanders of the reserve, as well as among the Red Army.

Meytsev's henchmen. According to 5 mobo-circles, out of 9 available in Ukraine, 824 Poles and 21,889 Poles of the Red Army assigned to the reserve, who at the time of mobilization will have to merge into the Red Army units formed in Ukraine, are registered with the reserve commanders. Thus, fears arise that those parts of the Red Army that will have to act against the Poles may be joined by members of the Peowyak organizations and other Polish agents who will spy, harm and change at the front. In addition to the work of the Polish headquarters, which we uncovered in the army - investigative materials, it is now established that the Polish headquarters carried out its military mobilization plans in collusion with the Ukrainian nationalist center, planted numerous Peovyatsky sabotage and rebel formations on the territory of Ukraine, mainly at once, along the border with Poland. In total, since February 15 of this year, we have eliminated 103 sabotage-spy-peovyatsk organizations with 5,550 participants. The largest number of these peovyatsky formations is opened in the Kamyanets-Podilsky region, at sugar factories and, especially, in the Narkomles system, most of which is filled with Poles. The Peovyatskaya group was liquidated at the sugar factory in Shepetovka, Kamenetz-Podolsk region, created by LATZHINSKY, a former instructor of the district committee

DOCUMENTATION

525

Komsomol. The arrested member of this organization, an employee of the sugar factory OSTROVSKII, testified that he created combat groups in a number of points in the Shepetovsk district, which had the task of helping the Polish troops in wartime, operating in the rear of the Red Army. Similar subversive and insurgent organizations and groups from Peovyatsk have been liquidated and are being liquidated by us at many sugar factories in Kamenetz-Podolsk, as well as in the Kyiv regions.

Arrested by us in recent days, DZERZHANOVSKY, the head of the forest management party, ZRAZHEVSKY, the director of the Berdichevsky timber industry enterprise, LYSAK, the director of the Slavuta timber industry enterprise, PLUTO, the engineer of the Berdichevsky forestry enterprise, and others show that the Peovyaks, as well as members of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian Nationalist organizations working in the system of the People's Commissariat of Forests carried out the following subversive work:

a) an area of 46,000 hectares in the zone of fortified areas of the Polish direction was sabotaged, as a result of which the military structures of the fortified areas turned out to be blind - they do not have an area of fire. In addition, 17,000 hectares of forest in the zone of Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky and Kyiv fortified areas have not been cleared at all, as a result of which these fortified areas are largely blind and not combat-ready. By checking we found that in the Korosten fortified area, out of 455 structures - 277 do not have a shelling area;

b) in accordance with the instructions of the Polish headquarters, clearings were cut from west to east in the forests of the Kamenetz-Podolsk and Zhytomyr regions in order to create facilities for the accumulation and advancement of Polish troops. At the same time, the instructions of the military specialist on strategic cuttings were not carried out;

c) the fulfillment of the mobilization task of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine on the special felling of 9,860 hectares of forest in the border strip was disrupted (only 163 hectares were cut down);

d) stocks of valuable wood for the aviation industry were destroyed, as a result of which the forests of Ukraine would have to remain without this type of wood for several years. In the forestry of the border strip of the Kamenetz-Podolsk and Zhytomyr regions, Peovyatsky sabotage groups and rebel detachments are being liquidated, which during the war were supposed to operate in the immediate rear of the Red Army (destroy communications, defense installations, organize rebel demonstrations, bandit raids, etc.). .P.).

Arrested workers of the People's Commissariat of Forests system, peoviyak ZRAZHEVSKY, PLUTO, LYSAK, KHOTYNETS and others show that they created military sabotage groups and insurgent detachments in the forests of Slavutsky, Iz Yaslavsky, Antoninsky, Pluzhnyansky, Staro-Konstantinovsky, Shepetovsky, Smotrychsky and other areas Kamenetz-Podolsky region, Berdichevsky, Dzerzhinsky, Chudnovsky, Yanushpolsky and Pliskovsky districts of the Zhytomyr region, as well as in the forests of a number of areas in the Kiev region.

As these arrested persons testify, these sabotage groups and insurgent detachments included Poles - members of the POV and Ukrainian nationalists, Petliurists, hetmans, bandits and kulaks.

Arrested ZRAZHEVSKY and PLUTO show that the Peovyatsk military sabotage and insurgent work in the forests is led by: vrid Nar

526

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GU GB NKVD. 1937-1938

commander KOSIOR Kazimir and senior officials of the Narkomles system: DZERZHANOVSKY, STEFANSKY, YAVORSKY, KATVITSKAYA and MAZANOVSKY (all, with the exception of KOSIOR, were arrested and started interrogation).

The arrested DZERZHANOVSKY also names KOSIOR Kazimir as the leader of the Peoviyat work in the forests. On April 11, we arrested a responsible worker of the People's Commissariat of Forests, ZAPOROZHETS, one of the prominent members of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist organization in the system of the People's Commissariat of Forests, headed by the former People's Commissariat of Forests KUZ'MENKO. ZAPOROZHETS shows a complete collusion between the nationalist organization and the Peovyatsky organization headed by Kazimir KOSIOR. The sabotage and insurgent ranks of these organizations in the Lespromkhozes in a number of cases were united. Zaporozhets shows about his personal connection with KOSIOR Kazimir, who until recently gave him sabotage and sabotage instructions.

The arrested head of the financial department of the People's Commissariat of Forests KHUDOKOR MOV, who was a member of the Trotskyist organization in the system of the People's Commissariat of Forests, headed by the former deputy of the People's Commissariat of Forests SEMENOV, testifies that in 1937 he was contacted by KOSIOR Kazimir and the

ordered him to continue wrecking, especially in matters related to defense work in the forests of Ukraine. SEMENOV, who was arrested by us, also testifies about the espionage connection with KOSIOR Kazimir. Thus, six active participants in the espionage and sabotage organization in the system of the People's Commissariat of Forests directly expose Kazimir KOSIOR as the head of this organization.

According to our intelligence data, Kazimir KOSIOR served in the Polish national units of the Red Army during the Civil War, in a command position.

From 1930 to 1934, Kazimir KOSIOR worked abroad as a representative of Soyuznefteexport and is known in Berlin for his drunken orgies and wild lifestyle.

Abroad, KOSIOR was associated with a major spy, an employee of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, PODOLSKII (arrested in Moscow).

The data of undercover surveillance of KOSIOR Kazimir speak of his sharply embittered moods.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of KOSIOR Kazimir. In order to decisively defeat the Peovyatsk espionage and sabotage agents in the Red Army, I ask you to allow me, in agreement with the commander of the KVO, comrade. TYMOSHENKO and a member of the military council comrade. KHRUSHCHEV, to make arrests of the Poles of the Red Army soldiers - members of the Peovyatsk organizations with a subsequent report.

I report that today I am leaving for Kamenetz-Podolsk to launch an operation against peovyak in Kamenetz-Podolsk and Zhytomyr regions. I will report on the course of the operation and new results of the investigation by telegraph. In the next few days I will send the protocols of interrogations.

USPENSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 255. L. 24-41. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "For the arrest. I. St.

DOCUMENTATION

527

No. 322

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON COORDINATION WITH THE NKID OF ARRESTS MADE BY THE NKVD

April 29, 1938

48 - Question of the NKID.

1. Confirm the obligation of the NKVD for it to strictly comply with existing international agreements on notifying foreign embassies, missions and consulates of arrests through the NKID. These notices must be sent to the NKID immediately after the arrests are made.
2. Offer goods. Yezhov to entrust one of his deputies with constant relations with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, making him responsible for timely responses to the latter's requests.
3. In the event of contesting the foreign citizenship of those arrested and expelled, the NKVD is obliged to provide the NKID with the exact data on the national passport with which the said persons arrived in the USSR, as well as copies of their applications for the transition to Soviet citizenship and the decisions of the Central Executive Committee or Vera → The Council on acceptance into Soviet citizenship.
4. Foreign citizens expelled from the USSR, especially those who have lived for a long time in the USSR, and even more so those born here, are to be given a reasonable time, in agreement with the NKID, for the liquidation of cases.
5. Allow a meeting of the representative of the British Embassy with Rosa Cohen.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 65. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 61.

ÿ323

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF TESTIMONIES
ARRESTED BY THE NKVD OF THE USSR (79)

April 30, 1938

No. 103376

Tov. STALIN

I am sending a summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the NKVD
Departments of the USSR for April 28, 1938.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

According to the 4th DEPARTMENT

BERMAN B.Z. - former 2nd secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU (b).
Interrogated: KOLOSKOV.

He confessed that he was a member of the anti-Soviet organization of the right, in which he was
recruited in 1935 in the mountains. Kirov as a JOINER.

The anti-Soviet organization in Kirov included: STOLYAR, ABUGOV, LEGKONRAVOV, AKOPYAN,
DUBINSKY, *BELKEVICH, IVANOV, ROGOZHIN, GOLDMAN, YURSHKIN, AKMIN
and BEREZIN*.

The organization carried out sabotage in agriculture and industry.
laziness.

528

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

STOLYAR set himself the task of disrupting logging. They paid special attention to the Izhevsk Steel Plant, the organization of sabotage, accidents, and the production of mass rejects.

The participants of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in Udmurtia were: IVANOV G. - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, IVANOV P.T. - second secretary of OK, KILDIBEKOV - editor of the newspaper, CARRIERS - authorized committee for procurement, Krivoshein - deputy. People's Commissariat of Agriculture and others (named 15 people in total).

BERMAN further testified that when he moved to Sverdlovsk, he, together with STOLYAR, continued his anti-Soviet work, planting members of the organization (LVOV, SAMARIN, TESLA) in leadership work.

KOLETVINOV - former chairman of the organizing committee of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in Tula. Interrogated: KRASOVSKY.

KOLETVINOV confessed that he was a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization that existed in the Tula region, in which he was involved in 1934 by SEDELNIKOV, who at that time was working as secretary of the Tula city committee of the CPSU (b). Subsequently, in his anti-Soviet activities, he was associated with SOIFER, who worked as secretary of the Tula city committee of the CPSU (b), and later secretary of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in the Tula region.

KOLETVINOV testified that the organization carried out its anti-Soviet activities on the directives of the center of the right-wing Trotskyist bloc, with which SOIFER, and before him SEDELNIKOV, maintained contact.

According to the testimony of KOLETVINOV, the members of the organization are: •SOIFER* - secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Tula region; •OVSEENKO* - Head. ORPO Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; TROFIMOV* - ex. SOIFER's assistant; ADAM - SOYFER's assistant; BEZUKHOV - second secretary of the city committee of the VKII (b); LOBANOV - b. chairman of the city council; MOZA EV - Deputy Chairman of the City Council; TOKAREV - Secretary of the City Council; ROGOV - Chairman of the City Council; AFANASIEV - head. gorfo; GUBERMAN - head. regional health department.

The organization carried out wrecking work in the industry and agriculture of the region.

SOIFER Ya.G. - former secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Tula region. Interrogated: GERZON.

He confessed that he was a member of the anti-Soviet organization of the right, in which he was recruited in 1928 by the former. 2nd secretary of the MC of the CPSU (b) KOTOV.

From 1933 to 1935, while working as secretary of the Dzerzhinsky and then Leninsky district committees of the CPSU (b), he was associated with the right-wing Trotskyist group, which carried out anti-Soviet work in the MK and the Moscow Regional Executive Committee, in particular, was

associated with FILATOV, KAMINSKY, MARGOLIN, FURER and KRYMSKY.

SOIFER testified that in Moscow he had recruited the following individuals into the right-wing Trotskyist organization: V.Ya. TROFIMOV. - former assistant secretary of the Leninsky district committee, OVSEENKO - former agitprop of the Leninsky district committee, currently works as head. ORPO of the Tula Regional Committee and Lipsky Yu.A. - former zavorg of the Leninsky district committee of the CPSU (b).

In 1935, before leaving for work in Tula as secretary of the city committee of the CPSU (b), SOIFER received an assignment from KAMINSKY to contact the former secretary of the Tula city committee SEDELNIKOV and 2nd secretary BYKHOVSKY, who are active participants in the right-wing Trotskyist organization in Tula.

DOCUMENTATION

529

SOIFER further testified that upon his arrival in Tula he contacted the members of the organization KOLETVINOV, IVANOV, GAYDUL and KHODORKOVSKII. When organizing the Tula region, he took measures to promote the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization to leading work. In addition, a lot of work was launched to recruit new members of the organization.

Along with this, as SOIFER shows, through the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization he established contact with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik underground in Tula.

A terrorist group was also created in Tula, which included members of the organization DEBTS, OVSEENKO and BEZUKHOV.

The organization also carried out great wrecking work in the defense industry. For these purposes, SOIFER created a wrecking and sabotage organization at the Tula Arms and Cartridge Plant, which was headed by b. secretary of the party committee TOZ BEZUKHOV, secretary of the factory district committee STEPANOVĭM and former. POLEZHAEV, secretary of the party committee of the cartridge factory.

RABINOVICH I.M. - former editor of the newspaper "Turkmenskaya Iskra". Before they asked: VLADZIMIRSKY, COOPER.

He confessed that he was one of the leaders of the Trotskyist organization operating in the Turkmen SSR.

He showed that he was recruited into the organization * former. secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen SSR POPOK *, who was the head of the Trotskyist organization (at present, POPOK is the secretary of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Republic of Volga Germans).

Among the leading members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist organization, RABINOVICH named KIPARISOV - ex. head Industrial Department of the Central Committee of Turkmenistan, Gulyaev - ex. head agitprop, BELETSKY - former. deputy head rural

economic department, UMANSKY - former. Secretary of the Ashkhabad City Committee, FIRSOV - ex. Deputy POPOK.

The organization carried out sabotage and sabotage in industry and agriculture.

<...>

4. SLIVKIN b. pom. early Ch. Management film industry. Interrogated: POLYACHEK.

He showed that he took an active part in counter-revolutionary Trotskyist activities, and one of the serious underground organizations with his leading participation was created at the Mosfilm film factory*.

As SLIVKIN shows, the organization was directly led by SOKOLOVSKAYA (YAKOVLEV's wife) and the director * of the factory BABITSKY *.

SLIVKIN testifies that the organization was connected in counter-revolutionary work with GAMARNIK and EIDEMAN. On the instructions of GAMARNIK and EIDEMAN, the Trotskyist organization at the Mosfilm film factory, under the guise of Osoviahimov's work, built a military-type shooting gallery in 1935 to train leaders of insurgent detachments.

The command staff of the insurgent detachments that were being formed included employees of the factory, mainly former officers, including Ilyin, FESYUK, LEBEDEV, RAKITSKY and PETRISCHEV (set up for arrest)**.

Direct training and selection of insurgent personnel were entrusted to a member of the Trotskyist organization *KOVALSKI* (not arrested),

530

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

who gave the task to the head of the factory's fire department, the former officer RAKITSKY, and the head of the watch guard, the former officer LEBEDEV, to select reliable persons for this purpose.

KOVALSKY, reporting to SLIVKIN on the progress of the formation of the insurgent detachments, said that RAKITSKY and LEBEDEV had justified his hopes and recruited 45 people, that he personally, KOVALSKY, had attracted the sound engineer 'SEMENOV * and 'SVERDLOV *, pom. head of capital construction 'KOPYLOVA* and early. planning department SOKOLOV (set up for arrest).

On the instructions of the Trotskyist organization, the arrested SLIVKIN, together with a member of the organization 'DARNITSKY* (not arrested) on the initiative of GAMARNIK, who transmitted the relevant instructions to SOKOLOVSKAYA, was engaged in the purchase of weapons for the purposes of the counterrevolutionary organization, covering the purchase and concentration of weapons with production needs**.

SLIVKIN testifies that in this way, by the time of his arrest, at least 300 combat rifles, 4 machine guns, 20 revolvers, hand grenades and various edged weapons, completely unnecessary for filming, were concentrated in the factory warehouse. The pyrotechnic workshops also stored a large amount of explosives in sizes significantly exceeding the production needs of the factory for the purposes of the organization. The head of the warehouse where the above weapons were stored was a member of the organization 'KALNIN*' (under arrest)**.

Measures have been taken to seize military weapons.

5. SHTRAUS A.G. - b. deputy director of the Astronomical Institute of Moscow State University.
Interrogated: DEMIN.

He testified that he was a member of the Latvian Trotskyist terrorist group, in which he was recruited by a former employee of the USSR trade mission in Hamburg, F.Kh. (arrested).

STRAUSS testifies that he maintained a close relationship with the PDE since 1924, when the PDE was already a Trotskyite. In subsequent years, the PDE continued to maintain contact with the Trotskyist underground and with the Trotskyist exile, supplying the exile with Trotskyist literature in particular. Of the participants in the Trotskyist work of that period, who later became part of the Trotskyist terrorist group, STRAUSS names LENTSMAN (arrested as a member of the Latvian nationalist counter-revolutionary organization).

In 1929-1930, Mr. PREDE returned from one of his business trips abroad and told STRAUSS that TROTSKY had given a directive to intensify underground work, set the stage for a coup d'état and use terror against Comrade STALIN and other leaders of the party and governments.

The composition of the Trotskyist terrorist group, according to the testimony of STRAUSS, in addition to PREDE and his STRAUSS included: LENTSMAN, closely associated with RUDZUTAK (arrested), SKUDRA - worked for PREDE in the "Plastmas Association", MELKEN Zh.P. - authorized NKVD in Pavlovsky Posad, Gorky zh.d., LINDE V., Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Denmark and his wife LINDE V., CLEKIS August and REKSTIN Robert (Crimea), BAUZE (Leningrad), SMIRNOV-DEYCHMAN (Leningrad) and AKIT R.K. who worked on the periphery, who was one of the active members of the organization.

"We are checking all these people for arrest**.

According to STRAUSS, a member of the SCUDR organization played an active role in the preparation of terrorist acts.

The indications are primary.

DOCUMENTS _531^

6. DAVTYAN Y.Kh. b. Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Poland. Rubinstein interrogated.

He gave additional evidence that in 1937 in Paris, Simon, a representative of the Transcaucasian Federation of Pirums, connected him with a major oilman, an English subject GULBENKYAN, who negotiated

spoke with DAVTYAN about joint work under the leadership of the British for the separation of Armenia from the USSR.

In Moscow, DAVTYAN informed DAVTYAN of this agreement to TER-GABRIE LYAN, who by that time, as DAVTYAN shows, was already working under the directives of the British.

DAVTYAN, being in Persia, conducted practical counter-revolutionary nationalist work, having contact with MESTRON (a representative of the clergy, an English intelligence officer) and the British consulate.

Among the leaders of counter-revolutionary nationalist work in the USSR, DAVTYAN named: KHANJYAN (deceased), NAZARETYAN, *PARYAN* and KHALATOV.

ON THE 5TH DEPARTMENT

1. PERKON - b. deputy early 10 department of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. Interrogated: YAMNITSKY, PAVLOVSKY.

He testified that after the trial of the parallel Trotskyist center of PYATAKOV and others, on the instructions of the leadership of the "military" of the Latvian spy-fascist organization BERZINA PERKON, he set about organizing a terrorist group to commit a terrorist act against Comrade T.T. Stalin, Molotov, Ezhov, Voroshilov.

The terrorist group consisted of PERKON, LOZOVSKY (head of the 10th department of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army), KLEPPER (former employee of the Intelligence Agency), BERZIN (employee of the Butyrka prison), his sister BERZINA (former employee of the Intelligence Agency), POLIS Alvina (employee The Central Committee came from Latvia) and STURRIT* (an employee of the People's Commissariat of Education)**.

At the beginning of 1937, a terrorist organization consisting of PERKON, LOZOVSKY, KLEPPER, BERZIN, BERZINA held a meeting at KLEPPER's apartment, at which it was decided to carry out a terrorist act in three ways:

1. Through *POLIS Alvina*, as an employee of the Central Committee, to establish contact with the Latvians working in the Kremlin near the leader and leaders of the party, through them to poison food with poisons. For this, strong poisons were prepared by PER KON (these poisons were found during a search in PERKON's office).

2. Shoot cars etc. STALIN, MOLOTOV, EZHOV and VOROSHILOV. For this purpose, special observation was established at the Borovitsky Gates of the Kremlin and along the entire route of Arbatskaya Square and Arbatskaya Street. Moreover, the direct performers PERKON and KLEPPER were on duty at the Praga restaurant on Arbatskaya Square.

STURRITH, BERZINA Jan and BERZINA observed the route and studied the cars.

3. The same terrorists were supposed to commit a terrorist act at celebrations, in a theater, on Red Square and during a speech by the leader and leaders of the party to voters in Moscow. In order for terrorists to penetrate these places, facsimiles of Comrade VOROSHILOV's signature were specially prepared in order to obtain passes and free

532 _ LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

passage to the indicated places (the indicated facsimiles were confiscated during a search from the arrested PERKON).

The terrorist organization specially prepared foreign passports with entry and exit visas and counterfeit dollars to escape after committing terrorist acts (during a search of PERKON, two Canadian passports were found for him and his wife and 600 US counterfeit dollars).

2. BERZIN - b. early RU RKKA Interrogated: YAMNITSKY, KAZAKEVICH.

In addition, he showed that during his stay in 1936-1937.

in Spain, as chief adviser to the Republican command, he continued to carry out espionage communications with German intelligence. In February 1937, through the German intelligence agent BUSH, who appeared to him in Valencia, he gave the Germans detailed information about the Republican army, the state of technology and assistance from the USSR.

In March 1937, through the same BUSH in Valencia, he gave the Germans detailed information about the state of the Northern Front, as well as about the plans of the command of the republican Basque and Asturian fronts.

BERZIN informed the Germans about the planned strike of the Basques on Gipuzko-San Sebastian and the Asturians on Oviedo with the aim of further developing the strike on Leon. As a result, the rebels (troops of General MOLA), who were aware of the plans and forces of the Republicans, launched an attack on Gipuzko in April before the Basques prepared a blow, which was the beginning of the defeat of the Northern Front.

3. OAK b. com. HVO troops. Interrogated: NIKOLAEV, YAM NICKSHG

He testified that on August 31, 1919, he killed SHCHORSA. DUBOVOY commanded the 1st Ukrainian Army, which included the SHCHORSA division. Then the 1st Ukrainian Army was folded into the 44th division, the commander of which was appointed SHCHORS, and OAK his deputy. The transition to submission to Shchorsu extremely embittered DUBOVOY. The anger against the SCHORSA was further intensified by the fact that the SCHORS was demanding, striving to introduce strict discipline in the units, and fought against the line of OAK.

At the same time, DUBOVOY made a firm decision to kill SHCHORSA in order to take his place, which he did, having received an appointment to the post of head of the 44th division after the assassination.

During the battle with the Galicians near the village of Beloshitsa, SCHORS was in the forward line a few steps ahead of DUBOVOY under machine-gun fire. Taking advantage of the moment when SCHORS turned his face to the rear, OAK fired at him from a revolver point-blank and hit him in the temple.

DUBOVOY knew that some fighters and commanders had suspicions that ShchORS had been killed by him, but no one had evidence, and DUBOVOY managed to hide his crime.

The murder of SHCHORSA was taken advantage of by Yakir in 1933, recruiting DUBOV

GO in a conspiracy.

Yakir showed DUBOVOY the two statements he had from the Red Army men of the 44th division, received a confession from DUBOVOY, and in turn told him that KOTOVSKY "we also removed, but not so cleverly." To DUBOVOY's question about the details of the murder, YAKIR evaded answering, saying only that, in addition to YAKIR, PRIMAKOV, GOLUBENKO, GARKAVIY, TUROVSKY and others were hostile to KOTOVSKY.

Yakir kindled antagonism between KOTOVSKY and PRIMAKOV, patronizing the latter. It is characteristic, in particular, that already in recent

DOCUMENTATION _ 533

years Yakir raised the issue of appointing PRIMAKOV Deputy. com. KVO troops on cavalry.

Yakir treated the KOTOVSKY family with hostility, defiantly did not take part in its fate and took measures so that no help was provided to KOTOVSKY's wife and children. He always strove to keep quiet, to smear KOTOVSKY's merits in the Civil War.

4. GRUZDUP - former worker of the Red Army Republic of Uzbekistan. Interrogated NIKONOV.

In addition, he named the members of the espionage-fascist-Latvian organization with whom he was personally connected:

1. 'POKHVAL'SKY' - adviser to the Soviet embassy in Riga, is a resident of BERZIN on the affairs of the fascist organization, is associated with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia MUNTERS; 2. *FREIMAN-KRAUSE* - works in Riga under the direction of POKHVALSKY; 3. *CAPRAL* Petr Ilyich - assistant captain of the ship "Georgia"; 4. 'FREIMAN' - Art. lieutenant of state security, special commissioner at the beginning. UNKVD in Tashkent; 5. *KANTSEN* - inspector of the Main Directorate of Geodesy and Surveying of the NKVD, at the disposal of the Red Army RU **.

In addition, the GRUZDUP named members of the fascist organization working in civilian institutions:

1. SEISUM - diplomatic courier of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; 2. DUMPIS - engineer, works in the geological and reconnaissance department of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry; 3. KLYAVA - secretary of the deputy. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs STOMONYAKOV; 4. PERLE - artist of the Latvian Drama Theater in Moscow; 5. ASHAK - deputy. commissar of social provision of the Byelorussian SSR; 6. BREDYS - beg. foreign department of Glavlit RSFSR**.

The GRUZDUP said that since 1931 it had been aware of the existence of a block of fascist organizations in Moscow: the Latvian-Estonian-Lithuanian (bloc of the Baltic fascist states). On the instructions of BERZIN, he was connected with a member of the center of the Estonian fascist organization in Moscow ĵTIKOM * - colonel, early. departments of the 1st department of the RU of the Red Army.

'GRUZDUP* was personally associated with members of the Estonian fascist organization - Colonel 'RIMM* - early. departments of the 2nd department of the RU of the Red Army; the wife of Colonel RIMMA - pom. head the library of the RU RKKA; KJASPER TOM worked in the organs of the GPU until 1924; BENIKAS - b. head department in Inst.

tourist**.

In addition, the GRUZDUP showed that a group of employees of the Intelligence Department, headed by BERZIN, served the intelligence services of the capitalist countries: the Baltic, Poland, Germany, France and Japan.

5. VITOLIN - b. resident of the Republic of Red Army. They interrogated MALYSHEV and KRIVOSHEYEV.

In addition, he testified that, on behalf of the JUSTA (an employee of the German intelligence service), upon arrival in the USSR from Vienna, he contacted the resident of German intelligence in the USSR, ERICKSON, and received spies from him for personal communication: 1. 'LITVINSKY * - b. an employee of the Intelligence Agency, now a teacher at the Academy. Frunze, colonel; 2. 'RATOVA* - now an employee of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, captain; 3. 'KHMELEV* or *KHMELEVSKY* - b. employee of the command department of the headquarters of the Red Army, now works at the MVO headquarters**.

From these persons VITOLIN received spy materials and passed them on to ERICKSON.

In 1934, Erickson, with the help of VITOLIN, recruited for espionage the beginning. Department of Intelligence of the Red Army Davydov. Then VITOLIN finished

534

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

used for espionage work by KILOCHITSKY - b. an employee of the Intelligence Agency, who worked until recently in the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry.

Spy documents were photographed in KILOCHYTSKY'S apartment.

YUST from German intelligence through VITOLINA transmitted disinformation materials to the Intelligence Agency.

VITOLIN gave YUSTU the entire network of residencies, of which he was a resident: in France, Germany, Austria. Part of the network was recruited by the Germans, and part was arrested.

In 1937, upon his arrival from Germany to the USSR, VITOLIN was contacted by an employee of the Intelligence Agency *VIR* for espionage work using the password of YUSTA, with whom he was connected until the day of his arrest.

VITOLIN also testified that he was also a member of the Latvian fascist organization, into which he was recruited in 1933 by BERZIN (former head of intelligence) and 'BERKOVSKY* Fritz - b. an employee of the Prometheus publishing house.

6. RHEA - b. deputy early 8th department of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. Interrogated: LEBEDEV, YAKUNIN.

He confessed that he was a member of the fascist-spy Latvian

a nationalist organization since 1935, in which PER KONOM was recruited - the head of the 10th department of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, brigade commissar.

At the same time, he showed that he, REYA, was a spy for Latvian intelligence. Materials of a spy nature were transmitted to the Latvian intelligence service through PERKONA.

Of the persons who are members of the fascist spy organization, REYA named: 1. Yan Karlovich BERZIN - b. head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army; 2. PERKONA - head of the 10th department of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, brigade commissar; 3. GRUZDUPA - head of the Main Inspectorate of Glavlit, regimental commissar; 4. KASVAND Eduard - head of the point of the intelligence school, colonel; 5. STIGGA O.A. - Head of the 1st Department of the Intelligence Agency, Divisional Commander; 6. OZOLINA - head of the encryption department, regimental commissar; 7. LOZOVSKY (brother of PERKON) - is on a business trip along the line of the Intelligence Agency beyond the cordon.

7. KIDAISH - b. early branch of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army. Interrogated: PETUSHKOV, LUKIN.

In addition, he testified about his participation in the anti-Soviet military conspiracy, in which he was recruited b. STEINBRUK, head of the department of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army.

Until 1925, KIDAISH carried out open Trotskyist work at the Military Academy. Frunze and the enterprises of the Khamovniki region, and then, declaring his "departure" from TROTSKY, began to carry out illegal Trotskyist work.

From 1924 to the day of his arrest on Trotskyist illegal anti-Soviet activities, he was associated with BELA KUN (worker of the Comintern). On the instructions of BELA KUN, he did a great deal of work to disintegrate the Hungarian communists associated with the club of political emigrants in Moscow, working them in a Trotskyist direction. In 1929, BELA KUN, in order to obtain legal opportunities for gatherings and rallying anti-Soviet Trotskyist elements, received permission from BUBNOV (former head of the Red Army PU) to create a section of the "fellowship of the internationalists participating in the Civil War" at the Central House of Culture. In the bureau of the community of BELA KUN, the most

DOCUMENTATION

535

persons given to him and active Trotskyists: TAVRO * (in 1936 he commanded the 32nd Pacific Division), * MUNICH * (worked in Grozneft), * SUGAR * Bundy (worked at MOGES), * MULLER * Erne (worked as secretary of the club political emigrants), TARASHIN * (director of one of the Moscow printing houses) and he KIDAIII **.

The bureau of the community, on the instructions of BELA KUN, carried out a tremendous amount of work to disintegrate the Hungarian communists and indoctrinate them in the anti-Soviet Trotskyite spirit.

As active Trotskyists and people devoted to BELA KUN, KIDAISH also

named: 1. MATE ZALKA (writer); 2. NAGY Imre (until 1935 he worked at the International Agrarian Institute as a researcher).

8. ZILENBERG - b. pom. early department of the 3rd department of the UMS of the Red Army. Interrogated the PETROVs.

He testified that he was recruited for espionage activities in 1921 by a Latvian intelligence officer - an employee of the Latvian embassy in Moscow through his sister ZILENBERG b. employee of the Latvian mission in Moscow (located in Latvia).

In 1922, through an employee of the Latvian embassy (I don't remember her last name), ZILENBERG transmitted espionage information.

Subsequently, communication was carried out from 1923 to 1928 through Andrey Frantsevich PETERSON, head of the Latvian club. From 1929 to 1937, through YURTSSEN, Elizaveta Frantsevna, an employee of the Latvian club.

ZILENBERG named E.F. - GUSLYAROV theater artist. Stanislavsky.

ZILENBERG at the same time testified that since 1929 he had been a member of the Latvian nationalist organization, having been recruited into it by JURTSSEN.

Of the members of the organization known to him, ZILENBERG named a number of employees of the Latvian club and others.

... BELOV I.P. - former commands. Belarusian military district. Interrogated: Yamnitsky and Kazakevich**.

In addition, he showed that the military-SR organization had insurrectionary groups in a number of districts, including: in ZABVO, where an insurrectionary organization was created by the former district commander GRYAZNOV (arrested) and the former secretary of the regional committee RAZUMOV (arrested). The members of this organization were Socialist-Revolutionaries, rightists, an anti-Soviet element from Cossacks and settlers.

The direct leadership of the insurgent groups was carried out by *MESHKOV - the commander of the 93rd Infantry Division * (not arrested), recruited by GRYAZNOV into the military-SR organization. MESHKOV coordinated this entire group with RAZUMOV, entering the "Joint rebel headquarters of Transbaikalia."

In addition, BELOV shows that a member of the military-Socialist-Revolutionary Ukrainian nationalist organization "Borotbists" associated with him - commander KOPULOVSKIY (arrested) was a member of the "military headquarters" of the Ukrainian rain nationalists.

The main role in the creation of broad insurgent organizations in Ukraine was played by the nationalists, who created the central, regional and district "rebel headquarters", leading detachments from the former. Petliurists, bandits and nationalists.

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGBNKVD. 1937-1938

At the head of the insurgent regional organizations were the commanders of the Red Army, nationalists, of whom BELOV names MISHUK in the Vinnitsa region, in the Dnepropetrovsk ZUBKA and in the Kiev BORISENKO (arrested), the rebel cavalry was to be led by the corps commander KRIVORUCHKO (arrested).

The military rebel leadership of the nationalists was associated with the former. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR LYUBCHENKO and Chairman of the Central Council of Osoviahim of the Ukrainian SSR BOGDANOV (convicted). The "Commander in Chief" of the entire insurgent army in Ukraine was planned to be the former commander of the HVO OAK (arrested).

The rebels had to seize weapons from police warehouses, military registration and enlistment offices, Osoviahim, warehouses of the Red Army, where there were members of a nationalist organization.

Through KOPULOVSKY and the Socialist-Revolutionaries PERVILYEV (arrested) - the prosecutor of the KVO SABLINA - ex. The head of the Letichevsky fortified area, the nationalist military-insurgent organization was connected with the military-SR center.

The same work on the creation of insurgent organizations was carried out by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and nationalists in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

SMAGIN - ex. early Department of Foreign Relations of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Interrogated: KASHCHEEV.

Additionally, he testified that in 1936 he was recruited into the anti-Soviet military conspiracy by the former. Head of the Department of Military History of the Academy. Frunze brigade commander EVSEEV (former officer, arrested).

Evseev suggested that SMAGIN, as a former member of the partisan movement in the Far East (chief of the headquarters of a large partisan detachment), recruit new participants in the conspiracy from former partisans expelled from the CPSU (b), former. Socialist-Revolutionaries, ex. anarchists and people from other parties, to acquire weapons, to study the technique of explosions, to study areas in which guerrilla operations can be organized.

Of the participants in the conspiracy at the Frunze Academy, SMAGIN named the following persons: brigade commander YERMOLIN, head of the service department of the General Staff (arrested); brigade commander GOLIKOV - head of the cavalry department (arrested); brigade commander PANOVA - teacher of the department of military organization (arrested) ...

ON THE 5th DEPARTMENT

POKUS Ya.Z. - b. pom. commander of the OKDVA troops, divisional commander. Interrogated: LORKISH, ELOS, KUZ'MENKO.

In addition, he testified that after the arrest of the leaders of the conspiracy in Moscow TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR and other organizations of the anti-Soviet conspiracy in the Far East, he did not stop his anti-Soviet activities.

In August 1937, POKUS received instructions from * the leaders of the anti-Soviet organization * in the Far East to intensify work ***.

The organization set as its goal the separation of the Soviet Far East from the USSR and the creation of an independent republic under the protectorate of Japan.

POKUS showed that the conspirators had an agreement with the Japanese General Staff that in the event of a war, the organization would raise an uprising and create a partisan army. This army should attack the main rear areas of the OKDVA and destroy them, making it easier for the Japanese to win.

The cadres of the partisan army were to be formed from former partisans in the Far East and from among the "offended" commanders. For provo

DOCUMENTATION

537

sabotaging instructions were given in the DVK in order to provoke discontent among the collective farmers and to facilitate recruitment by the center of the organization of the right.

To identify the cadres of former partisans who remained in the Far East, a member of the organization, the former editor of the collection of partisan stories *SHURYGIN*, collected the addresses of the partisans and probed their moods ****.

In accordance with the existing plan, after the overthrow of Soviet power, it was meant to create a republic within the boundaries of the former Far East, and for this assistance Japan was to receive Sakhalin, Kamchatka and part of Primorye up to the Iman River.

If successful, the rebel army was to act together with the Japanese against the Red Army. By agreement with the Japanese, he was planned to be the commander of the rebel army - POKUS.

KRAVCHENKO M.R. - b. head of the personnel department of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. Interrogated: BRENER, GOLFARB.

KRAVCHENKO, who previously confessed to participating in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy, additionally testified that, being the head of the political department of the 7th Cavalry. division in the BVO, on the instructions of a participant in the conspiracy BULIN (arrested) in the spring of 1937, he recruited into an anti-Soviet military conspiracy: NIKOLAEV - commander of the 7th horse artillery regiment and KRASNIKOV - instructor of the political department of the 7th cavalry. division, cadre Trotskyist (both were not arrested)*****.

KRAVCHENKO gave Nikolaev and Krasnikov tasks: to recruit new people from the command and political staff into the conspiracy and to carry out subversive work in all types of combat training. In order to preserve the participants in the conspiracy and cover up their wrecking work...

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 408. L. 144-167. Script. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "T. Malenkov. I ask you to take into account the following testimonies of those arrested and take measures to cleanse the relevant organizations from evil spirits. I. Stalin. "R.8. I need to find a replacement immediately...

— underlined in pencil. * in the margins of Stalin's litter: "Important!".

** all the names in the paragraph are circled, in the margins is Stalin's resolution: "Arrest everyone!!"

— in the margins of the litter: "Do not "check", but arrest. St.".

*** on the margins of Stalin's litter: "From whom exactly?"

**** in the margins of Stalin's litter: "Where is he?"

***** in the margins of Stalin's litter: "Why?"

No. 324

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE HEAD OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR"

May 3, 1938

62 - 0 head of the personnel department of the NKVD of the USSR.

Approve com. Davydova N.K. head of the personnel department of the NKVD of the USSR, releasing him from the work of the head. the military sector of the Department of Leading Party Organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 999. L. 12. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 61.

538

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 325

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING THE LIMIT ON KULAK OPERATIONS TO THE
ROSTOV OBLIK COMMITTEE OF THE VKP(b)

May 13, 1938

149 - Question of the NKVD (telegram of Dvinsky and Lupekin).

To allow the Rostov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKVD for the Rostov Region to submit for consideration by the troika for cases of kulaks and counter-revolutionary elements the cases of members of opened counter-revolutionary groups, increasing for this purpose the limit by 5 thousand people, including for the first category by 3,500 people.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 177. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 61.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov; Rostov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

No. 326

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "QUESTION OF THE NKVD"

May 26, 1938

243 - Question of the NKVD.

To extend until August 1, 1938, the simplified procedure for the consideration of cases against persons of Polish, German, Latvian, Estonian, Finnish, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Greek, Romanian, Iranian, Afghan, Chinese nationalities and Harbinites exposed in espionage, terrorist and other anti-Soviet activities .

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 177. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 61.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov.

No. 327

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"On NKVD EMPLOYEES" (80)

May 26, 1938

250 - About the workers of the NKVD.

1. To approve the head of the 3rd Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Berman B.D., releasing him from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR.

2. Approve the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR comrade. Nasedkin A.A., releasing him from the post of head of the UNKVD of the Smolensk region.

3. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Smolensk region comrade. Zozulina V.Ya.

4. Release Comrade. Lyushkova G.S. from the work of the head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory, with his recall to work in the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR.

5. Approve the head of the UNKVD DVK comrade Gorbach G.F., releasing him from the post of head of the UNKVD of the Novosibirsk Region.

6. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Novosibirsk region comrade. Maltse
va I.A.

DOCUMENTATION

539

7. To approve the head of the GUSHDSDOR of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Dmitriev, releasing him from the work of the head of the UNKVD of the Sverdlovsk region.
8. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Sverdlovsk region comrade. Viktorova M.P.
9. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Omsk region comrade. Volokhova Z.A.
10. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Kirov region comrade. Yurevich V.I.
11. Release Comrade. Vershinina S.Ya. from the work of the head of the UNKVD of the Ryazan region.
12. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Ryazan region comrade. Kornilieva N.I.
13. Approve the head of the Special Department of the Kyiv military district comrade. Grechukhin, releasing him from the work of the head of the UNKVD of the Odessa region.
14. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Odessa region comrade. Kiseleva P.P.
15. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Kyiv region comrade. Dolgusheva A.R.
16. To approve the head of the UNKVD of the Moscow Region, comrade. Tsesarsky, releasing him from the work of the head of the GV-th Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.
17. Appoint the head of the GV-th Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Zhurbenko.
18. Approve the head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Fedorov.
19. Approve the head of the UNKVD of the Murmansk region comrade. Ketova A K. (Urals).

RGASPI. F. 3. Op. 17. D. 999. L. 50-51. Script. Typescript.

Protocol No. 61.

ÿ328

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE CHINESE FROM THE FAR EAST

June 10, 1938

41 - Question of the NKVD.

1. To stop the eviction of Chinese from the Far Eastern Territory, allowing only the resettlement to Xinjiang of those Chinese who express their voluntary desire to do so. The resettlement of the Chinese in Kazakhstan should be completely stopped.

2. To the Chinese who voluntarily wish to leave for Xinjiang, to provide full assistance (assistance in the sale of property, the fastest paperwork, assistance in delivering to the railway station, in exceptional cases, material financial assistance, etc.).

3. Chinese who wish to travel to Xinjiang should be sent at their own expense.

4. Chinese - Chinese subjects and Soviet citizens living in the territory of the forbidden border zones and fortified areas in the event that they do not express a desire to leave for Xinjiang, resettle outside these zones and areas on the territory of the region.

5. To resettle within the Far Eastern Territory, but outside the forbidden border zones and fortified areas, all those Chinese and their families who, having been raised from places for deportation to Kazakhstan, lost their homes and do not wish to leave for Xinjiang, as well as those Chinese who have already gone up to leave for Xinjiang or are already in trains, but want to stay in the Far East Territory.

6. The arrested Chinese, excluding those convicted and accused of espionage, active sabotage, terror, should be released from custody and deported to Xinjiang along with their families and property.

540

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

In the future, the mass arrests of the Chinese will be stopped. The arrests of the Chinese should be carried out if there are sufficient data exposing them to counter-revolutionary or criminal offenses. The cases of the arrested Chinese should be referred to the relevant judicial authorities.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 106-107. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 62.

No. 329

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

About TOV. SMIRNOV (81)

June 22, 1938

101—0 items Smirnov

1. Satisfy the request of comrade. Smirnov (People's Commissariat of the Navy) about letting him go south for one month to one of the resorts, where the NKVD will indicate.

2. To oblige the NKVD to take all measures to ensure that no suspicious conspiratorial elements could contact Smirnov.

3. Continue checking on Comrade Smirnov.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 364. L. 161. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 62.

No. 330

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

"ABOUT PROCESSES OVER ORGANIZERS OF ACCIDENTS IN MINES"

July 21, 1938

207 - On the trials of the organizers of accidents in mines.

Propose to Comrade Vyshinsky to organize open trials of the organizers of accidents at mines No. 12/18 Budennovugol, Komsomolets of the Artemugol trust, No. 18 of the Sovetskugol trust, Kapitalnaya Markovka of the Makeevugol trust and them. Ilyich Trust Sergougol.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1000. L. 43. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 62.

No. 331

NOTE N.I. Ezhova I.V. STALIN WITH APPENDIX
A LIST OF PERSONS TO BE JUDGED
BY THE MILITARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

July 26, 1938

Owls. secret

Tov. STALIN

I am sending a list of those arrested, subject to trial by the Military Collegium in the first category.

EZHOV

DOCUMENTATION

541

MOSCOW CENTER

LIST OF PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY JUDGMENT

BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

REFERENCE

1st category 2nd category TOTAL

Moscow-center 139 - 139

MOSCOW CENTER

1st category

1. AGRANOV Yakov Saulovich
2. Alksnis Yakov Ivanovich
3. AMATUNI Amatuni Semenovich
4. AMOSOV Maxim Kirovich
5. ANTIPOV Nikolai Kirillovich
6. BAZENKOV Boris Ilyich
7. BAYRACHNY Petr Porfiryevich
8. BAUSER Fritz Davidovich
9. BEKZADYAN Alexander Artemevich
10. BELOV Ivan Panfilovich
11. BERGOLTS August Ivanovich
12. BERGSTREM Walter Karlovich
13. BEREZIN Nikolai Sergeevich
14. BERZIN Eduard Petrovich
15. Yan Karlovich BERZIN
16. BERMAN Boris Zakharovich
17. Bodrov Andrey Mikhailovich
18. BONDARENKO Ivan Petrovich
19. Brezanovsky Yakov Eremeevich
20. BUBNOV Andrey Sergeevich
21. BULAKH Petr Fedorovich
22. BULIN Anton Stepanovich
23. BUROV Alexey Nikolaevich
24. BUTENKO Konstantin Ivanovich

25. VANYAN Andrey Lvovich
26. VAREIKIS Iosif Mikhailovich
27. VATSETIS Ioakim Ioakimovich
28. WEINBAUM Ernest Ivanovich
29. VELIKANOV Mikhail Dmitrievich
30. VERKHOVSKY Alexander Ivanovich
31. VIKTOROV Mikhail Vladimirovich
32. BUL Leonid Davidovich
33. GAYLIT Yan Petrovich
34. GENYAVSKY Mikhail Alexandrovich
35. GORELITS Abram Grigorievich
36. GRACHEV Alexey Petrovich

542

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

37. GRIBOV Sergey Efimovich
38. GRINBERG Isaak Moiseevich
39. GRISHAEV Petr Grigorievich
40. GRYAZNOV Ivan Kensorinovich
41. DAVTYAN Yakov Khristoforovich
42. DERIBAS Terenty Dmitrievich
43. DUBOVOY Ivan Naumovich
44. DYBENKO Pavel Efimovich
45. EVTUSHENKO Dmitry Matveevich *4b.
EGOROV Alexander Ilyich*
47. ZATONSKII Vladimir Petrovich
48. ZASHIBAEV Alexander Sergeevich
49. ZIMIN Nikolai Nikolaevich
50. INGAUNIS Felix Antonovich

51. KADATSKY-RUDNEV Ivan Nikitich
52. KANDELAKI David Vladimirovich
53. KIREEV Grigory Petrovich
54. KNORIN Wilhelm Georgievich
55. KOGAN Evgenia Solomonovna
56. KOGAN Lazar Iosifovich
57. KOLETVINOV Andrey Fedorovich
58. KOSOGOV Ivan Dmitrievich
59. KOHANSKY Vladislav Stanislavovich
60. KOVTYUKH Epifan Iovich
61. KRIVORUCHKO Nikolai Nikolaevich
62. KRUCHINKIN Nikolai Kuzmich
63. KRYLENKO Nikolai Vasilievich
64. KUIBYSHEV Nikolay Vladimirovich
65. KUTYAKOV Ivan Semenovich
66. KUCHEROV Georgy Georgievich
67. KUCHINSKY Dmitry Alexandrovich
68. LAVROV Vasily Konstantinovich
69. LANDA Mikhail Markovich
70. LEVANDOVSKY Mikhail Karlovich
71. LEGKONRAVOV Pavel Konstantinovich
72. LEPIN Andrey Genrikhovich
73. LEPLEVSKY Grigory Moiseevich
74. LEPLEVSKY Israel Moiseevich
75. LOGANOVSKY Mechislav Antonovich
76. LOPATIN Vsevolod Nikolaevich
77. Mantsev Vasily Nikolaevich
78. MARCHUK Mikhail Ivanovich
79. MARYAMOV Israel Emmanuilovich

- 80. MEZH LAUK Valery Ivanovich
- 81. MIROSHNIKOV Ivan Ivanovich
- 82. MIF Pavel Alexandrovich
- 83. MIKHAILOV Mikhail Efimovich
- 84. NYURINA-NURENBURG Faina Efimovna

DOCUMENTATION

543

- 85. OZOLIN Konstantin Ivanovich
- 86. OKUNEV Grigory Sergeevich
- 87. ORLOV Vladimir Mitrofanovich
- 88. Paskutsky Nikolai Antonovich
- 89. PAKHOMOV Nikolai Ivanovich (water transport)
- 90. PAKHOMOV Nikolai Ivanovich (Khozupr CEC)
- 91. PEREMYTOV Alexey Makarovich
- 92. POBEREZHSKY Iosif Izrailevich
- 93. POGREBNOY Vasily Semenovich
- 94. PODOLSKY Boris Grigorievich
- 95. POPOV Mikhail Vasilievich
- 96. POPOK Yakov Abramovich
- 97. PRAMNEK Eduard Karlovich
- 98. PYATNITSKY Iosif Aronovich
- 99. RAVIKOVICH Efim Moiseevich
- 100. RODIN Mikhail Naumovich
- 101. ROSENTAL Yakov Davidovich
- 102. ROMANOVSKY Vladimir Ignatievich
- 103. RUKHIMOVICH Moses Lvovich 04.
RUDZUTAK Yan Ernestovich
- 05. SAMURSKY (EFENDIEV) Nazhmugdin

06. SANGURSKY Mikhail Vladimirovich 07.
SVECHIN Alexander Andreevich 08.
SVISTUN Panteley Ivanovich 09.
SEDYAKIN Alexander Ignatievich

10. Daniil Fedorovich SERDIC

11. SINYAVSKY Nikolai Mikhailovich

12. SKOBELEV Matvei Ivanovich

13. SMIRNOV Gennady Ivanovich

14. SOIFER Yakov Grigorievich.

15. SOLONNIKOV Orest Sergeevich

16. STAROSTIN Konstantin Fedorovich

17. STEPPE-SPIZHARNY Konstantin Ivanovich

18. STETSKIY Alexey Ivanovich

19. STIGGA Oscar Ansovich

20. STOLYAR Abram Yakovlevich

21. TEUMIN Yakov Abramovich

22. TKALUN Petr Pakhomovich

23. TKACHEV Ivan Fedorovich

24. TROJANKER Benedict Ustinovich

25. UNSHLICHT Iosif Stanislavovich

26. URITSKY Semyon Petrovich

28. HAVKIN Grigory Izrailevich

29. KHALEPSKY Innokenty Andreevich

30. KHARLAMOV Nikolai Mikhailovich

31. Khitarov Rafael Moiseevich

32. Khripin Vasily Vladimirovich

33. TSEKHER Aron Abramovich

134. CHERLYUCHANKEVICH Nikolai Alexandrovich

135. CHUBAR Trofim Yakovlevich

136. SCHMIDT Vasily Vladimirovich

137. SHUMYATSKY Boris Zakharovich

138. YURENEV Konstantin Konstantinovich.

139. YAKOVLEV Yakov Arkadievich

Head of the 1st Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR

Senior Major of State Security I. SHAPIRO

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 417. L. 210-217. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a handwritten resolution: "For the execution of all 138 people. I. St., V. Molotov.

* Surname has been deleted.

No. 332

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING THE LIMIT ON KULAK OPERATIONS
FOR DVK (82)

July 31, 1938

40 - Question of the NKVD.

Approve for the DCK a limit for the repression of counter-revolutionary elements of 15,000 people in the first category and 5,000 in the second.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 189. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 63.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov.

No. 333

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN

ON PROCESSES IN CONNECTION WITH
ACCIDENTS AT THE MINES OF DONBASS (83)

August 2, 1938

No. 217 forest

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade I.V. STALIN

In pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on cases of accidents in the mines of Donbass, I inform you:

1) On August 1, the Special Collegium of the Donetsk Regional Court considered the case of former employees of the Budenovugol Trust.

Sentenced to death:

Semenov - b. mine manager 12/18;

Voronchenko - b. chief engineer of the mine;

Pruzhinskiy - b. mine mechanic;

Bavkun - b. section head;

b. Astakhov, an iron-cutting machine driver, was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

DOCUMENTATION

545

2) The remaining cases of the organizers of the accidents at the Makeevugol, Sergougol, Sovetskugol, and Artemugol mines have been scheduled for hearing on August 2-3.

I will report further on the verdicts in these cases.

A. VYSHINSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 333. L. 186. Original. Typescript.

No. 334

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF THE NAVY AND THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF THE NKVD

August 21, 1938

126 - 0 People's Commissar of the Navy and First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

1. Predetermine the appointment of Comrade Frinovsky as People's Commissar of the Navy with his release from the duties of First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

2. Approve Comrade Beria as the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

3. The issue of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia should be resolved within three days and invite Comrade Beria to submit a candidate for approval by the Central Committee of the CPSU(b).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1001. L. 26-27. Script. Typescript.

Protocol No. 63.

No. 335

CODE TELEGRAM K.I. FILIPPOVA and B.A. Malysheva I.V. STALIN AND N.I. Ezhov
ON INCREASING THE LIMIT
ON KULAK OPERATION

August 25, 1938

No. 1080

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade.
STALIN NKVD comrade. Ezhov

In view of the unfinished cleansing of the region from Right-Trotskyist, White Guard and Pan-Mongolian counter-revolutionary-hostile elements, Kolchakists, Harbinites, Socialist-Revolutionaries, kulaks falling under the first category, we ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to allow an additional limit for the Irkutsk region of 5 thousand.

Secretary of the Irkutsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks FILIPPOV

Head of UNKVD Malyshev

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 190. Copy. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the cipher telegram: "Exhausted. Decision PB 65/110".

546

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 336

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"THE QUESTION OF VYSHINSKY"

August 25, 1938

150 - Question of Vyshinsky.

To consider the case on the transition to the territory of the USSR for the purpose of sabotage and espionage of a Japanese armed gang in open court

17 bandits and the owner of the scow CHANG-BAO-NAN were subjected to capital punishment - shooting, and to the crew of the scow - long prison terms.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 255. L. 45. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 63.

No. 337

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING THE LIMIT ON KULAK OPERATIONS
FOR THE CHITA REGION

August 29, 1938

165 - Question of the NKVD.

Satisfy the request of the Chita Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to extend the work of the Special Troika to consider the cases of anti-Soviet elements - until November 1 and increase the limit by 3 thousand people.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 191. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 63.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov, Chita Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

No. 338

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON THE "TERRORISM"
GROUP IN THE RUBBER INDUSTRY

September 2, 1938

No. 106426

Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

On the basis of obtained intelligence and investigative data, the 8th Department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD identified a terrorist group from among the members of the Right-Trotskyist organization that existed in the rubber industry.
ness.

The terrorist group planned to carry out a terrorist act on the day of aviation on August 18 of this year. at the Tushino airport.

The group was created on the initiative of one of the leaders of the right-wing Trotskyist organization, formerly. People's Commissar BRUSKIN and was led by the participation of

DOCUMENTATION

547

com of the anti-Soviet organization, former. chief engineer Glavrezina KOMAROV.

The terrorist group included KAMINER - ex. early of the technical department of the Glavrezina, POLUNIN - engineer of the Special Department of the Glavrezina, YANTS - administratively deported to the city of Kuibyshev and an employee of TASS KUZNETSOV.

In the month of May of this year. BRUSKIN instructed LUKASHIN to select suitable people from among the members of the anti-Soviet organization to commit a terrorist act against comrade. Stalin.

For this purpose, LUKASHIN involved Komarov, who, in turn, recruited the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act. Then LUKASHIN connected KOMAROV with BRUSKIN.

According to the first variant of the plan developed by Komarov, the terrorist attempt was planned to be carried out by throwing bombs.

BRUSKIN was supposed to get the bombs, but in connection with his arrest, this option was dropped.

Then KOMAROV, having previously been connected by espionage with an employee of the German embassy WALTER, agreed with him on weapons.

Fearing to arouse suspicion by frequent absences from Moscow for secret meetings with WALTER, KOMAROV connected with him a member of the YANTS terrorist group, who had no specific occupation and was constantly
living place.

YANTS, having met three times with WALTER, informed him about the preparations for the terrorist act.

WALTER agreed with Yants on August 18, on the day of the planned terrorist act, to meet between 6-7 o'clock in the morning at st. Pushkino and give him two revolvers.

For the purpose of conspiracy, WALTER did not tell JANTZ his real name, but introduced himself as LEMKE.

Having received the revolvers, the YANTS was to immediately leave for Moscow and report to KAMINER's apartment, where the rest of the members of the terrorist group were to wait for him in order, armed, to go together to the Tushino airfield.

On the morning of August 17, KAMINER made a special visit to YANTS at st. Pushkino in order to agree on the time of delivery of weapons.

On the same day, KAMINER obtained tickets for the airfield through his friend KUZMIN.

By the evening of August 17, members of the terrorist group (with the exception of YANTZ) gathered at KAMINER's apartment to clarify the actions of each, where they were arrested.

All members of the terrorist group confessed. Their testimonies were confirmed by interrogation of the former. early Glavrezina LUKASHIN and former. early Head of rubber BELOVA.

The investigation continues.

Beginning 3 departments of the 1st directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, Major of State Security GRIGORIEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 366. L. 1-4. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "KV. Walter (German)" and "KV. (beat up Walter)."

548

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 339

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON ASSIGNMENT L.P. BERIA SPECIAL RANK

September 9, 1938

214 - On the assignment to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Art. Beria L.P. rank of Commissioner of State Security of the 1st rank.

Assign the title of Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank to Comrade Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1001. L. 44. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 63.

No. 340

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR WITH THE APPENDIX OF
THE NOTES N.I. EZHOVA (84)

September 13, 1938

8 - Question of the NKVD.

On changing the organizational structure of the NKVD of the USSR

1) To change the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 28, 1938 (pr. No. 60, paragraph 7), to form three main departments in the system of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR:

First Main Directorate - State Security.

The second Main Directorate is Economic.

Third Main Directorate - Transport.

2) The First Main Directorate of State Security shall be organized as part of the following departments:

1st Department - Protection of the government.

2nd Division - Secret Political.

3rd Division - Counterintelligence.

4th Department - Special Department of the Army and Navy.

5th Department - Foreign.

6th Department - Paramilitary organizations (police, fire brigade, Osoaviakhim, district military commissariats, sports societies, etc.).

7th Department - Special Department.

3) Propose to the NKVD of the USSR within five days to submit for approval by the Central Committee the structure of the second and third departments and candidates for the post of heads of departments and their departments.

4) Separate into independent operational-Chekist departments under the NKVD of the USSR:

1st Special Department - operational accounting, registration, statistics.

2nd Special Department - operational equipment.

DOCUMENTATION

549

3rd Special Department - operational (surveillance, installations, search, arrests).

5) To form as part of the NKVD - the Main Prison Directorate.

6) Separate from the composition of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transfer to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - the Main Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography, forming under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

Main Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography.

7) To approve the head of the First Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Beria L.P.

8) Approve the deputy head of the First Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Merkulova V.N.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 66-66v. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 64.

No. 341

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT CREATING SPECIAL TRIPLES (85)

September 15, 1938

22 - Question of the NKVD.

1. Accept the proposal of the NKVD on the transfer of the remaining pending investigative files on those arrested in the K.R. national contingents, according to orders of the NKVD of the USSR Nos. 00485, 00439 and 00593 - 37 and Nos. 302 and 326 - 1938, for consideration by Special Troikas in the field.

2. Special Troikas are formed as follows: the first secretary of the regional committee, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks or the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, the Head of the relevant department of the NKVD and the Prosecutor of the region, territory, republic.

In the Ukrainian and Kazakh SSRs and the Far East Territory, Special Troikas are formed by regions.

3. Special Troikas consider cases in relation to persons arrested only before August 1, 1938, and complete their work within 2 months.

4. Cases against all persons indicated nat. k.-r. contingents arrested after August 1, 1938, to be sent for consideration to the appropriate judicial bodies, according to jurisdiction (Military Tribunals, Linear and Regional Courts, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court), as well as to the Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR .

5. Grant the right to Special Troikas to pronounce sentences in accordance with the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00485 of August 25, 1937 in the first and second categories, as well as to return cases for further investigation and make decisions on the release of the accused from custody, if in cases, there are no sufficient materials to convict the accused.

6. Decisions of the Special Threes in the first category must be implemented IMMEDIATELY.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 195-195v. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 64.

550

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 342

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM A.A. NASEDKIN ON
EXPANDING THE RIGHTS OF A SPECIAL TROIKA (86)

September 18, 1938

Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 7384 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR comrade. Nasedkin on the consideration by the judicial troika of cases of those arrested after August 1, 1938.

Comrade's request I support Nasedkin.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs General
Commissar of State Security Yezhov

Top secret Minsk

September 18, 1938

MEMORANDUM No. 43074

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Comrade. Ezhov

On No. 37417

The operation by order No. 00485 and others, due to the special contamination in Belarus, was extended by us on the basis of your personal instructions until September 1 of this year. As a result, for August m-c. this year 1,900 people were arrested mainly in order to clear the border strip, the cases on which we have already completed, but cannot be taken to court, since they are filed by order No. 00485.

Due to the fact that the operation was extended especially for Belarus until September 1 this year, I ask permission to consider the cases of all those arrested before September 1 this year at the troika. G.

I ask you to communicate your decision by telegraph.

NASEDKIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 195a-1956. Copy. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the cipher telegram: "For. I. St.

No. 343

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON APPROVAL IN THE CC AUCP(b)

RESPONSIBLE EMPLOYEES

September 20, 1938

57 - On the registration, verification and approval in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Defense Committee, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat of Defense

DOCUMENTATION

551

mentality, the Commission of Party Control and the Commission of Soviet Control.

1. Establish that in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the following senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, the Party Control Commission and the Soviet Control Commission for the military departments of the People's Commissariat of Industry are subject to approval RSFSR, Narkommash and Narkomtyazh:

a) For the Central Office of the People's Commissariats, the CPC and the KSK.

All responsible employees of the central apparatus from senior positions to heads of departments and their deputies, in the People's Commissariat of Defense, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Committee and the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry - to the heads of departments for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and - to the heads of groups and their deputies for the CPC and the CPC, as well as all personal assistants and secretaries of the people's commissars, deputy people's commissars, chairmen of the CPC, the CPC and their deputies.

b) According to the local bodies of the people's commissariats, the CPC and the KSK.

According to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs - people's commissars, deputy people's commissars and heads of departments of the NKVD of the union and autonomous republics; the heads of the regional, regional and district bodies of the NKVD, their deputies and the heads of departments of these bodies; heads of city and district departments of the NKVD.

According to the People's Commissariat of Defense - commanders of troops of districts and armies and their deputies; members of military councils of districts and armies; heads of political departments of districts and armies and their deputies; chiefs and military commissars of headquarters of districts and armies; commanders, military commissars and heads of political departments of corps, divisions, brigades; heads of academies, schools and their deputies; military attaches and their assistants; military representatives at enterprises.

According to the People's Commissariat of the Navy - fleet commanders and their deputies; members of the military councils of the fleets; heads of political departments of the fleets (military flotillas) and their deputies; commanders and military commissars of the air forces of the fleets; commanders, military commissars and heads of political departments of brigades, fortified areas and fortified sectors, aviation brigades, main military ports and ports of the first category, training detachments of fleets and scuba diving; chiefs, military commissars and heads of political departments of the naval academy and naval schools, special courses and research institutes; commanders and military commissars of battleships and cruisers; military representatives at enterprises authorized for shipbuilding and armaments and military commissars under authorized representatives.

According to the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry - trust managers; factory directors; pom. hiring and firing directors; party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at factories; construction managers; directors of universities and research institutes.

According to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs - plenipotentiaries of the USSR; advisers, first and second secretaries of embassies; consuls general of the USSR and consuls of the USSR; authorized by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the Union republics and in the Far East.

According to the Commission of Party Control and the Commission of Soviet Control - authorized commissions of Party and Soviet control for regions, territories, republics and their deputies; secretaries of party collegiums attached to authorized CCPs.

c) For the military department of the People's Commissariat of Industry of the RSFSR, the head of the department and his deputies.

d) For the military department of the People's Commissariat of Engineering - the head of the department and his deputy bodies.

552

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

e) For the military department of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry - the head of the department and his deputies.

2. To oblige the department of leading party bodies of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to organize in the ORPO of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the registration and verification of the above-mentioned employees approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Accounting, verification and approval in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks should be carried out in the following order:

a) first of all, take into account, check, start personal files and submit for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the responsible employees of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, primarily the central apparatus of the NKVD, the departments of the NKVD in the Moscow and Leningrad regions, completing this work within three weeks. Accounting, verification and approval of other employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to be carried out within a month;

b) to complete the registration, verification and approval of responsible employees for other people's commissariats by December 1, 1938.

3. Permit the department of leading party bodies of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to create the following sectors under the department:

a) the sector of employees of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and judicial and prosecutorial employees, with a staff of 15 resp. and 5 tech. workers;

b) the sector of navy workers with a staff of 10 resp. and 4 tech. workers;

c) the defense industry sector with a staff of 15 responsible, 5 tech. workers;

d) the sector of workers of the KPK and KSK with a staff of 3 responsible, 1 tech. workers;

e) the sector of employees of the military department of the People's Commissariat of Industry of the RSFSR with a staff of 3 responsible, 1 tech. workers;

f) the sector of employees of the military department of the People's Commissariat of Industry with a staff of 3 resp., 1 tech. workers;

g) the sector of employees of the military department of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry with a staff of 3 resp. 1 tech. workers.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1002. L. 18-20.

Published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Sat. doc. Comp. O. V. Khlevnyuk et al. M. 1995. S. 42-44.

Protocol No. 64.

No. 344

LETTER N.I. Ezhov to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

I.V. STALIN (87)

September 23, 1938

Top secret

In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. STALIN

I ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to release me from the work of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR for the following reasons:

1. During the discussion at the Politburo on November 19, 1938, the statement of the head of the UNKVD of the Ivanovo Region, Comrade Zhuravlev, fully confirmed the facts stated in it. The main thing for which I bear responsibility is that Comrade Zhuravlev, as is evident from the statement, signaled to me about the suspicious behavior of Litvin, Radzivilovsky and other responsible workers.

DOCUMENTS _553

NKVD officers who tried to hush up the affairs of some enemies of the people, being themselves associated with them in conspiratorial anti-Soviet activities.

In particular, Comrade Zhuravlev's note about the suspicious behavior of Litvin, who in every possible way hindered the exposure of Postyshev, with whom he himself was associated in conspiratorial work, was especially serious.

It is clear that if I had shown proper Bolshevik attention and sharpness to Comrade Zhuravlev's signals, the enemy of the people Litvin and other scoundrels would have been exposed a long time ago and would not have occupied the most responsible posts in the NKVD.

2. In connection with the discussion of Comrade Zhuravlev's note at the meeting of the Politburo, other, completely intolerable shortcomings in the operational work of the NKVD organs were revealed.

The main lever of intelligence - intelligence work turned out to be badly put out of hand. Foreign intelligence, in essence, will have to be created anew, since the INO was littered with spies, many of whom were residents abroad and worked with agents set up by foreign residents.

Investigative work also suffers from a number of major shortcomings. The main thing here is that the investigation with the most important detainees in many cases was carried out by conspirators from the NKVD who had not yet been exposed, who managed in this way not to give a turn to the case at all, to extinguish it at the very beginning and, most importantly, to hide their accomplices in a conspiracy from the workers of the Cheka.

The cadres turned out to be the most neglected section in the NKVD. Instead of taking into account that the conspirators from the NKVD and the foreign intelligence services associated with them managed to recruit not only the top of the Cheka, but also the middle level, and often the grass-roots workers, for at least ten years, I calmed down that I defeated the top and some of the most compromised mid-level workers. Many of the newly nominated, as it now turns out, are also spies and conspirators.

It is clear that I am responsible for all this.

3. The most serious omission on my part is the revealed situation in the department for the protection of members of the Central Committee and the Politburo.

Firstly, there remained a significant number of unexposed conspirators and simply dirty people from Pauker.

Secondly, Kursky, who replaced Pauker, who subsequently shot himself, and now arrested Dagin also turned out to be conspirators and planted a considerable number of his people into the guard. I trusted the last two chiefs of the guard as honest people. Made a mistake and should be held accountable for it.
ness.

Without touching on a number of other shortcomings, such is the general state of operational-Chekist work in the People's Commissariat.

Without touching on a number of objective facts that, at best, can somehow explain the poor work, I want to dwell only on my personal fault as the head of the People's Commissariat.

First: It is quite obvious that I did not cope with the work of such a huge and responsible People's Commissariat, did not cover the entire amount of the most complex

intelligence work.

My fault is that I did not raise this question in all its acuteness, in the Bolshevik way, before the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in time.

Secondly: My fault is that, seeing a number of major shortcomings in my work, moreover, even criticizing these shortcomings in my own People's Commissariat, I did not simultaneously raise these questions before the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Satisfied with

554

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

he floundered alone, trying to straighten things out with his successes, glossing over his shortcomings. It was hard to straighten out - then I was nervous.

Thirdly: My fault is that I often approached the arrangement of personnel in a businesslike manner. In many cases, politically distrusting the worker, he delayed the issue of his arrest, waited until another one was selected. For the same businesslike motives, he made a mistake in many workers, recommended them to responsible posts, and they are now exposed as spies.

Fourthly: My fault is that I showed a completely unacceptable carelessness for a Chekist in the matter of decisive cleaning of the department for the protection of members of the Central Committee and the Politburo. In particular, this carelessness is inexcusable in the matter of delaying the arrest of the conspirators in the Kremlin (Bryukhanov and others).

Fifthly: My fault is that, doubting the political honesty of such people as the former beginning. The UNKVD DVK, the traitor Lyushkov and recently the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, the traitor Uspensky, did not take sufficient measures of Chekist precaution, and thus made it possible for Lyushkov to escape to Japan and Uspensky still does not know where, and the search for him continues.

All this taken together makes it completely impossible for me to continue my work in the NKVD.

Once again I ask you to release me from the work of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Despite all these great shortcomings and blunders in my work, I must say that under the daily leadership of the Central Committee-NKVD, he crushed the enemies great.

I give my Bolshevik word and commitment to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and to Comrade. Stalin to take into account all these lessons in his future work, to take into account his mistakes, to correct himself and in any sector where the Central Committee deems it necessary to use me, to justify the confidence of the Central Committee.

EZHOV

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1003. L. 82-84. Copy. Typescript. "Historical Archive" published. 1992. No. I. S. 129-130.

No. 345

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR

September 23, 1938

82 - Question of the NKVD (PB dated 13 IX. 38, pr. No. 64, p. 8).

1. To change the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 13, 1938 (pr. No. 64, paragraph 8), to approve the following structure of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR:

Office

- 1) Main Directorate of State Security.
- 2) Main Economic Department.
- 3) Main Transport Administration.
- 4) Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops.
- 5) Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia.
- 6) Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.
- 7) Main Directorate of Highways.
- 8) Main Fire Department.
- 9) Main Prison Department.

DOCUMENTATION

555

- 10) Main Archive Department.
- 11) Office of the Commandant of the Kremlin.
- 12) Administrative and Economic Department.
- 13) Administration for Construction in the Far East (Dalstroy).

Independent departments and sectors that are not part of the Directorates

- 1) 1st Special Department - operational accounting, registration and statistics.
- 2) 2nd Special Department - operational equipment.
- 3) 3rd Special Department - surveillance, installation, arrests.

4) Central department of acts of civil status.

5) Central financial and planning department.

6) Personnel department.

7) Resettlement department.

8) Specially authorized NKVD of the USSR.

9) Department of special design bureaus.

10) Bureau for the receipt and consideration of complaints.

11) Boiler Supervision Inspection.

12) Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR.

2. Approve the following structure of operational security departments:

a) The Main Directorate of State Security as part of departments:

1st department - Protection of the Government.

2nd department - Secret political.

3rd department - Counterintelligence.

4th department - Special Department of the army and navy.

5th department - Foreign.

6th department - Paramilitary organizations (police, fire brigade, Osoviahim, district military registration and enlistment offices, sports societies, etc.)

7th department - Special department.

b) Main Economic Department as a part of departments:

1st department - Defense industry.

2nd department - Heavy industry and engineering.

3rd department - Light, food, forestry and local industries.

4th department - Agriculture and procurement.

5th department - Trade, cooperation and finance.

c) Main Transport Department as a part of departments:

1st department - Railway transport.

2nd department - Water transport (including the Glavsevmorput).

3rd department - Communications, highway construction and civil air fleet.

3. Approve the head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR comrade.
Beria L.P.

4. Approve the deputy head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR comrade.
Merkulova V.N.

5. Propose to the NKVD of the USSR, together with the Department of Leading Party Organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, within five days, to submit for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the candidacies of the heads of the Economic and Transport Departments and the candidacies of the heads of departments of these departments.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 72-74. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 64.

55.6

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 346

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION of Comrade VYSHINSKY"

September 26, 1938 95 -
Question from Comrade Vyshinsky.

Put the Japanese Kishima Saburo on trial for espionage and publish it
in the press.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 255. L. 47. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 64.

No. 347

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova and L.P. BERIA I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF INVESTIGATORY MATERIALS
ON M.E. KOLTSOVA (88)

September 27, 1938

No. 109103
Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

We are sending you a certificate on undercover and investigative materials on KOLTSOV (FRIDLAND)
Mikhail Efimovich, a journalist.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR EZHOV Head of
the GUGB UTB NKVD USSR BERIA

REFERENCE

KOLTSOV (FRIDLYAND) Mikhail Efimovich - journalist, member of the CPSU (b), deputy
of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

KOLTSOV was born in 1898 in the city of Bialystok (Poland) into the family of a merchant exporting
leather abroad.

From the beginning of 1917, KOLTSOV collaborated in St. Petersburg in magazines.

According to intelligence data, in the summer issues of the St. Petersburg magazine for everyone
(1917), a number of articles by KOLTSOV were published with attacks on the Bolsheviks, on
Lenin.

In 1918-1919. KOLTSOV collaborates in the newspaper of a pronounced counter-
revolutionary trend "Kievskoye Ekho". The content of Koltsov's articles of that period is
characterized by "pity" for the enemies of the revolution, savoring the "cruelty" of the Bolsheviks, and
libelousness.

In No. 1 of Kiev Echo of January 13, 1919, in an article entitled "Pity", KOLTSOV wrote:

"The families of the convicts or those being shot themselves crawled at the feet of the Red Army
soldiers, wept, tore their hair, begged for mercy and pity. In these cases, the execution was especially cruel
and amazing.

"I was in Moscow: I had to finish off for a feuilleton about the state of emergency, printed in one of
the Moscow newspapers. I spent fifteen eerie and stuffy minutes at the Lubyanka.

DOCUMENTATION

557

In the same "Kiev Echo" dated February 3, 1919, KOLTSOV wrote:

"I happened to see the first Chinese Soviet detachments. Spacious barracks near Sparrow Hills.
Rows of rifles, low-cropped heads. Communist proclamations on the walls. Portrait of Lenin. Oblique
eyes. High, shrill Asian laughter.

This is very sharp and unheard of - a combination of eastern "victorious" exoticism with long-
range reinforced concrete European communism.

Just as casually and diligently, as the yellow Red Army men washed their hard round heads in the
mornings, they (the implacable, advancing Chinese) now went to the Volga, to the Ukraine, they shoot
at black unfamiliar houses, devastate the shrines of unfamiliar and unnecessary gods.

In 1921, being sent by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Prague to work in the
Novy Put newspaper, KOLTSOV received letters from the Cadet journalist POLIA-

KOVA-LITOVTSSEV, met with White émigré journalists, in particular with Pyotr PILSKII.

In 1930-1931, under the influence of criticism in connection with the "green famine", KOLTSOV was in opposition:

"He fluctuated to the right. It was then that I met MARETSKY, who had returned from exile, at Koltsov's. KOLTSOV spoke well of him, saying that MARETSKY was in great need. KOLTSOV often talked about hunger, discontent and unrest among the peasants in connection with the excesses in the collective farm policy.

In connection with the arrests of the enemies of the people ANTONOV-OVSEENKO and others, KOLTSOV expressed great confusion and confusion.

"On February 7th, KOLTSOV declared with a depressed look: there are more arrests. BELOV, VIKTOROV, TKACHEV were arrested. A few days ago I went skiing with RABICHEV and TKACHEV - one shot himself, the other was arrested.

Displaced DYBENKO and EGOROV. It's so annoying that they don't even post. Egorov was kept in a high position for loyalty, and not for military talents. People take everything and take it."

In the winter of 1937-1938. Passing by SEREBRYAKOV's dacha, KOLTSOV said with regret and sadness:

"Yes, SEREBRYAKOV tipped over. Now he doesn't need anything else: no dacha, no plot, no garden, no playground.

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs offers me a dacha from those that have been confiscated, but I don't want to take it. I can not. It may be quixotic, but my scrupulousness does not allow me to accept as a gift what is taken from another in this way.

After his arrival from Spain, KOLTSOV said:

"When I arrived here, I literally felt on my shoulders how difficult the situation was. It used to happen that you ask about a person, how he is doing, where does he work? Now, alas, I immediately learned to apply this sad formula: "Is he all right?".

"Now is the time. That for the next two months it's better to sit at home and not meet with anyone, by that time everything will be settled, the arrests will subside."

Speaking of the situation in Spain, KOLTSOV declared:

"Now the Spanish Communist Party is losing its leading role, is beginning to lose its authority and will lose more and more in the near future. Among the foreigners fighting in the ranks of the republican army, these rumors of arrests in the USSR cause hesitation."

Referring to foreign writers, KOLTSOV says that "very many of them (Vauger Martin Du Gard, Jules Romain and others) turn their backs on A. GID as a result of recent arrests in the USSR."

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Feuchtwanger is now much worse off than when he wrote his book on the USSR. He was influenced by the facts of arrests in the USSR.

In our country everyone is subject to conjuncture, especially in relation to foreign writers. They are approached as our "law-abiding". With such a policy, we have lost all our friends. In fact, the Central Committee brought up this spirit."

On November 4, 1937, a convicted member of the anti-Soviet right-wing organization ANGAROV testified that KOLTISOV created an unfavorable environment for foreign writers coming to the USSR and influenced some of them in an anti-Soviet direction.

"During the arrival of Romain Rolland in the USSR, APLETIN came to me on behalf of KOLTISOV, who stated that KOLTISOV asked not to interfere in the activities of AROSEV in meeting and setting up ROLLAND.

AROSEV, on the other hand, created impossible conditions for the meeting and stay of R. ROLLAND in the USSR. KOLTISOV, asking not to interfere in this matter, gave a line of counter-revolutionary behavior in this matter.

During André GIDE's visit to the USSR, I met with KOLTISOV, who told me how he planned to organize the acquaintance of this "distinguished traveler" with the country. This plan, in essence, isolated A. ZHIDA from the Soviet people and placed him in an environment of people who could give a wrong idea about the country. "Look," added KOLTISOV, what he would write about us after all this. While traveling around the USSR, A. ZHIDA, as is known, had a number of incidents, in particular, in Gori."

(From the testimony of ANGAROV)

In an intelligence report dated March 20, 1938, on this issue, there is:

During A. GID's stay in the USSR, M. KOLTISOV was attached to him, who, together with his wife M. OSTEN, traveled with A. GID almost throughout the entire Union.

Watching A. GID during his stay in the USSR, I saw with what admiration and enthusiasm A. GID spoke of the USSR.

And suddenly, upon returning to France, the ZhID wrote a number of books in an anti-Soviet spirit.

I have a suspicion that M. AUSTEN and A. KOLTISOV did not then treat Gide in such a spirit that he, having arrived in France, wrote the anti-Soviet book "Return from the USSR".

In connection with his book on GORKY KOLTISOV said:

"In our country, in general, lately they want to smooth, slick GORKY, but I don't want to do this, he was not at all as obedient as he is now portrayed. But now you really need to write carefully."

Telling his impressions about the process of the Right-Trotsky bloc,

KOLTSOV said:

"Just think, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars RYKOV was a correspondent for the lousy Socialist Vestnik and staked on the unfortunate DAN. Or CHERNOV, one of the very important state officials. He goes abroad for the first time for one month and manages to be recruited, carefully fill out spy forms, get the nickname "Reingold" and all this, out of haste, in a few days. In Moscow, RAIVID comes to CHERNOV, calls him "Rheingold" like a dog, and our People's Commissar -

DOCUMENTATION

559

seam handles. Or RAKOVSKY. Leaving Tokyo for 8 days and fast
becomes a Japanese spy."

Concerning KOLTSOV's work, Pravda contains the following intelligence reports:

"In the article on Uchpedgiz and the publication of textbooks (the article was published on March 19 in Pravda), KOLTSOV omitted one passage in which the responsibility for the poor situation with textbooks was essentially shifted to the Central Committee. It turned out that bad textbooks are not revised because a firm course has been taken towards a stable textbook.

"I am an idiot," says KOLTSOV, in the daytime I am writing a Spanish diary, and in the evening by night in Pravda. I was also offered to work in the Central Committee in the Writers' Union, but there are no fools, you'll break your head there, it's better in Pravda - it's quieter here.

In connection with the decree on rewarding the Papaninites, one worker in the information department of Pravda suggested that an article by OSTALTSEV be published on how the Papaninites were removed from the ice floe. Rejecting this proposal, KOLTSOV threw out with malicious irony:

"Everything has already been said about the Papaninites, only the glorious Soviet intelligence, if they had taken up this matter, would have discovered something new here too."

Ironically, in connection with the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, KOLTSOV said:

"Obviously, the masses of the people do not know KOLTSOV, and therefore he was not sent to the Supreme Soviet. After all, the people themselves chose us and chose those whom they know."

"Immediately, KOLTSOV giggled and joked about the position in which the deputies to the Supreme Soviet found themselves after STALIN in his speech promised to feel them too."

According to a number of intelligence reports, KOLTSOV was repeatedly present when his brother, the artist Boris EFIMOV, expressed undisguised anti-Soviet sentiments and views.

In a conversation with one of our sources, which took place in January of this year, KOLTSOV expressed slanderous fabrications about the leaders of the party and government.

Undercover reports KOLTSOV is characterized as a person who shows his sympathy for people "depending on the political weather."

KOLTSOV at one time gave AVERBUKH his book with the inscription: "To the commander of the squadrons of the proletarian word."

Now KOLTSOV is unbalanced by the fact that his former second wife, Maria von OSTEN, who was with him in Spain, fled from there with the German BUSH to France, allegedly because of fear of reprisals against her by the republican government.

Maria von OSTEN, the daughter of a major German landowner, who has been in a number of countries and parties, is a Trotskyist. KOLTSOV met her in 1932 in Berlin. Upon arrival in Moscow, Austen cohabited here with film directors, artists, and German writers (most of them were arrested as spies).

KOLTSOV continues to maintain correspondence with AUSTEN and, according to intelligence data, through it he tried to influence Feuchtwanger, persuading him not to come to the USSR, due to an unsuitable situation.

Before leaving for Spain, AUSTEN and KOLTSOV visited Erwin PISKATOR, who is now abroad, to whom AUSTEN, according to intelligence data,

560

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

nym arranged meetings with RADEK being close to the latter. PISKA TOR is now in America, where he allegedly went over to the Trotskyist camp.

KOLTSOV patronized the actress NEJER Karolla, who arrived from Berlin in 1934 (she was shot as a spy), after the arrest of her husband, a former White émigré officer who had fled to Germany, who had moved with her and fled to Germany. KOLTSOV took NEIER to work in the editorial office, paid her increased fees.

According to the party organization of the Khabarovsk branch of Benzokladstroy, in 1935 KOLTSOV sent a positive review to Khabarovsk to the well-known Trotskyist I.A. FELDMAN, who was later exposed and arrested.

KOLTSOV hired a relative of BRONSTEIN, who had recently been arrested, to work for Pravda.

KOLTSOV's brother, FRIDLAND Ts., was repressed by the NKVD as an enemy of the people.

Arrested Trotskyist LEONTIEV G.K. showed that KOLTSOV united a conspiratorial Trotskyist group of writers around him and tried to promote them in Pravda, in Krokodil and Ogonyok. A salon was organized at KOLTSOV's apartment in the government house, where

writers were selected: B. LEVIN, V. GERASIMOV, LUGOVSKOY, S. KIRSANOV, M. KOLOSOV, M. SVETLOV and others.

"KOLTSOV was an unspoken center around which people united who were dissatisfied with the policy of the party in general and the policy of the party in the field of literature in particular.

Meetings and conversations in Koltsov's salon had a very definite political orientation. Criticism of the existing order in literature, in general political life, in the editorial board of Pravda—that was the usual thread of communication. These meetings also took place in Koltsov's absence, but when he was at home, the direction of the conversation did not change at all, but only became more acute.

Further, in her testimony, LEONTIEVA speaks of a politically harmful line in the press, carried out by KOLTSOV.

"The life and customs of the group and, if I may say so, the "working credo" consisted in pumping out as much money as possible for that "reading" and "essay dregs" - which were printed and under which it was impossible to "undermine in a political sense.

Such an adaptation, instead of a single clear political line, was carried out on a larger scale by KOLTSOV in Pravda. Proceeding from his political application, the fear of "missing the mark", KOLTSOV ignored numerous signals about the corruption or crimes of the party and Soviet elite in a number of territories and regions, told me in several cases of this kind that even a remote hint in a feuilleton of responsibility this or that well-known party worker for any disgrace - is unacceptable, deflected blows in the most egregious cases from various people he needed or known - for a long time Pravda was put in the position of an organ stating facts of this kind only after the decision of the Central Committee or revelations of the NKVD.

In the name of this political adaptation and the fear of its own failure, the feuilleton section of Pravda was excluded from criticism, and a plan of feuilletons on abstract topics was outlined in advance for entire blocks, which served as a screen separating the newspaper from real life. The topics were: about love, about friendship, about devotion, about duty and others.

DOCUMENTATION

561

All these topics were distributed among the same members of the group, people whose moral and political character very little corresponded to the high civic concepts that they had to operate with.

Head of the 4th Department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD
Senior Major of State Security KOBULOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 366. L. 55-64. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten resolution: "Summon Koltsov. St.".

No. 348

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. BERIA I.V. STALIN AND V.M.
MOLOTOV ON THE CLOSING OF THE CHURCH
AND THE REMOVAL OF THE BELLS (89)

September 30, 1938

No. 109142

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
Comrade. STALIN comrade. MOLOTOV

The Nekrasovsky district executive committee of the Yaroslavl region decided to close the church and remove the bells in the village of Chernaya Zavod.

To implement this decision, the following arrived in the village: the secretary of the district committee of the CPSU (b) GORIAEV, the chairman of the district executive committee MEZENEV, the head of RAIFO BAKANOV and the Tsvetmetallom brigade.

At the same time, a group of clergymen gathered a crowd of 500-600 people, who, standing at the church, categorically declared to those who arrived: "We will not let you remove the bells, and if you dare to start removing the bells by force, then we will inflict reprisals."

At the slightest attempt by representatives of the district to approach the church, a movement began in the crowd and provocative cries were heard: "Sentry, beat, rob", "drunk bandits have arrived", "beat them", etc.

Active cleric BAULIN K.P. from the porch of the church, she called on the faithful to arm themselves with axes and pitchforks and drive out all those who came, and if they press, then cut them all down.

Having met organized resistance, the representatives of the district became confused and called a doctor to testify that they were not drunk. When this did not help, the representatives of the district left the village amid whistling, shouting and clapping their hands.

After their departure, clergymen and believers organized round-the-clock duty of 50-60 people at night and 10-15 during the day and constant monitoring of the road from the regional center near the church. As soon as the observers discovered a car coming from the area, a cry arose, the peasants abandoned their field work and ran to the church.

After the speech described above, the district executive committee revised its decision - the church decided not to close, but to remove only the bells. The chairman of the district executive committee again went to the village of Chernaya Zavod to get the consent of the church twenty to remove the bells, but did not receive such consent.

The leaders of the district are to blame for this whole matter, who did not conduct any preliminary explanatory work among the population, and

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD, 1937-1938

They started holding the event exclusively by administrative means, informing only the rural activists about the upcoming removal of the bells.

It turned out that the churchmen were aware of the proposed closure of the church and the removal of the bells in advance, and they organized a tour of the believers from house to house with an appeal to resist.

The administration of the NKVD in the Yaroslavl region sent a responsible operational officer to the place to carry out the investigation.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 60. D. 23. L. 100-102. Script. Typescript.

Published: Novaya Gazeta. May 6–12, 2002

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Malenkov. Please check and report the results. I. Stalin.

ÿ349

CODE TELEGRAM K.I. FILIPPOVA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT
ELIZARIEV

October 6, 1938

No. 1205/sh From Irkutsk Top
secret

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

At plant 104, a large counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist group headed by the director of the plant, Elizariiev, was uncovered. The group disrupted the plant's defense program, disabled equipment, and produced substandard products.

I ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to dismiss the director of the plant, Elizariiev, and appoint a new director.

Secretary of the Irkutsk Regional Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks FILIPPOV RGASG11. F. 558. Op. I. D. 65. L. 126. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "T-shu Beria. What's the matter here? I. St>.

No. 350

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON ARRESTS, PROSECUTOR'S SUPERVISION
AND INVESTIGATION"

October 8, 1938

141 - On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation.

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Yezhov (chairman), Beria, Vyshinsky, Rychkov and Malenkov to develop within 10 days a draft resolution of the Central Committee, Council of People's Commissars and the NKVD on a new setting on the issue of arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1002. L. 37. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 64.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Beria, Vyshinsky, Rychkov, Malenkov*."

DOCUMENTATION

563

No. 351

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova and L.P. BERIA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE ARRESTS OF THE WIVES OF "TRAITORS TO THE HOMELAND"

October 15, 1938

No. 109173

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

At the suggestion of the NKVD of the USSR, on July 5, 1937, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to repress the wives of exposed traitors to the motherland, right-Trotskyist spies.

On the basis of this decision, the NKVD of the USSR issued order No. 00486 of August 15, 1937, providing for the arrest of the wives of traitors to the motherland, members of the Right-Trotskyist espionage and sabotage organizations, convicted by the military collegium and military tribunals in the first and second categories, beginning from August 1, 1936. Subsequently, it was proposed to arrest the wives of traitors to the motherland simultaneously with their husbands, in accordance with the developed procedure. The arrested wives were then subjected to imprisonment in a forced labor camp, deportation for a period of 5 to 8 years, and so on.

Over the past period, according to incomplete data, more than 18,000 wives of arrested traitors were repressed, including over 3,000 in Moscow and about 1,500 in Leningrad.

In the future, we consider it expedient to repress not all the wives of convicted traitors of the homeland of Right-Trotsky spies, but only those of them:

a) who were aware of or contributed to counter-revolutionary work

their husbands;

b) in relation to whom the NKVD authorities have data on their anti-Soviet sentiments and statements and which can be considered as politically dubious and socially dangerous elements.

We are planning measures to strengthen undercover coverage of the sentiments of connections, etc., wives and other members of the families of repressed enemies of the people. We ask for your instructions.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR EZHOV
Head of the Main Directorate of State Security BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24.
D. 366. L. 78-79. Script. Typescript.

On the second sheet there is a handwritten note: "To T-shcham Yezhov and Beria. Right. I. Stalin.

No. 352

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. BERIA I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT S.A. SMOLENSK

October 16, 1938

No. 109244

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

Smolensky Semyon Abramovich - Deputy. The trade representative supported spies and bribe-takers-defectors Illumyatsky, Chlenov, Schweitzer, Meyerzon in Germany. Overpaid 3 million marks for 30 trawlers. Rosengolts protege, Kandelaki.

564

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Smolensky kept Kandelaki's package, which contained a check for 30 thousand dollars.

Revealed by Loganovsky.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR BERIY AP RF. F. 3.
Op. 58. D. 255. L. 49. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the sheet: "T. Beria. For arrest. Arrest to make in Moscow. I. Stalin.

No. 353

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. Berii I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL B.D. BERMANA (90)

October 21, 1938

No. 109301

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the protocol of interrogation of BERMAN to BD. October 13-14 this year

Berman BD. testified about a meeting of representatives of foreign intelligence services in 1938 and about the nature of the activities of these intelligence services in the USSR, which he learned about from a "liaison officer" of German intelligence.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

DB. BERMAN on October 13-14, 1938.

Question: What instructions did you personally receive through German intelligence?

Answer: I will not repeat here all those conclusions that flowed, as indications, from all previous meetings, described by me in my earlier testimony. I will stop at the last meeting, where the liaison officer, on behalf of his leaders, that is, HITLER and GOERING, as if summed up what was left of their organization in the USSR, what mistakes were made and how they are planning and conducting work in the USSR now.

In 1938, when exactly he did not say, in Germany in a secluded place, somewhere in the Harz region, a very secret meeting of representatives of several foreign intelligence services was taking place - only on the issue of fighting the USSR. This meeting was, as it were, a continuation of the ongoing negotiations between the staffs. Negotiations, which by that time had already taken real forms, that is, real results, were a conspiracy against the USSR. It was stipulated in advance that the work of foreign intelligence services in other countries would not be the subject of discussion and trial. Thus, the "allies", as it were, deliberately turned a blind eye to the work of each other's intelligence services - if only to agree on this issue against the USSR.

At the meeting there were confidants - who came to Germany incognito - from the Poles, Japanese, Germans, British, Italians and French. What conclusions did they come to, assessing the situation in the USSR, past processes and extensive operations in the USSR on all kinds of counter-revolutionaries?
elements.

1. The situation in the USSR, that is, the conditions for the work of intelligence services in the USSR, has changed radically in favor of the USSR. What's over the so-called op

DOCUMENTATION

positional groups of the Rights, Trotskyists, Zinovievites, and the like—it must be put an end to the fact that a special search for such people who undoubtedly remain is inexpedient, or rather, hardly expedient, that the “banner” of BUKHARIN-TROTSKY-ZINOVEV is so hated in the USSR that people who want to fight the current regime will not go under this “banner”. As an additional argument for this, the fact was taken that at the trials, and indeed in the NKVD, there were no people who did not confess. No one wants to get in touch with groups or organizations that will certainly extradite you to the NKVD tomorrow.

The question of what organizational forms to give to the new groups, what program to equip them with, was the main question over which the participants in the meeting struggled. They are very well aware that the NKVD is carried away by investigative work, that in this investigative work a fair number of mistakes have been made or deliberate strikes against non-enemies, and that, as a rule, the NKVD has lost that good part of the network that could be useful. The main thing that is staked on is that while the NKVD does not conduct any serious undercover work, it is necessary to build, create new groups and organizations before the war, which in no case should be connected with the old ones - permanently located under threat of destruction. Large-scale organizations in which each participant almost knows everyone else, and knows terrorist, sabotage, espionage and other lines - such forms of work must be abandoned. Representatives of the British simply ridiculed it. All representatives of the intelligence services spoke out without giving names, addresses and other especially conspiratorial things, in the sense that many of their residency groups, in whole or in part those that were not connected with broad organizations, remained in the USSR. Some are destroyed, some are only battered. Units were torn out of them. More than that, it was also said about the strange fact that the valuable technical property of foreign intelligence services in the USSR - all sorts of secret inventions put into the service of intelligence for terror, and mainly for all kinds of sabotage - remains untouched by the NKVD*. They explain this by the fact that either the NKVD, having no agents at all, does not know about it, or knowing something, but does not touch it, develops and eliminates it when it is beneficial for the USSR. All this gave the conference grounds for drawing a firm conclusion: an organization of residency built on truly conspiratorial principles will, at the right moment, be more useful in the struggle against the USSR than a broad but loose organization where everyone knows almost everything. Great hopes are placed on those residencies in the USSR that the NKVD has not touched.** Foreign intelligence officers are extremely pleased with this circumstance. These residencies are strictly conspiratorial, many of them are mothballed until a decisive moment and, in the opinion of an intelligence officer, they can only be encountered by chance through an investigation. When I told the liaison officer that I did not understand and did not share his optimism, he answered me that the NKVD was not touched not only by the newly created residencies, created in recent years, but that very many residencies created ten or more years ago, are well. He said that now it is incomparably more difficult to deliver to the USSR all kinds of mechanisms, apparatus for residencies, but that which was exported to the USSR at one time, mainly through diplomatic institutions, is overwhelmingly safe and sound. Now it is possible to import the necessary equipment to the USSR only in a form disassembled to details and only in parts. Many secret laboratories work exclusively on the invention of portable mechanisms, apparatuses, and the like, without prejudice to

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

their destructive power. In this regard, he spoke of the great importance for them to acquire people from special technical universities, people who are technically literate. When he spoke about conspiracy, about the big gaps in the NKVD's intelligence work, and that for the time being this circumstance would create good conditions for the work of foreign intelligence services, he pointed out that it was an indisputable fact, unanimously recognized by all, that this was a danger to foreign intelligence agents from from the side of the whole people, from the residents of cities and villages. The desire among the people to catch a spy is so great that one of the scouts who will neglect this *** will perish. This has already greatly complicated the work of intelligence.

In passing, so as not to forget, I will say that the British, without naming anything specific, referred to the fact that they even retained the old pre-revolutionary agents. The French, who nevertheless somehow isolated themselves (either did not attend all the meetings, or in a different form), were learned, forced to admit that, objectively, their conditions for working in the USSR are better than those of the rest meeting participants. This fact was considered very important, since French intelligence was involved in the general struggle of the aggressor countries against the USSR. Under the wing of the intelligence of "democratic" France, much more can be done against the USSR than by hiding behind the many diplomatic passports of the Germans, in any case. At this meeting of the French, their intelligence, obviously connected primarily with officers from the General Staff and that part of the big capitalists who are against rapprochement with the USSR, practically included in the general plan a conspiracy of war and intelligence work against the USSR. They included them, but with caution, in moderation, still not completely trusting the French, because at this meeting, as one could understand the liaison officer, they were not kept on an equal footing with representatives of other intelligence services.

Taking into account the more difficult conditions for the work of foreign intelligence services in the USSR (compared to what it was a few years ago), they agreed to inform each other in general terms, for example, where, in what region, region, in what industry and what similarly, this or that intelligence has its own serious base, so that other intelligence gets into those places that are most not yet closed. All this in order to preserve and make the most effective use of intelligence forces in the struggle against the USSR.

"In general," I told him, "the reconnaissance farms of Herr Goering and Co." "Not really," he replied. If, for example, the Germans have a real opportunity to infiltrate a defense enterprise where the British consider their base to be more or less strong, the Germans will penetrate and will not refuse this real opportunity. To what extent and in what form did we agree to exchange material about the USSR? The officer did not say anything to me, and as far as I remember, he did not say anything from which it would be possible to draw appropriate conclusions****.

Above, I referred to "herr Goering's farm." This is not accidental, because in the conversation the liaison officer mentioned that GOERING had come to the meeting.

This whole conversation did not proceed in such a way that the liaison officer spoke and I listened. The conversation jumped from question to question and was not in the form of a liaison officer's story, but in the form of posing leading questions to me, on which I approved my opinion, and he developed the idea further, argued it and reinforced it with arguments, referring to the meeting, to GOERING, for experience

bots and so on. For example, I was asked how hard the operations of the NKVD hit all sorts of former officers, such as: large professional old officers, white officers, counterintelligence officers, gendarmes, former

DOCUMENTATION

567

officials of the tsarist and provisional government not in the capital, but also on the periphery. I began to answer at length and said that many had eluded the blows, or you were cunning, or you really knew little. Look, for example, at the civil air fleet - who is arrested there and who is working. Take an interest in other edges and regions. In particular, in the Far East, in Moscow, in Ukraine, and you will see that there are many "choice" people walking freely and will walk for a long time. It is necessary to save these people, and such a directive was given to German agents in the NKVD apparatus. The same directive was given for other intelligence agencies. This was the subject of discussion at a meeting of representatives of foreign intelligence services. It will be very good if all the work of the NKVD will be based on the investigation, then much that is valuable to us Germans will survive. In passing, I will say here that I became interested in the civil air fleet and instructed RADZIVILOVSKY to collect materials, both about the people working there and about the affairs going on there. For me, the purpose and significance of the civil air fleet is completely clear. RADZIVILOVSKY managed to collect only a small part of what is going on there. What is happening there, especially in Moscow, Ukraine and other places, is simply terrible things. There are people working for whom there is little in the NKVD, but who are the worst enemies of both the party and the Soviet state. Large arrests were carried out there, and people were left out of the investigation's field of vision. When I told RADZIVILOVSKY who was arrested there, if such bastards were at large, and whether it was possible to analyze this by numbers, he followed him in agreement with him, which is clear even without this in this example *****.

I saw that the communications officer of the German intelligence was right. About the same picture, I and other NKVD workers saw from the so-called albums - of many territories and regions. Agents of foreign intelligence, who made their way into the NKVD, were diligently, to the point of recklessness, helped by "careerist Chekists". There is no need to say that this alone is harmful and dangerous. The intelligence officer bluntly said that the foreign intelligence services knew this and would do everything through their people to keep it that way. In Moscow, even earlier, I heard what kind of business heaped up in the Urals by the hardened scoundrel DMITRIEV. I did not miss the chance and told the liaison officer that you seem to have done a special job in the Urals. He did not answer the question directly, but asked where DMITRIEV was, I replied that by order he had been assigned to Moscow in Gushosdor and that I was sure that he would not be in trouble.

The meeting discussed the question of work among the youth of the USSR, both Komsomol and all-Union, especially students in higher educational institutions. They know that some young people who are anti-Soviet or under the influence of such people cannot find an exhaustive answer to a number of questions in the life of the USSR. Some of the processes that took place in the USSR are not clear to some, others doubt the process in general or in particular, and so on, that on the periphery certain arrests arouse bewilderment in people of this category, then doubt, and so on.

further, and that the further development of the thought of these people is not being introduced into the right channel, which would unite them all and lead to one common understanding, useful and necessary for the struggle against the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). German intelligence received such data some time ago. They were sent to TROTSKY and some prominent Social-Democrat on the subject that these gentlemen would think and give the "necessary" answer to such similar questions*****.

568

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

In this regard, foreign intelligence services in every possible way collected such questions in the USSR through their agents and transferred them to the "Goebbels laboratory", who is the pastor of TROTSKY and some major social democrats. On this basis, in the "GOEBBELS-TROTSKY laboratory" the question arose of issuing a document that would answer "questions", would go beyond this, that is, a document would be drawn up - something like a program for such people in order to fight against USSR

This question was also discussed at the conference, which I am writing about here, and it was recognized as expedient not only for this environment of young people in the USSR, but also for young people opposed to fascism in capitalist countries: to take such young people into their hands, not to give her the opportunity to go into revolutionary organizations, and ultimately, with the help of TROTSKY and some prominent social democrats, harness them to the shafts of HITLER - a war against the USSR.

B.D. BERMAN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 367. L. 12-27. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "1) Arrest Pugachev. 2) Clear the civilian fleet. 3) In my opinion, Berman (or one of his Russian friends) himself was on intelligence conference in the Harz.

There are marks and resolutions of Stalin on the margins:

* "Enemy equipment (property) remained unaffected?"

** "Who are they? Where are they?"

*** "We need to intensify this desire."

**** "You're lying. You yourself attended the meeting.

***** "Old former people in Moscow, in Dalvost, in Ukraine - to withdraw."

***** "The youth".

No. 354

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. BERIA I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE
APPENDIX OF THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION Y.V. RONISA

October 21, 1938

No. 109305

Top secret

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

'I am sending the protocol of interrogation dated October 17, 1938, of a member of the anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization RONIS Ya.V.

RONIS shows that in 1922 he established a counter-revolutionary connection with the Latvian nationalists and until recently carried out active espionage, counter-revolutionary work. Occupying a number of responsible positions in the Red Army from 1922 to 1929, RONIS led the training of insurgent personnel in the army.

RONIS names a number of participants in the counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyist organization that existed in the ICP, to which he had been a member since 1930. Referring to the terrorist activities of this organization, RONIS shows its role in organizing terrorist groups in Transcaucasia, Voronezh and other cities to prepare terrorist acts against members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR BERIA

DOCUMENTATION

569

PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION
of the accused Yan Vasilyevich RONIS dated October 17, 1938

RONIS Yan Vasilievich, born in 1898, a native of the Andrian estate of the Bauzsky district of the Courland province. (Latvia), Latvian.

Before the arrest, lecturer (associate professor) of the history of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of KIZh.

Question: You are exposed by the investigation that for a number of years you have been conducting active counter-revolutionary work against the Party and Soviet power.

Do you plead guilty to this?

Answer: Yes, I admit it. Indeed, for more than 10 years I carried out active counter-revolutionary work directed against the Party and Soviet power.

Question: When did your enemy activity begin?

Answer: My criminal connection with the Latvian nationalists began in 1922, when in the North Caucasus I worked as a political worker in parts of the North Caucasus Military District.

In 1930, I left Rostov to study in Moscow, was admitted to the ICP, and here I established organizational ties with the rightists, who soon merged with the Trotskyists. From that time on, I waged an active struggle against the party as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization.

In Moscow, I managed to restore my former contacts with a number of workers of the Red Army, from whom I learned about the military conspiracy and took part in it.

Question: Under what circumstances did you establish contact with the Latvian nationalists?

Answer: I established an anti-Soviet connection with the Latvian nationalists in 1922 in Rostov-on-Don with the help of Yakov, my close friend of the DIC MANA, who worked at that time as the head of the regional department. I knew him from Latvia as a student. Ditzmann, in my opinion, was an ardent nationalist, an opponent of the CPSU(b). In conversations with me, DITSMAN made no secret of his counter-revolutionary, nationalist views. In one of the conversations, DITSMAN told me that, apparently, my father would have to be tried for bribery, but the situation could be changed, my father would avoid responsibility if I agreed to give him, DITSMA NU, some information about the army.

Knowing well that my father would have to answer, since he was involved in a dirty campaign of crooks and took bribes, in order to save him, I agreed with Dietzmann's proposal and became a spy.

Some time later, I learned from DITSMAN that there was a Latvian nationalist group, and I agreed with his proposal to be a member of it.
steward.

Question: With which of the members of the Latvian anti-Soviet nationalist organization were you associated?

Answer: The following members of the Latvian organization were known to me from their joint counter-revolutionary activities: DITsMAN Yakov; to Moscow

570

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

flour milling trust, DUNIS - former regiment commander of the 11th Cavalry Division, worked after demobilization in the Moscow Regional Police, EIFERT - former commander of the 13th division of the North Caucasus Military District, now I don't know where he works; ZI-

BERT - former secretary of the CCP of the 28th cavalry division, worked in the conflict commission of the PUR, LAUTSIN - former head of information of the political department of the 220th division, KRUMOVITS (I don't remember who he worked for); STAHL Rudolph (who worked, I don't remember). Where they work now, I do not know**.

Question: What hostile work did you do as a member of a nationalist organization?

Answer: I systematically collected detailed espionage information about combat training, the political and material state of the units of the North Caucasus Military District and transmitted them through DITSMAN Yakov to the Latvian intelligence.

Occupying responsible positions - 1922-1924, worked in PUOKR, 1925 - teacher of the district military political school, since 1925 - executive secretary of the district party commission of the North Caucasus Military District, it was not difficult for me to collect the necessary espionage information. In addition, at various times I recruited for espionage work: SIEBERT, who gave information on the 28th division (Vladikavkaz), LAUTSIN - gave information on the 22nd division (Krasnodar), ROBOTKIN - on the garrison Rostov-on-Don and other parts of the district and ROMANOV - regimental commissar for the 28th division ***.

This is not the end of my hostile activities. I also worked on the creation of rebel detachments.

Even before the war, there were two large colonies of settlers, Latvians and Estonians, in the North Caucasus. In order to prevent the scattering of Latvians among various military units at the time of their call for active service in the Red Army, I, RONIS, *EIFERT* and *DUNIS*, through the command of the district, ensured that the colonists, Latvians and Estonians, did military service not in personnel, and in territorial parts. Since we conducted nationalist propaganda among these changelings, we created insurrectionary cells rather quickly.

Question: In what units were counter-revolutionary insurgent cells created?

Answer: Insurgent cells were created in units of the 11th Cavalry Division in the Cavalry Regiment in the city of Pyatigorsk, led by DUNIS, and in the 22nd Cavalry Division, led by EIFERT.

As far as I know, these rebel nests existed until 1932 and only at the time of collectivization in the North Caucasus were they eliminated by the mass resettlement of national colonies.

I was engaged in espionage activities and training of insurgent personnel until 1929 inclusive, that is, until the moment of demobilization from the Red Army.

Question: Where and in what capacity did you work after demobilization?

Answer: After demobilization, I worked in Rostov-on-Don as head of the organizational department of the KraiKK-RKI and as a teacher at the Komvuz. At the same time, I was preparing to pass the acceptance tests at the ICP.

Question: What kind of counter-revolutionary work did you carry out after demobilization from the army?

Answer: Upon demobilization from the Red Army, I continued to keep in touch with * DIC-

MANOM* and other members of the Latvian nationalist organization

DOCUMENTATION

571

tion, but did not show active anti-Soviet activity. Since moving to Moscow, I again began to actively carry out counter-revolutionary work.

Question: Which of the members of the Latvian nationalist organization did you contact upon your arrival in Moscow in 1930?

Answer: In Moscow, I established contact with an active member of the nationalist organization PAUSER, PECHAK*** and known to me from Rostov-on-Don - SHURP, whom I contacted on the instructions of DITSMANN.

As for PAUSER, I studied together with the latter at the IKP and lived in the same hostel, where I established a connection.

Pechak contacted me in 1932. At that time he taught political economy at the evening department of the IKP. I knew about my participation in the anti-Soviet organization from PAUSER.

Question: What do you know about the counter-revolutionary activities of PAUSER, PECHAK and SHURP?

Answer: Being associated with PAUSER, PECHAK and SHURP through counter-revolutionary work, I am well aware of the following data in relation to each of them.

PAUSER, as a former employee of the ECCI, was in close relations with the leaders of the nationalist Latvian organization, former employees of the Latvian section of the Comintern - KRUMIN, SALNA and others ***.

PECHAK Karl Yanovich, a teacher of political economy, was close to the central leadership of the Latvian nationalist organization (*KRAS TYN*, KRUMIN*, *SALNA*, *STUCCH* and others). In addition, PECHAK was an agent of the Latvian intelligence service and had a large, extensive spy network.

SHURPE Eduard Yurievich - a doctor, worked in the labor protection of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry.

SHURPE grouped several Latvians around him, representing a closely related group. From my conversations with SHURPE and a number of people associated with him, I know that a group of Latvians led by SHURPE pursued terrorist and sabotage goals.

Question: Who was a member of the SURPE group?

Answer: This group, in addition to SHURP, included MERIN, the prosecutor of water transport, GAYLIS, the former director of some technical school, was repeatedly expelled from the party for domestic decay, ZVEY-

NEK - in Moscow he worked in a flour-grinding trust (manager of a mill or warehouse) and PARRE August - in Moscow he studied at the IKP, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. He was expelled from the party for his connection with the Trotskyists, to whom he gave recommendations ***.

Question: What specific counter-revolutionary work was carried out by the SHURP group?

Answer: In 1935, I was invited by Shurpe to an illegal meeting of this group, which took place under the guise of a party in Shurpe's apartment in Moscow at ul. Kirov, house 27, apt. 84. Being by this time aware of the military-fascist conspiracy, I informed the members of the SHURP group about the upcoming armed uprising against the Soviet government and demanded a reversal and intensification of their sabotage and terrorist activities. At the same time, together with SCHURPE, we talked with each one separately (MERIN, GAYLIS, ZVEYNEK and PARRE) and identified the specific possibilities for organizing acts of sabotage. As for terro

572

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

ristic activity, then we agreed with SHURP that he would establish contact with the section of the Lettish riflemen and would act in accordance with the general plan. All members of the SHURP group were in the section of the Latvian riflemen and underwent combat training. I had no information about the further activities of the SHURP group, since by that time I had moved away from this group and was actively involved in the participation of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in the ICP and in the military-fascist conspiracy.

Question: You will be interrogated separately about your participation in the military-fascist conspiracy, but now give evidence, how did you establish contact with the pro-Trotskyist organization in the ICP?

Answer: Entering the IKP in 1930, I made connections with students of GEN KINOIT a, M. BOREVA, V. KOPTIEVSKAYA, S. ALIMOV, and S. BANTKE.

Meeting with this group of people at the apartment of E. GENKINA, I was drawn into general conversations on party topics. I was informed about political groupings in the ICP. ALIMOV, for example, told me about the group of KARAVAEV (former secretary of the bureau of the CPSU(b) collective in the ICP), which at one time supported the line of UGLANOV, and that if I enter the ICP, I should join this group. In the conversations of GENKYN, ALIMOV, BANTKE, BOREVA, they portrayed inner-party relations in a right-wing Trotskyist spirit, and defended the line of the right (BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKY, UGLANOV), and sharply attacked the general line of the CPSU (b), and especially STALIN. A group of rightists (ALIMOV and others) did their best to win me over to their side. But another group - the group of "leftists", in turn, was engaged in the "recruitment" of their supporters. V. TOLMACHEV, D. KIN, VINNIKOV and KHOKHLOV**** reported that the group of "leftists" (LO MINADZE, K. POPOV, D. KIN and others) was right in assessing the general line of the CPSU(b) and internal party relations.

After the 16th Congress, it was noticeable that the two groups of Rightists and "Leftists" (semi-Trotskyists, as they were then called) that were allegedly fighting among themselves in the ICP, somehow drew closer to each other, and attacks by one against the other began

less sharp, there were obvious shifts towards the unification of both groups, and proceeded from the fact that at the 16th Congress the right and the "left" did not attack each other, as it had happened before, and as an example they referred to the content of Syrtsov's speeches and LOMINADZE.

In the autumn of 1930, the historical-party IKP was created (the old IKP was divided into several independent, specialized IKP). During this period, the unification and organizational formation of the counter-revolutionary group among the students and teachers of the historical-party IKP began.

The initiators of the creation of a counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization in the historical-party ICP were KROVITSKY (former instructor of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) Ryabokon (former instructor of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), F. KRETOV (former employee of the organizational distribution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) , D. KIN (teacher of the ICP), 3. FEDOSEEV (student of the ICP) ***.

These persons, connected at that time with SYRTSOV, LOMINADZE, and with the UGLANOV group in Moscow, created support groups or grass-roots cells among the students of the IKP for the right-left block of SYRTSOV-LOMINADZE.

In December 1930, a counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization already existed in the Historical-Party IKP. I, RONIS, was drawn into this anti-Soviet organization by Yan SHIPOV.

DOCUMENTATION

573

Question: Who headed the right-wing Trotskyist organization under the ICP?

Answer: At the head of this organization was a leading group: 3. FEDOSEYEV, RYABOKON, KROVITSKY, F. KRETOV, K. RATNIK, Y. SHIPOV, PESKAREV, ANDRESYAN, F. KSENOFONTOV, ILYIN.

Question: Who was a member of the right-wing Trotskyist group that existed in the historical-party branch of the IKP?

Answer: This group included the following persons: I am RONIS, RAD KOV, ASLANOVA, SIMONOV, LOGINOV, SEREDA, KOSTROMITINOV, SMIRNOV, KHOKHLOV, ABRAMOV, TOLMACHEV, SEREGIN, IONOV, SHACHNEV, FOKIN, ANTROPOV and teachers: D. KIN and D. BAEVSKY. The leading head consisted of RADKOV, FOKIN, SIMONOV, and D. KIN*****.

Question: Who was a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization that existed in other branches of the Historical-Party IKP?

Answer: The counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization of the party building department included: SHIPOV, RYABOKON, KROVITSKY, FEDIN, ANANYIN, FEDOSEYEV, BOGDASAROV, NEFEDOV, PESKAREV, ANDRESYAN, MELKUMOV, SCHMIDT, SIDOROV *****. The leading core of this group: RYABOKON', PESKAREV, ANDRESYAN, FEDIN, and KROVITSKY.

The right-wing Trotskyist group that existed in the department of Leninism included: *FRUG, SILING, RATNEK, MOSHONKIN, URAZOV, ILYIN, PONOMAREV, OVSYANNIKOV. Their leaders were FRUG, RATNEK and ILYIN*.

The right-wing Trotskyist group that existed in the department of history and politics of the Comintern included the following persons: BANDIN, PAUSER, GLOBA, FEDER, SOLOVEIKO, KRUMS, KSENOFONTOV, SIMONOV, GURS KAYA. The leading group consisted of BANDIN, KSENOFONTOV and GLOBA.

Question: How did you know about the personnel of the right-wing Trotskyist groups in the Historical-Party ICP?

Answer: The composition of the leading persons and members of the groups in the departments was known to me as one of the active participants in the organization, as well as from conversations with SHIPOV, RADCOV, ANDRESYAN, FRUG, SERED, who named the persons I have listed. From the words of NIKITIN, PYATKOVSKY, SISASK, and DMITRIEV, I learned that similar anti-Soviet organizations had been set up in the economic, agrarian, and philosophical ICP, but they did not name the participants.

Question: What anti-Soviet work was carried out by the Right-Trotskyist organization outside the ICP?

Answer: The anti-Soviet activities of the right-wing Trotskyist organization were carried out mainly in the universities and factories. For this, the students' pedagogical practice (teaching at universities) and party practice (party education and organizational work at factories) were used. The Right-Trotskyist organization, created in the IKP, sought to create strictly conspiratorial organizations in the universities and enterprises of Moscow, in which those dissatisfied with the general line of the party were involved.

Question: In what universities and enterprises in the city of Moscow were the right-wing Trotskyist groups created?

Answer: I knew that counterrevolutionary groups were created in the following universities: at the Krupskaya Communist University

574

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

(organizers SEREGIN, SIMONOV), at the Communist University of the Workers of the East (organizers FOKIN, ASLANOVA), at the Higher School of the Trade Union Movement (organizer IONOV), at the Moscow Regional Komvuz (organizer SMIRNOV), at the All-Union Communist Institute of Journalism named after Pravda (the organizer was me - RONIS).

The group of VKIZH teachers I created included: POKORNAYA, YAKUBOVICH, NEKHABIN.

Students of the historical-party IKP conducted party practice at all

the largest plants and factories in the city of Moscow and the nearest areas of Moscow. As far as I know, anti-Soviet groups were created by the counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization at the following plants: Dynamo, the electric plant, the automobile plant named after Stalin, brake plant, "Hammer and Sickle", Mytishchi Carriage Works, "Ball Bearing", "Rubber".

In 1932, the program and goals of the right-wing Trotskyist organization in the historical-Party ICP were determined by the platform of the counter-revolutionary group of RYUTIN, IVANOV, GALKIN and others.

In the same year, I learned from RATNEK that our struggle against the Party should not be limited to the creation of underground organizations in universities and enterprises, but that we must move on to more acute forms of struggle, that is, to terror and sabotage at enterprises.

Question: Tell us about it in more detail.

Answer: Within the walls of the Historical-Party IKP, an intensified ideological preparation of listeners, members of the counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization, was carried out for the perception of the idea of terror. The teachers of the historical and party IKP V. NEVSKY, VANAG, I. POPOV, KIN, BAEVSKY, KNORIN, KAREV, RAZUMOVSKY conducted their classes in such a way that they justified the methods and means of struggle of populist groups, socialist-revolutionaries, maximalists in Russia; Blanquists, syndicalists, anarchists - in the West, that is, they justified terror. For example, in his classes NEVSKY openly justified the terror of the Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, arguing that the Bolsheviks allegedly stood on the point of view of using individual terror as a method and means of struggle.

Agitation for the recognition of individual terror as a means of struggle for the anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization was conducted by all possible means. Our hopes that there would be some social force that would turn back the wheel of history within the country have failed, and now the only hope remains for intervention, which will be realized only when groups of people are found inside the country who are ready to start an armed struggle. against Soviet power. Hence the conclusion was that it was imperative to start terrorist activities. Terror must be carried out, first of all, against STALIN and his closest associates.

Question: Give evidence about the terrorist activities of the right-wing Trotskyist organization that existed in the ICP.

Answer: From personal conversations, as well as from the words of SHIPOV, FEDIN, RADKOV and FRUG, I knew the members of the right-wing Trotskyist organization who directly said that it was necessary to prepare terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government, while it was indicated that the main task was to physically eliminate STALIN. The following persons are known to me: RADKOV, FROG, BOGDASAROV, SOLOVEIKO, SHIPOV,

DOCUMENTATION_ 575

FEDIN, KROVITSKY, Urazov, Sereda, Ilyin. I also belong to the named persons - RONIS.

From the words of FRUG and RADKOV, I know that the leadership of the Right-Trotskyist organization attached great importance to the fact that we, students of the ICP, had free access to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Party's MK and to the people's commissariats.

Question: Continue your testimony about the hostile activities of the Right-Trotskyist organization in the ICP, of which you were a member.

Answer: In the autumn of 1932, changes took place in the activities of the counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization of the Historical-Party ICP, which entailed significant changes in its original composition. Many students of the ICP, members of the counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyist organization, were sent to the political departments of the MTS and state farms. The very outline of candidates for sending to the countryside pursued the goal of placing people in such a way that it would be possible to retain their cadres and expand the network of counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organizations in the localities.

According to SOLOVEIKO, I knew that those leaving for the political departments of the MTS and state farms were given directives to organize acts of sabotage using kulak elements for this purpose.

Among other students of the historical-party IKP, I was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to go to the state farm as head of the political department.

I learned from FEDIN and PESKAREV that I, as a member of the counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyist organization, were entrusted with the task of harming the work of the state farms in every possible way; disrupt the plan for sowing, weeding and digging sugar beets; to artificially increase the accidents of tractors and other machines; cause loss of livestock; recruit a kulak element and create insurrectionary detachments against Soviet power.

But my trip to the political department of the state farm did not take place due to circumstances beyond my control. By the decision of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at the end of November 1932, I was sent to work at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.

With the transition to work at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, my connection with the historical-party IKP was maintained only through teaching. Most of the students of the historical-party IKP, who studied with me and were members of the counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyist organization, went to the political departments of the MTS and state farms, as well as to work in the regional and regional party organizations.

In the years 1933-1935, the personnel of the students of the historical-party IKP was quantitatively very insignificant and initially known to me.

In 1933-1937, at the head of the counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization in the Historical-Party ICP were: KNORIN (director of the institute), ANDERSON (deputy director), KARAVAEV (head of the evening department), MAMULIYA (head of the educational department of the evening department leniya), PAUSER, VIKSNE (heads of the educational department in different periods), PONOMAREV (deputy director of the institute for scientific affairs), FEDOSEEV (secretary of the party committee) and students of the IKP BEZAYS and NOVIKOV*****.

As ANDERSON told me, there was a small group of participants in the counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyist organization at the main historical party IKP. The quantitative narrowing of the organization was explained to me by the fact that it is now necessary to involve in the organization such persons who are ready for decisive action, and not for chatter, as was the case in the past,

576

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

and that they decided to intensify work in this respect in the evening department of the Party History and Communist Party.

To my question to ANDERSON why special attention is paid to the evening branch of the ICP, he answered me that these people sit firmly in their places and by the nature of their work, especially in the party apparatus, they can do a lot in recruiting new members of the organization in the party and Soviet apparatus.

Anderson* said, we are now pressing especially hard on party education, on sending our people to district committees of higher education, party education houses at district committees, various courses of the Moscow Institute of Culture, the Higher School of Propaganda, and so on.

<...>*

Interrogated:

Head of the 7th Department of the UTB UNKVD MO
Senior Lieutenant of State Security KOZLIN

Head of the 4th Division of the 7th Division of the UTB Lieutenant
of State Security IZOSIMOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 367. L. 28-66. Script. Typescript.

ÿThe protocol is published in part.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "From Beria, then from Malenkov; N8".

ÿ—ÿ underlined in pencil.

ÿÿall the names in the paragraph are circled and in the margins there is Stalin's resolution: "All should be arrested."

ÿ** all the names in the paragraph are circled and in the margin there is Stalin's resolution: "Arrest"]".

*ÿÿ There is Stalin's note in the margin: "Which Khokhlov is this?"

ÿÿÿÿÿall the names in the paragraph are circled and there is Stalin's resolution in the margin: "For comrade Malenkov."

ÿÿÿÿÿ* There is Stalin's note in the margin: "Which Sidorov?"

in the margins there is Stalin's litter: "Where are they?"

No. 355

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. BERIA I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT M. AKHMETOV

October 22, 1938

No. 109309

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

By order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry Comrade. L.M. KAGANOVICH,
twelve qualified workers left the Karsakpai copper-smelting plant for Pribalkhashstroy to assist in the
development of the units of the Pribalkhash plant.

Among those who left was a Komsomol skimmer AKHMETOV Mombek, born in 1914.

This group of workers was in Moscow at the reception of Comrade. KAGANOVICH L.M.

DOCUMENTATION

577

On the way from Moscow to Pribalkhash on the night of August 8 of this year, Akhmetov stabbed the
sleeping Stakhanovite workers KOKO ZOV, DOSANOV and ASPANOV.

Being arrested, Akhmetov confessed to committing a terrorist act against Stakhanovite workers on
the instructions of a Trotskyist terrorist organization that existed at the Karsakpai copper smelter, in
which Akhmetov was involved in 1937 by KAZAZAEV Tikhon, a shift supervisor at a metallurgical plant.

At the suggestion of KAZAZAEV, Akhmetov joined the group of Stakhanovites who expressed
a desire to go to Pribalkhashstroy in order to carry out a terrorist attack on the Stakhanovite workers
on the way, on the instructions of the organization.

The investigation established that the anti-Soviet Trotskyist organization at the Karsakpay plant carried
out a number of acts of sabotage at the enrichment plant; In February 1938, on the instructions of the
organization, a worker of a machine shop, KANIBAYEV, was killed, who openly accused a member of the
organization of the foreman KUZNETSOV of sabotage.

KUZNETSOV and KAZAZAEV are arrested. The investigation continues.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs
of the USSR BERIA

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 367. L. 67-68. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "The question is: how and where to punish Akhme -
tova." —

ÿ356

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.P. BERIA I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL D.M. DMITRIEV (91)

October 23, 1938

No. 109313

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the testimony of D. M. DMITRIEV, who, before his arrest, held the post of head
of the NKVD Directorate for the Sverdlovsk Region, and before that he worked for a long time in the
central apparatus of the NKVD in the Economic Directorate as an assistant and deputy head of the
Directorate together with MIRONOV.

DMITRIEV named a large number of participants in the conspiracy in the NKVD who had already
been repressed and testified about their involvement in conspiratorial activities: MINAEVA A.M. - now
Deputy People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, who previously held the position of head of the
counterintelligence department of the GUGB and also worked for a long time in the Economic Directorate
of the NKVD together with MIRONOV and DMITRIEV; DENOTKIN - assistant to the head of the
counterintelligence department of the GUGB; AGASA V.S. - Deputy Head of
the Special Department of the GUGB; Z. I. Passova - head of the foreign department of the GUGB;
Gendina S.G. - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, before his arrest, he worked in
the counterintelligence department of the GUGB.

578

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

PASSOV and GENDIN were arrested by us yesterday.

DMITRIEV also testified about suspicious espionage connections between the deputy head of
the counterintelligence department of the GUGB VOLYNSKY and the GAI. These testimonies
confirm the materials we have about VOLYNSKY's involvement in espionage activities in favor of
the Germans. We are checking the materials on VOLYNSKY, and it is planned

to arrest.

DMITRIEV shows about the close relationship of the head of the counterintelligence department of the GUGB Nikolaev N.G. with the enemies of the people SHEBOL DAEV, SOSNOVSKY, LEPLEVSKY, ZAKOVSKII.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs
of the USSR BERIA

TESTIMONY OF DMITRIEV D.M.
dated October 16, 1938

In k.r. The organization of the right in the NKVD of the USSR was involved in me by LG MIRONOV, who was the head of the Economic Department of the NKVD of the USSR, and since 1937 the head of the Counterintelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. This was in March 1935.

We have known each other for a number of years.

Recently, before recruiting, he showed increased attention to me, creating an atmosphere of intimate conversation.

He often called me to his office, and sometimes to his apartment, and talked about work: he discussed with me the current tasks of the Economic Department.

MIRONOV praised Yagoda's personal qualities as the head of the NKVD, declared that he was the best representative of Chekism in the party.

MIRONOV told me that YAGODA values me as an employee, and from his words it turned out that such an attitude towards me is the result of MIRONOV's influence on YAGODA.

All these conversations with MIRONOV flattered me, raised MIRONOV in my eyes as a leader.

After some time, I noticed that MIRONOV was showing a noticeable interest in my political moods.

Mironov's favorite topic was the question of the difficulties of the USSR within the country and abroad.

MIRONOV constantly declared that in the inevitable war with the most aggressive capitalist country, Germany, the USSR would be defeated, as a weaker state, in terms of its internal position.

He usually asserted that success in modern warfare will be decided by the question of bread, which is at the same time the question of the stability of the given state system.

He admitted that the kolkhoz form of economy dominates in the countryside - the main supplier of grain, but believed that in the conditions of war with such an industrial state as Germany, with its high organization and management culture, the kolkhoz form would burst at the seams and crumble. on farms of singles who will begin to revolt against the Soviet state.

The muzhik, said MIRONOV, is a terrible force that will reveal itself on a gigantic scale in the hour of the greatest trials.

In equally negative terms, MIRONOV spoke of the industry

realization of the country, about the military industry, about the technical level of weapons of the RKUA

DOCUMENTATION

579

MIRONOV's position was defeatism. I agreed with his statement calls.

After some time, MIRONOV took a new step in order to reveal his true insides.

On the counter-revolutionary organization in the country and in the NKVD of the USSR

In one of his conversations in March 1935, he deciphered his thesis about internal forces dooming the country to defeat.

He revealed to me that there was a conspiracy of the Right in the country, headed by BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKY.

He spoke about the tasks of the conspiracy pursuing the seizure of power in the country.

He told me that the conspirators had their supporters in the People's Commissariats: in the NKTP, in the People's Commissariat of Light Industry, the People's Commissariat of Finance, in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of State Farms and in a number of other People's Commissariats.

He did not tell me the names of the participants. But from his words, it turned out that the conspirators had cadres of their people in the leading institutions of the country.

MIRONOV informed me in detail about the group of conspirators that operated in the NKVD.

At first, he named only himself and Yagoda as conspirators.

Some time later, he told me that the conspiracy included: AGRANOV, PROKOFIEV, MOLCHANOV, SHANIN, POGREBINSKY, GAY, VOLOVICH, RESHETOV, LEPLEVSKY, FEL'DMAN V.D., BERMAN BD, LYUSHKOV G.S., MINAEV A. .M., DENOTKIN, *ILYITSKY*, KROPOTOV, GUTZAYT, * DAVYDOV AD.*, DEYCH.

In the Economic Department of the NKVD of the USSR, he named as participants in the conspiracy: ID FELDMAN, former assistant to the head of the Economic Department, heads of the ECO departments CHERTOK, LOEV.

On the ground in the system of Economic agencies, MIRONOV called: * MILK VA *. *Rzhavsky* (IVF of Leningrad), MAZO, ORLOV (IVF of the Ukrainian SSR and Stalino), *Tserpitsky* (IVF of the Crimea), WEIZAGER (IVF of Novosibirsk), 'DASHEVSKY* (IVF of Gorkrai), SCHASTLIVTSEV (Urals, under the head of the UNKVD - RESHETOV), ROSENBLUM (IVF Kuibyshev), LISTEN GURT Rafail (IVF Moscow Region).

About the conspirator Berman B.D.

MIRONOV knows BERMAN, no later than since 1927, through joint work in the economic department of the NKVD of the USSR, in which BERMAN simultaneously held positions from the detective to the head of the department.

niya inclusive.

Even at that time, relations between MIRONOV and BERMAN were very close and friendly.

BERMAN was directly involved in the conspiracy in the NKVD of the USSR by L.G. Mironov.

Berman conducts active conspiratorial activity, personally conducting an investigation into the affairs of the rightists and Trotskyists, according to the instructions of G.G. BERRIES.

Major subversive work was carried out by BERMAN during his work in the apparatus of the foreign department of the NKVD of the USSR, I will show about all this in the section on the practical counter-revolutionary work of the conspirators.

ABOUT LUIIIKOV, MIRONOV told me that he was directly involved in the conspiracy by BALITSKY. Then he contacted BERRY.

580

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

It was, if I am not mistaken, in 1931, when LYUSHKOV went to work in the NKVD of the USSR at the same time as BALITSKY, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs.

Prior to this, LYUSHKOV had been personally connected in counter-revolutionary work with BALITSKY in the Ukraine.

In the same place in Ukraine, LYUSHKOV maintained counter-revolutionary ties with LEPLEVSKY, then BALITSKY's deputy.

In Moscow, LYUSHKOV got in touch with DEYCH, with whom he established an exceptional, close relationship, which could be observed by all who came into contact with DEYCH. LYUSHKOV, coming to Moscow from Rostov-on-Don on business trips, spends whole days in DEYCH's office.

YAGODA grew out of LYUSHKOV his main support in the leadership of the NKVD.

The appointment of LYUSHKOV to the post of head of the UNKVD corresponded to Yagoda's desire to give LYUSHKOV a political school of leading regional political work.

LYUSHKOV conducted not only the work of the deputy head of the SPO of the NKVD of the USSR. He directly helped Yagoda in subversive work, by drawing up, on his instructions, orders of the NKVD that met the interests of the right-wing conspiracy.

Constituting a single organization, the right in the apparatus of the NKVD simultaneously divided into separate groups; in the center of each of them was one of the leading rightists, who directly united the members of the

groups.

For example, L. G. MIRONOV, SHANIN, BULANOV, POGREBINSKY, VOLOVICH, PAUKER, CHERTOK, LYUSHKOV were peupped directly around YAGODA.

AGRANOV was closely associated with RADZIVILOVSKY, AGAS, RESHETOV, DEYCH, ZAPORIZHETS.

PROKOFIEV grouped around himself - "DAVYDOVA A.D.", GAY, FEL'DMAN V.D., BALAYAN, STANISLAVSKY, S. POLYAKOV, MAR KARYAN.

The MIRONOV group included: DMITRIEV, B.D.

GAI grouped around him - HUMP, SOUTHERN, SOSNOVSKY, BOGUSLAVSKII, GENDIN, PASSOV.

Leplevskiy I.M. had the same group around him. ("INSAROV", ARROV, USHAKOV and a number of other persons unknown to me).

Members of conspiratorial groups simultaneously maintained connections both within the group and between groups.

I.D. FELDMAN, mentioned above, who was a member of PROKOFIEV's group, was at the same time in direct counter-revolutionary communication with L.G. MIRONOV, whose assistant he was. Then with the whole GAI group and personally with the last one.

CHERTOK, who was extremely closely connected with Yagoda, was also connected with me in counter-revolutionary work, very closely with MIRONOV, Pyotr GUTZAYT, and KROPOTOV.

Chertok for Yagoda was an agent who probed Yagoda's moods.

DAVYDOV A.D., associated with PROKOFIEV, was at the same time in counter-revolutionary connection with L.G. MIRONOV. and MINAEV A.M.

DOCUMENTATION

581

DAVYDOV is an old close acquaintance of MIRONOV. He was his deputy in the department of foreign trade of the economic department of the NKVD of the USSR.

MIRONOV, having left for Tashkent in 1930 to work as the plenipotentiary of the OGPU, takes DAVYDOV with him to the post of head of the border guard. Subsequently, MIRONOV made him his deputy for the KRO of the NKVD of the USSR.

The above-mentioned LOEV was in counter-revolutionary connection, in addition to

MIRONOV with LEPLEVSKY, then with GAI.

LOEV's closeness to LEPLEVSKY and GAI was often a subject of jealousy on the part of MIRONOV, who accused LOEV of insufficient devotion to himself.

I testified above that the head of the EKO UNKVD of Leningrad, MOLOCHONIKOV, and his deputy RZHAVSKY, were participants in the conspiracy.

MOLOCHONIKOV - Mironov's nominee for work in Leningrad.

Fulfilling the tasks of MIRONOV, he did not conduct any operational work in Leningrad.

* RZHAVSKY * - an old worker of economic agencies. At one time he worked in the economic department of the NKVD of the USSR, being in very close personal and political relations with MIRONOV.

Together with * MOLOCHONIKOV * he ruined the work of IVF in Leningrad.

Both of them were brought to counter-revolutionary work directly by MIRONOV, who, having transferred them to work in Leningrad, got in touch with MEDVED, the former head of the Leningrad NKVD, an old experienced conspirator.

MAZO - was the head of the Economy. Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, he was in counter-revolutionary ties with BALITSKY and MIRONOV.

MAZO was called the Ukrainian MIRONOV - to such an extent he copied the methods of MIRONOV's work.

MIRONOV spoke of him as a person who knows how to create authority for himself in the absence of practical work.

ORLOV, head of the economic department of the NKVD of Donbass, was directly involved in the conspiracy by MAZO. According to MIRONOV, ORLOV carried out significant subversive work in the operational work of enterprises in the Donbass.

TSERPITSKY - Head of Economy, Department of Crimea. Involved in the conspiracy directly by MIRONOV, from whom he received practical instructions on counterrevolutionary work. The economic department of the Crimea was in a state of paralysis all the time.

WEIZAGER is the head of IVF in Novosibirsk. He was personally involved in counter-revolutionary activities by MIRONOV.

Failed the KGB work at the enterprises of Siberia.

WEIZAGER told me that he did a great job of glossing over the signals of counter-revolutionary work at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant.

WEISAGER was a rare specimen of a swindler and a liar.

He grouped around himself "his own people" who "would not betray him in case of failure!". One of them is *BREITMAN*.

* DASHEVSKY * - was the head of IVF in Gorky. MIRONOV before

he gave it to me in Sverdlovsk, as head of the KRO and at the same time assistant to the head of the Department.

I knew that DASHEVSKY by that time was already a participant in the conspiracy. I accepted it. About the counter-revolutionary work of DASHEVSKY I will show neither

582

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

same. DASHEVSKY worked for a long time with POGREBINSKY, being an assistant to the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Gorky Territory. He is his right hand in counter-revolutionary work in Gorky.

'SCHASTLIVTSEV * - was the head of the IVF of the Sverdlovsk region under the head of the UNKVD RESHETOV.

To counter-revolutionary work was. attracted by RESHETOV and MIRONOV; kept in touch with both. On the basis of their instructions, SCHASTLIVTSEV carried out tremendous subversive work in the EKO UNKVD, covering up the opening of the largest counter-revolutionary formations of the right at the enterprises of the Urals (the case of the chairman of Vostokostal SEDASHEV, the director of the Chusovoy metallurgical plant DONSKOV, the directors of the Verkhisetsky plant KOLGUSHKIN and GORBUNOV, the director of the Berezniki chemical plant PUCHKOV, the director Plant No. 98 MALYSHEV, director of Uralmashzavod VLADIMIROV and others).

As a result of SCHASTLIVTSEV's counter-revolutionary activities, these rightists, who had groups of accomplices around them, carried out subversive work with impunity for a number of years.

ROSENBLUM - Head of the Economic Department in Samara, and then in Rostov-on-Don. I only know about his counter-revolutionary activities in Samara.

He was involved in the conspiracy by L. G. MIRONOV, who connected him on counter-revolutionary work with the BAK, the former head of the NKVD for the Middle Volga, who was a conspirator.

MIRONOV told me that ROSENBLUM launched significant subversive work at the military factories of Samara, protecting a number of counter-revolutionary formations from exposure and reducing to an empty sound a special procedure for hiring labor at military factories.

LISTENGURT Rafail - Head of the Economic Department of the NKVD Directorate of the Moscow Region.

MIRONOV knew that LISTENGURT served in the police during the hetman period in Ukraine.

Using this circumstance, he involved LISTENGURTH in the conspiracy.

Through LISTENGURT, MIRONOV organized subversive work in operational affairs at the enterprises of the Moscow region - at a military plant

them. Kalinin (gun), at Dynamo, at Trekhgorka and at other factories.

MIRONOV noticeably brought LISTENGURT closer to his life, took him with him on business trips, entrusting him with the most "delicate matters" during investigations (the cases of the Rights and Trotskyists). Speaking at meetings, LISTENGURT spoke of MIRONOV as "the most talented leader of the NKVD", who created a whole school of students, including himself among them.

MIRONOV spoke of LISTENGURT as a valuable conspirator, saying that at the same time he must be firmly held in his hands, otherwise he breaks down.

As an illustration, he cited the case of LISTENGURT in Leningrad, where he was on a business trip with MIRONOV, investigating the cases of rightists and Trotskyists, when LISTENGURT, over the head of MIRONOV and YAGODA, sent the testimony of one arrested person personally to L.M. KAGANOVICH.

This "breach of subordination" evoked such a reaction in YAGODA that he demoted LISTENGURT and sent him to work in the periphery.

MIRONOV, however, did not change his attitude towards LISTENGURT, agreeing with him to go on a joint business trip to the Far East (after Yagoda left the NKVD of the USSR).

DOCUMENTATION

583

I have heard that R. LISTENGURT is now retroactively explaining this whole incident as an indication of the persecution against him by Yagoda and MIRONOV, calling himself a victim of their "counter-revolutionary work."

This is a blatant lie and a disguise.

The practical activities of the conspirators in the NKVD of the USSR

According to MIRONOV, I know that YAGODA maintained direct counter-revolutionary ties with the leaders of the right-wing underground in the USSR in the person of RYKOV and BUKHARIN.

MIRONOV told me that the conspiracy detachment, operating in the NKVD of the USSR, was entrusted with the exclusively responsible tasks of protecting the right underground from exposure and ensuring impunity for it in carrying out counter-revolutionary activities.

"You are, of course, aware," said MIRONOV, "that only the presence of conspirators in the NKVD of the USSR explains the serene existence of the right-wing underground headed by RYKOV and BUKHARIN.

In addition, - added MIRONOV, - whether the conspirators in the NKVD wanted or did not want, the agents systematically received signals about the activities of the right not only in Moscow, but also in a number of regions of the Union, and the iron logic of the struggle imperatively demanded to hide these ends in the water. .

Here, approximately, in such terms, MIRONOV introduced me to the main tactical installation of the conspirators in the NKVD.

He told me that this installation corresponds to a whole sum of measures carried out by the conspirators in their direct work in the NKVD, which is expressed both in jamming signals and in directing strikes of repression from the right underground.

MIRONOV emphasized the role and significance of Yagoda's orders in terms of the subversive work of the conspirators.

Yagoda, in his orders, frankly diverted the NKVD apparatus from the task of fighting and defeating the rightists, without encountering resistance from the mass of the operational staff.

Another important tactical setting of the conspirators in the NKVD was the establishment of direct counter-revolutionary ties with members of the right underground operating outside the NKVD.

MIRONOV here did not mean the conspirators of the central apparatus of the NKVD, who, according to him, apart from YAGODA, MIRONOV and PROKOFIEV, had no connections with the rightists outside the NKVD.

He spoke directly about the leaders of the regional and regional apparatuses of the NKVD - conspirators who established counter-revolutionary ties with the heads of the right underground in the localities, were members of the leading groups - centers that existed there, thus being included in the direct practical counter-revolutionary activities of these centers.

As an example, MIRONOV referred to the Western region, declaring that the head of the NKVD department of the Western region, BLAT, was part of the local regional center of the right. Then he said that in the Sverdlovsk region the head of the UNKVD, RESHETOV, was also a member of the Urals leading group of the Rights.

In July or August 1935, MIRONOV introduced me to the practical counter-revolutionary work of the most active conspirators. At the same time, he said something like the following: "You must understand," said MIRONOV, "that the performance of the functions of a conspiracy cannot be assumed exclusively

584

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

only one operational department of the NKVD, at least the Secret Political Department, which, as you know, is responsible for fighting political parties.

Ensuring the right from exposure is beyond the power of the Secret Political Department alone. That is why practical counter-revolutionary work is especially important in those sectors headed by GAI, MOLCHANOV and myself, that is, along the lines of the Special Department, the Secret Political Department and the Economic Department.